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1This book is about the U.S. military’s overseas operations, both recognized wars 
and clandestine campaigns. Or rather, it is about the  labor required to sustain such 
operations, and the experiences of  people from around the world that do it. For 
the present­ day U.S. military empire is profoundly dependent upon a global army 
of  labor that comes from countries as diverse as Bosnia, the Philippines, Turkey, 
India,  Kenya, the United Kingdom, Sierra Leone, and Fiji.
Such a state of affairs represents a profound shift in how the U.S. fights its wars, 
with social, economic, and po liti cal implications that extend well beyond the bat­
tlefields. Consider the following events that took place a year and a half  after the 
invasion of Iraq. On September 1, 2004, thousands of enraged Nepalese took to 
the streets of Kathmandu. Their target was the small Muslim community in the 
country. By the end of the night the city’s largest mosque, along with a number 
of Muslim­ owned businesses and dozens of labor­ recruiting agencies, had been 
set on fire, and the offices of Pakistani and Gulf­ based airlines ransacked. Seven 
 people died, including three individuals killed by rioters who mistakenly identi­
fied them as Muslims.1
The precipitant of this outburst of vio lence was the execution the previous day 
of twelve Nepalese men by the rebel group Ansar al­ Sunna in Iraq. The men had 
left Nepal a month  earlier, lured by a local recruiting agency with promises of 
employment at a luxury  hotel in Jordan. Instead, when they reached that coun­
try their passports  were confiscated and they  were told that they  were being sent 
to Iraq to work on a U.S. military base for a Jordanian­ based military logistics 
subcontractor, Daoud & Partners. If they refused to go they would be sent back 
1
MILITARY CONTRACTING, 
FOREIGN WORKERS, AND WAR
telling the story of the United states in the world from the perspec-
tive of  labor . . .  remaps our interpretation of empire building by 
demonstrating its deep connection to the migratory routes and 
protean life strategies of the global working class.
— Julie Greene
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to Nepal, still owing thousands of dollars in brokerage fees to the recruiting 
agency. On the way to their destination the convoy was attacked and they  were 
kidnapped. Less than two weeks  later they  were killed, and the execution video 
posted online.2
The twelve men  were in Iraq due to a remarkable change in how the U.S. sup­
ports overseas military operations. Since 2001 it has relied on a legion of private 
military companies (PMCs) that employ workers from around the world. The 
scale of this phenomenon is extraordinary. According to a November 2008 con­
tracting census conducted by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), for instance, 
 there  were more than 266,000 contractors supporting military operations in its 
area of responsibility (AOR), which includes the  Middle East and Af ghan i stan. 
This was just short of the number of troops deployed  there during the same pe­
riod. The total included roughly 163,000  people working in Iraq and 68,000 in 
Af ghan i stan, with the remainder located at vari ous bases and logistics support 
hubs elsewhere in the region.3
 There are several details from this report that are worth highlighting  here. First, 
the data represented only a partial accounting of the U.S. military’s reliance 
on contractors to support operations in Iraq and Af ghan i stan at the time as it 
did not include thousands of private security and support staff working for the 
Department of State (DoS), or  those employed by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), which has also grown more dependent on 
contractors to carry out its reconstruction and development proj ects in recent 
years.4 Second, 2008 was the high­ water mark for military contracting in the re­
gion due to the “surge” in Iraq that began the previous year.5 But it was in no way 
anomalous. As figure 1.1 indicates, the number of contractors working in CENT­
COM stayed above 200,000 from the beginning of 2008— when AOR­ wide cen­
suses  were first tabulated— until late 2010.6 At the end of 2013 nearly 100,000  were 
still at work in the region. The contracting workforce in CENTCOM bottomed 
out at roughly 42,000 in summer 2015. Since then it has increasing again, to more 
than 50,000, as the wars in Af ghan i stan and the  Middle East drag on.
The third point concerns the composition of the contractor workforce. Ac­
cording to the military’s estimate, only 15  percent of contractor personnel in 2008 
 were U.S. citizens. Much more numerous—at 47  percent— were what it refers to 
as Local Nationals (LNs). LNs are citizens of the country in which the work is 
performed, such as Afghan truck  drivers delivering goods to forward operating 
bases (FOBs) in Af ghan i stan. Occasionally military documents also refer to this 
class of workers as Host Country Nationals (HCNs), though this is a rather less 
common term. The remaining contractors— roughly 100,000  people at the time— 
consisted of what the military calls  either Third Country Nationals (TCNs) or 
Other Country Nationals (OCNs), the latter an alternative nomenclature that has 
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gained some ground in recent years. This catch­ all category refers to any work­
ers that are neither LNs nor U.S. citizens. The prevalence of TCN  labor in 2008 
was also not anomalous. As figure 1.1 shows, TCNs have represented roughly 
30–45  percent of CENTCOM’s contract workforce from 2008 to 2019.
The fourth impor tant detail to consider is that just 8  percent of the military’s 
contracting workforce was involved in providing security. This may come as a 
surprise to most readers  because to date writing on military contracting has fo­
cused on companies that provide armed security for convoys, military bases, and 
government personnel such as Department of State employees. Private security 
companies are frequently labeled mercenaries or hired guns by critics, who high­
light their role in the perpetuation of  human rights abuses and killings of inno­
cent civilians.7 One of the most notorious such incidents was the Nisour Square 
massacre in 2007, where Blackwater guards providing security for a U.S. embassy 
convoy shot and killed seventeen civilians in Baghdad. The voluminous academic 
lit er a ture on armed security PMCs tends to be state­ centric and focused on pol­
icy relevance. Prominent themes include the impact security contracting has upon 
state sovereignty and the mono poly of vio lence; analyses of its effectiveness; the 
ethical and moral implications of its use by states; and concerns about states’ abil­
ity to control and hold armed contractors accountable for their actions in war.8
Despite the focus on privatized security in the media and academia, employ­
ees of armed security PMCs have constituted but a fraction of the military’s 
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FigUre 1.1. CENTCOM contracting statistics, 2008–2019
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contractor contingent in the wars in the  Middle East and Af ghan i stan. In late 2008, 
for example, over 75  percent of CENTCOM’s contractor workforce performed 
tasks related to logistics such as transportation, construction, maintenance, and 
base support. This corresponds with a 2010 military analy sis of contracting data 
from Iraq that estimated that the ratio of contractors to uniformed personnel in 
the field of logistics was nearly 5:1, leading to the conclusion that “on the  whole, 
the military is most dependent on contracted support for logistics operations.”9 
Logistics workers are often employed by massive U.S. corporations like Kellogg, 
Brown & Root (KBR), Fluor, and DynCorp—or the multitude of subcontracting 
firms from around the world that they in turn rely on.
Military Contracting and the  
Everywhere of War
The growth of military contracting in recent years is an impor tant develop­
ment  because it represents a fundamental change in how the U.S. fights it wars. 
What is new is not the reliance on private companies and  labor to support mili­
tary campaigns, which has a long history in both the U.S. military and among 
other armed forces, but rather the scale and scope of the phenomenon. In World 
War II the ratio of contractors to uniformed personnel was roughly 1:7. In Viet­
nam it was 1:6. In contrast, in the three largest overseas contingency operations 
in the past two decades— the peacekeeping missions in the Balkans (Bosnia and 
Kosovo) and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan— the number of contractors has 
been roughly equal to or greater than the number of uniformed personnel in the 
theaters of operation.10 And in Africa, where the military’s presence has grown 
rapidly over the past de cade, contractors play a central role in supporting an ex­
panding network of drone bases, logistics nodes and clandestine Special Opera­
tions Forces (SOF). Put simply, the U.S. is now dependent on contracted  labor, 
especially in the realm of logistics, to fight its wars.11
I would argue, in fact, that the U.S. military’s increasing reliance on private 
companies and foreign  labor to provide logistics support for operations around 
the world is as significant as the vari ous technological innovations  toward network­ 
centric warfare over the past two de cades that have been dubbed a “revolution in 
military affairs,” or RMA.12 Especially since, as one military analy sis from 2001 
notes, “RMA is predicated on a revolution in military logistics” that centers on 
the increasing use of private contractors.13 Or as former army chief of staff Eric 
Shinseki put it in 2002, “Without a transformation in logistics  there  will be no 
transformation in the Army.”14
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The transformation of military logistics through contracting is not just oper­
ationally linked to RMA. Both have also profoundly impacted the spatiality of war, 
though in dif fer ent ways.15 A key claim made by po liti cal geographers and other 
social scientists is that RMA, combined with the U.S. response to 9/11, has led to 
a blurring of the traditional geographies of warfare: from defined battlefields to 
multidimensional and fluid urban “battlespaces”; from officially recognized com­
bat zones to shadowy campaigns against nonstate actors in “borderlands,” “un­
governed spaces,” and undisclosed locations; and the development of novel forms 
of “lawfare” that radically redefine  legal jurisdictions, detention policies, and the 
dif fer ent classes of  people that are considered “lawful targets.”16 In the evocative 
words of Derek Gregory, we are living in the age of “the everywhere war.”17
Military contracting is also reshaping the geography of war by generating new 
po liti cal and economic entanglements, the effects of which often extend well be­
yond the immediate spaces of vio lence.  These entanglements profoundly impact 
livelihoods, politics, and social relations in numerous communities and states 
around the world that are not directly involved in the vari ous U.S. wars and mil­
itary operations. Nepal’s deadly vio lence in 2004 dramatically illustrates  these 
distance­ spanning entanglements. Put another way, the expansion of military 
contracting is producing what may be called the “everywhere of war.”18
The following examples illustrate this claim. According to the Department of 
 Labor, more than 3,380 civilians working for the U.S. military or vari ous PMCs 
supporting the wars in Iraq and Af ghan i stan died between September 2001 and 
June 2018. This compares with roughly 6,950 U.S. military casualties in  those 
wars.19 While contractor deaths and injuries— especially foreign ones— barely 
register in the U.S., the same is not true of the countries that they are from. Fol­
lowing the deaths of the twelve workers from Nepal, the Nepalese government 
declared a national day of mourning. In the Philippines incidents involving work­
ers, such as the deaths of ten men whose he li cop ter crashed in Af ghan i stan in 
2009, are regularly given prominent coverage by national TV networks and 
newspapers.20 Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that the plight of workers in Iraq 
and Af ghan i stan has also impacted domestic and international politics around 
the world. In 2004, for instance, insurgents began targeting truck convoys carry­
ing food, fuel, and materials from Kuwait and Turkey to U.S. bases in Iraq. As 
deadly attacks and hostage taking of  drivers mounted, India and the Philippines 
declared travel bans to Iraq for their citizens. They  were joined by Nepal imme­
diately following the execution of its trafficked citizens.
In each case the countries’ decision to impose a ban on travel to Iraq for work 
was driven by domestic po liti cal considerations. Nepalese diplomats stated that 
the government felt “very vulnerable” following the anti­ Muslim riots in the 
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country, owing to fears about both further domestic unrest and potential repri­
sals against the hundreds of thousands of Nepalese working in Muslim countries 
in the  Middle East.21 For the Philippines the tipping point was the kidnapping of 
a truck driver, Angelo de la Cruz, in July. His hostage takers threatened to kill him 
if the Philippines did not remove its small contingent of troops from the coun­
try. Initially defiant, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who had just won a con­
troversial election dogged by allegations of vote rigging, eventually acquiesced to 
this demand following massive protests across the country. Shortly afterward de 
la Cruz was released, followed by the imposition of a travel ban.
The travel bans immediately set off alarm bells within the U.S. military due to 
its dependence on workers from  these labor­ exporting states. It also prompted a 
flurry of urgent  behind the scenes diplomacy by the DoS. To give a sense of just 
how dependent on TCN  labor for logistical support the military was at the time, 
one DoS analy sis written shortly  after the India and Philippines bans  were an­
nounced stated: 
Co ali tion forces are heavi ly dependent on Filipino and Indian  drivers and 
other logistical support personnel for the humanitarian fuels, military 
food supply and mission critical programs in Iraq. Contractors and U.S. 
military report that a fully enforced ban would cripple  these operations. 
 There are no readily implemented short­ term workarounds to ameliorate 
the effect of a travel ban. . . .  For example, Public Ware house Com pany 
(PWC), the prime vendor for the supply of  water and food to U.S. forces 
in Iraq, confirmed on 3 August that fully 48  percent of the firm’s 1,500 
 drivers are Indian and that at least 10  percent more are Filipino.22
Three days  later the U.S. embassy in Kuwait reported that over 1,000 trucks  were 
stuck at the Kuwait­ Iraq border, through which roughly 75  percent of goods en­
tered Iraq at the time. It also noted that the military estimated that less than a 
week’s supply of food and  water for troops remained in the country.23
Initially the U.S. tried to convince India, the Philippines, and Nepal to reverse 
their travel bans, or at least exempt from them citizens that worked for military 
contractors. It also promised to improve security mea sures for convoys, includ­
ing an increase in military escort vehicles. When this approach gained  little 
traction— and facing an “ever­ dwindling” supply of workers as other countries 
imposed and pondered travel bans in the fall—it changed course and pressed Ku­
wait not to enforce the bans at its border crossings, which would “allow dis­
tressed contractors to move  towards more normal work schedules and alleviate 
the mounting logistical prob lems created by the travel bans.”24 At first the Ku­
waiti government was resistant to this plan, especially without diplomatic cover 
from countries that had imposed the travel bans, but it eventually agreed follow­
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ing continued pressure from the U.S. government and Kuwaiti trucking firms that 
held the majority of military transport contracts for Iraq.
For the Philippines the decision to also withdraw its small contingent of troops 
from Iraq was even more geopo liti cally fraught than the imposition of a travel 
ban. Presenting itself as a close ally of the U.S. following 9/11, it had sent troops 
to Iraq as a member of the “co ali tion of the willing,” a decision motivated in part 
by the lure of potential contracts and jobs that it envisioned would accompany 
postwar reconstruction. The decision to pull out its military contingent to secure 
the release of de la Cruz met with angry condemnation from other members of 
the co ali tion. Australia’s foreign minister called the decision “marshmellowlike” 
and an “extreme disappointment,” while U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rums­
feld stated that “weakness is provocative.”25 In response the U.S. withdrew its 
ambassador to the Philippines for consultations. It also, according to interviews 
with Filipino officials and workers in Iraq at the time, imposed retaliatory mea­
sures including restrictions on diplomatic personnel visiting the Green Zone and 
reductions in the privileges of Filipino workers on certain U.S. military bases, such 
as restrictions on mobility and the use of recreational facilities.
In response to criticisms from other co ali tion members Philippine Senate ma­
jority leader Francis Pangilinan wrote an open letter that highlighted the distinc­
tive geopo liti cal situation his country faced due to its position as a major exporter 
of  labor to the  Middle East. He noted that over a million Filipino citizens  were 
working in the region, any of which he claimed might become “targets of retali­
ation” if the Philippines did not withdraw from the co ali tion. He also observed 
that if other co ali tion partners had such a large civilian presence in the region 
their views about continued participation would be “starkly dif fer ent.”26 As Pan­
gilinan’s comments illustrate, the position of labor­ exporting states was  shaped 
by domestic po liti cal protests in the aftermath of kidnappings and attacks on their 
workers in Iraq, and the fear that being seen as too closely linked to the U.S. oc­
cupation could potentially put hundreds of thousands of their citizens working 
elsewhere in the  Middle East at risk. Therefore  these states de cided to distance 
themselves by imposing travel bans.  These decisions, and the desperate attempt 
by the U.S. to circumvent the bans by inducing Kuwait not to enforce them at its 
border with Iraq, also illustrate the degree of de pen dency the military has on for­
eign  labor, and the need for support—or at least indifference— from labor­ 
exporting states in acquiring it.
The global entanglements of military contracting are also manifest in more 
mundane ways. Over the past two de cades, for example, the economic fortunes 
of a number of communities in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia have been inti­
mately linked to the growth of this phenomenon, first through employment re­
lated to peacekeeping missions in the region,  later as thousands of men and  women 
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from  those countries  were recruited to work in Iraq and Af ghan i stan, and 
more recently when a contingent traveled to West Africa to provide support for 
Operation United Assistance, the 2014–15 military mission to fight the Ebola 
outbreak in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone.
In fact, it was while conducting PhD research on postwar peacebuilding in Bos­
nia that I first became aware of the impact that military contracting has had in 
the region and beyond. The initial encounter took place in 2005 at the University 
of Sarajevo’s computer center, which was then located near the city’s main bus 
terminal. One day, while checking email, I heard six students huddled around a 
computer talking excitedly about jobs on military bases in Iraq. Peeking over I 
noticed that they  were looking at KBR’s recruiting page. A few days  later I asked 
two friends from the town of Brčko in northeast Bosnia about this. They had both 
served as interpreters for U.S. peacekeeping forces in the 1990s and said that they 
knew of several former interpreters who had been recruited by KBR to work in 
Iraq. At the time I just filed this away as a curious detail.
During further research in summer 2011, my attention was again drawn to the 
import of military contracting in Bosnia when several friends in Brčko discussed 
preparing résumés to send to recruiters in the nearby town of Tuzla, who  were 
actively looking for workers to support Fluor’s and DynCorp’s expanding opera­
tions in Af ghan i stan. That summer residents of Brčko also mourned the death of 
Nenad Antić, a contractor who was killed in Af ghan i stan. Interest piqued, the fol­
lowing year I arranged to talk with a handful of individuals in Tuzla who previ­
ously worked for KBR in Iraq. My thinking at the time was to write a short article 
about Bosnians working on military bases in the  Middle East. However, as I talked 
with  people and delved deeper into the topic I began to realize that the signifi­
cance of  these dynamics extend well beyond Bosnia.
The  Labor of Empire
Since the early 2000s the status of the U.S. as a modern­ day empire has gone from 
a highly contested claim to commonplace observation among both critics and 
proponents. As Robert Kaplan proclaimed in 2003, “It is a cliché  these days to 
observe that the United States now possesses a global empire. . . .  It is time to move 
beyond a statement of the obvious.”27 To be certain, this empire looks dif fer ent 
from  earlier Eu ro pean examples with their vast colonial holdings. Instead of col­
onies, a global network of military bases provides evidence of imperial might, 
with one recent analy sis concluding, “Although few U.S. citizens realize it, we 
prob ably have more bases in other  people’s lands than any other  people, nation, 
or empire in world history.”28 Some might argue that an absence of colonies dis­
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qualifies the U.S. as an empire. But reliance on a vast network of bases in client 
states and allies rather than territorial colonies simply constitutes a dif fer ent mo­
dality of imperial power, one based on informal rather than formal mea sures to 
exert influence on other countries.29
While this worldwide network of bases is considered one of the most promi­
nent examples of U.S. imperial ambitions and military might, less attention has 
been paid to the global army of  labor that supports overseas operations at  these 
bases, or the po liti cal and economic entanglements that this entails. Logistics  labor 
in par tic u lar has been overlooked in the lit er a ture dedicated to its vari ous wars. 
One reason for this lack of attention is that this work seems mundane and less 
“mercenary.”30 Filipinos driving trucks, Kosovar Albanians cleaning latrines, and 
Indians cooking pancakes are not what we picture when we think of the PMC 
industry. Yet it is precisely  these kinds of workers,  these types of  labor, that ani­
mate the U.S. military’s overseas interventions. Consequently, it is worth asking 
what the world looks like when we “gaze through the looking glass at the work­
ing  people and  labor systems” that make U.S. empire work.31
Adopting a more historical perspective makes apparent that for all its unique 
qualities, present­ day military contracting echoes  earlier U.S.  labor dynamics. As 
Julie Greene observes, “the U.S. imperial proj ect” has “always and everywhere in­
volved the recruitment, managing and disciplining of  labor.”32 In recent years a 
vibrant body of research premised on the argument that “empire has a  labor his­
tory” that is just beginning to be written has explored the  labor that facilitated 
expansionary po liti cal proj ects following the Civil War, especially the early years 
of the twentieth, or “American,”  century, from a global workforce mobilized to 
build the Panama Canal; to Filipino and Puerto Rican field hands brought in to 
work the sugar plantations in the territory of Hawaii; to Cuban laborers who con­
structed and maintained the military base at Guantanamo.33 Like  today’s global 
army of military  labor,  these  earlier examples depended heavi ly on the recruit­
ment and exploitation of foreign, nonwhite workforces. The per sis tence of  these 
dynamics exemplifies what Ann Laura Stoler refers to as “imperial durabilities.”34 
Thus while the following pages provide an analy sis of military logistics  labor in 
the U.S. imperial pre sent, it is necessary to recognize that this pre sent is also in­
extricably connected to its past.
Aims
This book is the product of a multiyear descent down the rabbit hole of military 
contracting and logistics  labor. It has multiple aims. One is to outline the history 
of logistics outsourcing by the U.S. military, including the rapid upshift in the 
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practice over the past two de cades.  Doing this necessitates situating this phenom­
enon within the wider context of government privatization trends in the fields of 
defense and intelligence, as well as the downsizing and transformation of the mil­
itary following the Cold War. It also involves outlining how present­ day con­
tracting compares with logistics support supplied by camp followers, sutlers, and 
corporations in  earlier eras.
A second goal is to illuminate the im mense work involved in sustaining the 
U.S. overseas military empire. Over the past two de cades U.S. forces have been 
continuously deployed fighting wars, hunting terrorists, and conducting peace­
keeping and humanitarian missions across the globe.  These operations, especially 
the wars in the  Middle East and Af ghan i stan, are logistically intensive. Conduct­
ing them has involved the movement of a tremendous amount of goods and  people 
along lengthy and complex supply chains, the construction and maintenance of 
hundreds of bases— many the size of small cities—in remote and challenging en­
vironments, and the provision of a panoply of life support ser vices like food, 
laundry, showers, and billeting for uniformed personnel. All of this logistical sup­
port depends upon an army of  labor drawn from around the world.
Third, this book endeavors to trace the routes and  labor supply chains traversed 
by the military’s global workforce, as well as the specific histories and present­ 
day politics that shape them. Taken together, such pathways “represent a kind of 
imperial geography, tracing bound aries of an empire of mobility.”35 Given the 
number of countries that serve as sources of  labor,  these routes are varied. In some 
cases, as with many workers from the Balkans, one’s journey began as a local hire, 
or LN, before following employers to military operations in the  Middle East or 
Africa. In other instances com pany websites or online forums have served as an 
introduction to the world of military contracting. For most workers from coun­
tries like India, Nepal, and the Philippines, the recruiting process— from the role 
of local agents, to fees and terms of contracts, to experiences of  labor trafficking— 
has shared characteristics with the broader recruiting assemblage that facilitates 
a massive  labor import­ export regime between wealthy Gulf petro­ states and 
poor, Asian, labor­ exporting countries. This should not be a surprise as the larg­
est military subcontractors in Iraq and Af ghan i stan tend to be firms from the 
 Middle East. But the result is that the military has in effect “imported” a host of 
exploitative  labor practices that parallel conditions experienced by  labor mi grants 
elsewhere in the region, while at the same time deliberately exercising minimal 
oversight responsibility.
The fourth, and primary, goal of this book is to give voice to the agency, aspi­
rations, and experiences of  those who  labor for the military— focusing specifi­
cally on foreign logistics workers whose experiences have been occluded by the 
overweening focus on private military security contractors. What, for example, 
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is life and work like on a military base in a warzone? News reporting and docu­
mentaries to date— mainly by a handful of dogged journalists such as Pratap 
Chatterjee, Anjali Kamat, T. Christian Miller, David Phinney, Cam Simpson, 
Sarah Stillman, and Lee Wang— have produced a portrait of exploited laborers 
from South and Southeast Asia employed by subcontracting firms. This book is 
indebted to their work. However, while difficult and exploitative working condi­
tions have certainly been the experience of many, life on military bases in the 
 Middle East, Af ghan i stan, and Africa is rather more complex than existing ac­
counts suggest. My research indicates that workers’ experiences vary considerably 
and are  shaped by a range of  factors including nationality, gender (a not insignifi­
cant portion of workers are  women), language, type of base or camp, the work one 
does, and what com pany one works for. Moreover,  there is a hidden history of 
 labor activism and worker agency on bases that has not been adequately exam­
ined to date. In addition to base life, I also examine the social, po liti cal, and eco­
nomic impacts that this work has on families, and on the communities and countries 
that laborers come from.
Sites and Sources
The geography and scale of U.S. military contracting over the past two de cades is 
vast. Workers from dozens of countries around the world have labored in a pan­
oply of states across Central Asia, the  Middle East, Eu rope, Latin Amer i ca, and 
Africa. Obviously it is not pos si ble to capture the full extent and diversity of this 
phenomenon. Any account  will be partial and incomplete.
This book focuses on laborers from two countries: Bosnia and the Philippines. 
 There are several reasons  behind this choice, three of which are worth noting  here. 
First, both countries have been significant sources of military  labor over the past 
two decades— and even longer in the case of the Philippines, with the U.S. mili­
tary continuously utilizing Filipino  labor from 1898 to the pre sent. Second, Bos­
nia and the Philippines are also useful for revealing the complexity and diversity 
of workers’ experiences on military bases, while also identifying commonalities. 
For example, whereas most Filipinos have worked for subcontracting compa­
nies in Iraq and Af ghan i stan, Bosnians have by and large been employed by 
prime contractors like KBR, Fluor, and DynCorp. This is significant  because the 
distinction between employment with a prime contractor or subcontractor is the 
most impor tant determinant of one’s pay and privileges on a base, with vast dis­
parities between the two categories. Moreover, a focus on Bosnian and Filipino 
workers also offers insight into the ways in which race and nationality shape 
work and life on bases. Third,  these countries’ specific histories, including the 
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Philippines’ decades­ old labor­ export economic development strategy, the colo­
nial and client­ state relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines through­
out the 1900s, and the U.S. military’s peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, are 
useful for tracing the history and development of military contracting in relation 
to U.S. empire and geopolitics in the twentieth  century, and broader currents of 
transnational  labor migration in recent de cades.
Between 2012 and 2016 I conducted in­ depth interviews with more than eighty 
current and former workers from Bosnia and the Philippines, interviews that 
in many cases included  family members and multiple sessions— sessions that 
extended across multiple years in the case of several Bosnian workers. I also in­
terviewed a number of recruiters and government officials in  these countries. 
Pseudonyms are used to protect the identity of interviewees throughout the 
book. This is not just a  matter of research ethics. Nearly  every PMC employee I 
talked with signed a confidentiality agreement as a stipulation of employment. 
Therefore revealing  people’s identities could not just have negative effects on 
their  future employment opportunities, but also potentially open them up to  legal 
repercussions. This is an unlikely but not completely hy po thet i cal risk. As I dis­
cuss in chapter 8, recruiting agencies and military subcontractors have initiated 
 legal cases in the Philippines against former workers in Iraq who jumped to new 
companies prior to the completion of their original contracts, a violation of the 
terms of the contracts they signed.
In addition to interviews this proj ect draws on a range of textual sources. Sev­
eral Filipino workers generously shared copies of employment contracts with 
me, and friends in Bosnia introduced me to online forums from the region that 
have served as key sources of information on employment opportunities, the 
hiring pro cess, and working conditions with dif fer ent companies. I have also 
extensively mined a variety of U.S. government documents, including Govern­
ment Accountability Office (GAO) reports, DoS cables, congressional testimony, 
and numerous military reports, websites, and investigations. A number of  these 
documents have been obtained through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
requests.
Organ ization
Thematically I divide this book into three parts. The first concerns histories. This 
section begins with a chapter that outlines the scale and scope of privatized mili­
tary work in the pre sent day, compares this with  earlier practices of contracting 
by the U.S. military, and explains the rise of large­ scale logistics outsourcing since 
the end of the Cold War. Following this I provide an overview of colonial and cli­
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ent state relations between the U.S. and the Philippines in the twentieth  century, 
as well as the related history of reliance on Filipino  labor by the U.S. military that 
continues to shape the recruitment of Filipinos for military work. Chapter 3 also 
describes the emergence of  labor export as a development strategy by the Philip­
pines starting in the 1970s, the concurrent development of  labor flows between 
Gulf states and South and Southeast Asian countries, and links between  these two 
pro cesses and recruiting pathways, logistics subcontractors, and Filipino employ­
ment on U.S. military bases in Iraq and Af ghan i stan. Chapter 4 then examines 
the duality of prosperity and precarity experienced by Bosnians who have worked 
for the U.S. military and vari ous contractors over the past two­ plus de cades. It 
begins by describing the economic and social significance of participation in the 
country’s postwar “peacekeeping economy” in the 1990s, with companies pro­
viding logistics support for peacekeeping forces, or employment with one of 
the myriad international organ izations involved in peacebuilding proj ects dur­
ing this period. I then detail the shift to employment in warzones in the  Middle 
East and Af ghan i stan as relatively privileged direct hires with Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) prime contractors (i.e., KBR, Fluor, and 
DynCorp), followed by a discussion of the experience of both prosperity and 
precarity by  those who have done this work.
The theme of the second part is routes. This includes networks, infrastructures, 
and practices that span and constitute the spaces through which  people, infor­
mation, and goods circulate. I begin in chapter 5 by describing logistics spaces 
and  labor involved in supporting overseas operations in Iraq, Af ghan i stan, and, 
increasingly, Africa. Chapter 6 then contrasts the  legal hiring pro cesses and key 
nodes for recruitment and travel to and from worksites in Af ghan i stan and the 
 Middle East for Bosnians, who tend to be directly hired by prime contractors, and 
Filipinos, who have primarily worked for subcontractors. One way I approach 
this is by tracing the pathways— social networks, recruiting agencies, internet 
forums, and company­ specific application processes— that constitute  these re­
spective  labor supply chains. Drawing on interviews with workers and  labor bro­
kers in the Philippines, chapter 7 examines trafficking of South and Southeast 
Asian workers, and the “backdoor” or under ground recruitment of Filipino  labor 
following the introduction of travel bans to Iraq and Af ghan i stan. This chapter 
also discusses the continuing prob lem of  labor abuses— especially trafficking— 
and  legal rationales deployed by the U.S. military to disentangle itself as much as 
pos si ble from oversight responsibility.
The third part of the book focuses on base life. I approach this topic in a vari­
ety of ways, beginning in chapter 8 with an analy sis of the hidden dynamics of 
 labor activism on military bases in Iraq and Af ghan i stan, focusing in par tic u lar 
on three strategies: protests, strikes, and “jumping” from one com pany to another. 
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I describe the motivations of workers who engage in  these actions, as well 
as the risks, and the coercive mea sures employed by companies— especially 
 subcontractors—to suppress them. Following this, chapter 9 examines stark dif­
ferences in pay, perks, and working conditions between  those employed by 
prime contractors or subcontractors, and ways that race, nationality, and gender 
shape relations and hierarchies among workers and between workers and ser vice 
members on bases. Chapter 10 explores the themes of  family, community, and 
returning home. This encompasses the impact of working on bases in warzones 
on  family life, including divorce and marriage, the economic and social impacts 
on communities workers hail from— which is significant given spatial concen­
trations of recruitment in both Bosnia and the Philippines— and difficulties in 
adjusting to life at home following the end of employment.
In the conclusion I step back and ask the following question: How has mili­
tary contracting and the increasing reliance on foreign  labor detailed in this book 
impacted the “American way of war”? The answer, I suggest, is that the growth of 
contracting has—in conjunction with technological innovations— transformed 
both the spatial and temporal registers of war. I have briefly discussed the chang­
ing spatial dimensions (the “everywhere war” and the “everywhere of war”) above. 
Temporally, it has enabled what Dexter Filkins aptly refers to as the “forever 
war”— a ceaseless parade of military operations around the world over the past 
two de cades in response to 9/11.36 Crucially, military contracting transfers risk 
and casualties onto foreign bodies, thereby dampening domestic opposition to 
the pursuit of boundless war elsewhere in the world. Put another way, this global 
army of  labor is an inextricable facet of the present­ day U.S. military empire.
15
Part 1
HISTORIES
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In 2014 the world watched in horror as an outbreak of the deadly Ebola virus 
spread through West Africa. By the beginning of August the World Health Organ­
ization had recorded over 1,700 cases, resulting in more than 900 deaths in 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In response it declared the outbreak a “public 
health emergency of international concern.”1 As the death toll  rose, Ebola was in­
creasingly framed as not just a public health crisis, but also a global security 
threat, culminating in a September 18 United Nations (UN) Security Council res­
olution declaring the epidemic “a threat to international peace and security.”2 
Two days before this resolution President Barak Obama held a press conference 
announcing that he was deploying the U.S. military to Liberia as part of a multi­
national effort to stem the outbreak.3
The military, in turn, looked to contractors to provide critical logistics sup­
port for what became known as Operation United Assistance (OUA). The first 
com pany they reached out to was Fluor, which had just won a LOGCAP contract 
the previous month to provide support ser vices in Africa.4 Within days of Obama’s 
announcement an advance team of Fluor employees was in Liberia conducting 
initial assessments.5 Three weeks  later recruiters for Fluor arrived in Tuzla, in 
northeast Bosnia. They quickly set up shop in the city’s main  hotel and began in­
terviewing applicants.  Those that passed the interviews received background 
checks and health exams at a local clinic and then  were flown to Dubai.  There 
they waited for necessary paperwork and watched training pre sen ta tions that cov­
ered safety procedures, dangers inherent to working in warzones, life on military 
bases, and discussions of potential environmental and health risks. Less than two 
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FROM CAMP FOLLOWERS TO  
A GLOBAL ARMY OF  LABOR
Although  there is historic pre ce dent for contracted support to our 
military forces, i am concerned about the risks introduced by our 
current level of de pen dency.
— Robert Gates, former U.S. Secretary of Defense
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months  after Obama’s announcement the initial batch of recruits from Bosnia 
arrived in Liberia and in Dakar, Senegal, which served as the main West African 
logistics hub for operations. For the next five months they worked hand in hand 
with the military, building Ebola Treatment Units and providing an array of sup­
port ser vices. At the peak of operations in late 2014 over 1,000 Fluor employees 
 were supporting the OUA mission.6
Fluor was not the only com pany contracted by the military, though it was the 
largest. By the end of OUA over 400 contracts totaling more than $120 million 
had been signed.7 Many of  these  were with local companies, such as a Liberian 
transportation firm that provided 300 trucks to move supplies across the coun­
try. All of this was by design as the “plan from the outset,” according to one ret­
rospective assessment of the logistics component of the mission, “was to attempt 
to contract as much of the effort as pos si ble to minimize the military footprint” 
in Liberia.8
The case of OUA illustrates four central ele ments of present­ day military 
logistics contracting. The first is that the use of contracted support has been 
institutionalized by the military and is built into operational plans from the 
beginning. The best example of this is LOGCAP, the primary mechanism through 
which the U.S. Army procures logistics support. From  humble beginnings in 1985, 
LOGCAP has expanded into a multibillion­ dollar program, with LOGCAP con­
tractors providing support for the military across the world, from  giant bases in 
the  Middle East to drone facilities in Africa to remote counternarcotics outposts 
in South Amer i ca.
Second, and relatedly, contractors support a wide variety of overseas opera­
tions, not just wars. The first significant use of LOGCAP, for example, was the 
UN­ sanctioned humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992–93. In the late 
1990s thousands of local and U.S. contractors  were employed to support peace­
keeping operations in the Balkans. In recent years contractors have played a 
critical role in supporting clandestine operations by SOF in Africa, ranging from 
counterterrorism missions across the Sahel and Maghreb to the campaign against 
Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Re sis tance Army in Central Africa.9 Like Mary’s lamb in 
the nursery rhyme, wherever the military goes, logistics contractors are sure to 
follow.
Third,  there is  little that the military does not outsource to contractors. Con­
sider the list of goods and ser vices provided by contractors for OUA: construc­
tion, hazardous material disposal, provision of laundry machines, canvas and tent 
repair, material  handling equipment, maintenance of showers, latrines and sew­
age, bulk fuel operations, dining facilities, fire prevention, bottled  water, power 
generation, vector (pest) control,  water production, and logistics transportation.10 
At the largest bases in the  Middle East and Af ghan i stan troops have access to a 
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wide range of amenities such as gyms, movie theaters, twenty­ four­ hour food 
courts and cafeterias, internet and merchandise stores, all provided by thousands 
of workers recruited from around the world.
It is this last detail— the global composition of the workforce— that is the 
fourth, and arguably most impor tant, aspect of logistics contracting  today. From 
 Kenyans washing clothes in Af ghan i stan to Bosnians providing vector control in 
Djibouti to Filipinos building detainment facilities in Guantanamo, U.S. military 
operations overseas are sustained by a diverse  labor pool and global recruiting 
networks.
None of  these four ele ments are wholly without pre ce dent. But taken together 
they represent a significant departure from past practices. To substantiate this 
claim, the rest of this chapter provides an overview and history of logistics con­
tracting by the U.S. military. It asks and answers three questions: What is the scale 
and scope of contracting in the pre sent day? How does this compare with  earlier 
periods in U.S. history? And how did we get  here? I begin with an overview of 
logistics contracting by the U.S. military from the Revolutionary War to Vietnam. 
This is followed by a discussion of shifts in contracting priorities and practices in 
the 1990s, as well as the  drivers of  these changes. I conclude by outlining the scale 
and scope of contracting in Iraq and beyond.
Camp Followers, Sutlers, and the 
Beginnings of Corporate Logistics 
Contracting
As Christopher Kinsey argues, in contrast to armed mercenaries, “which the state 
has tried to marginalise . . .  since the end of the eigh teenth  century,” logistics sup­
pliers and contractors “have continued to be an impor tant part of the military 
system.”11 In the Revolutionary War soldiers’ needs on both sides  were served by 
a train of accompanying civilians that washed and repaired clothes, cooked food, 
and sold a variety of goods including liquor, clothing, shoes, tobacco, and soap. 
 These “camp followers” included servants and slaves, wives and  children of sol­
diers, un regu la ted peddlers, and commissioned sutlers whose trade and prices 
 were prescribed.12 The British Army also relied on contractors to source and ship 
food, medical supplies, forage, and coal from  England, Canada, and Ca rib bean 
colonies to troops in Amer i ca.13
In 1821 sutlers  were formally incorporated into the U.S. Army’s supply sys­
tem for frontier posts in the West. This involved appointments that granted ex­
clusive trading rights at an assigned post or with a specific regiment in exchange 
for submitting to rules and regulations that governed prices and the quantity and 
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types of goods to be supplied. This frontier post supply system, which lasted  until 
the end of the  century, could be quite profitable for sutlers, especially when paired 
with army contracts for other necessities such as lumber, fodder, and freight op­
erations.14 Transportation contracts  were a particularly lucrative source of in­
come, especially following the Mexican­ American War (1846–48) that led to the 
acquisition of vast new tracts of Western territories. By the mid­1850s the mili­
tary’s primary overland transportation contractor in the West, Russell, Majors and 
Waddell, was making hundreds of thousands of dollars in profits— a vast sum at 
the time.15 The sutler system eventually became a source of corruption and scan­
dal as contracts and appointments  were often acquired through po liti cal patron­
age and bribes. In 1876, for example, President Ulysses Grant’s  brother, along with 
Secretary of War William Belknap,  were implicated in a pay­ for­ posts scheme in­
volving tens of thousands of dollars in bribes.
During the Civil War thousands of sutlers and assorted camp followers played 
a critical role in providing goods for both Union and Confederate soldiers. They 
 were even used by the Union to supply food and sundries to Confederate prison­
ers of war.16 At the same time, sutlers developed a negative reputation among sol­
diers for price gouging, leading to calls in Congress and state legislatures to abolish 
the position. The letter of one Kentucky volunteer gives a sense of the disgust that 
merchants who profited from the war inspired: “Is the word ‘scoundrel’ exagger­
ated when applied to such cads? Is it enough to merely give them the name? 
Should they not become strung up at the closest tree, which is strong enough, to 
bear them and their heavy sins?” He concluded with the  bitter statement that “we 
soldiers can think only with anger about the money making class.”17
The money­ making class in the Civil War did not just consist of unscrupu­
lous sutlers and camp followers that roused the indignation of ordinary soldiers. 
Far greater fortunes  were realized by contractors that supplied the Union with 
clothing, blankets, tents, wagons, fodder, weapons, and transportation. Indeed, 
the war was an economic enterprise on a scale never before seen in the nation’s 
history, with spending by the federal government between 1861 and 1865 exceed­
ing the combined total of all previous U.S. government expenditures.18 It is 
impor tant to note that this was a mixed military economy, with significant pro­
duction and transportation  labor performed by public enterprises. The Army’s 
Quartermaster’s Department, for instance, “employed over 100,000 civilians, far 
more than any private American business enterprise of the era.”19 Nonetheless, 
the majority of goods and ser vices for military operations  were procured through 
contracting.
Following the Civil War, the Army quickly shrank back to prewar levels. When 
the Spanish­ American War began in 1898, it consisted of less than 30,000 troops.20 
The invasions of Cuba and the Philippines, as well as the subsequent counterin­
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surgency campaign in the latter, and participation in the multinational suppression 
of the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900–1, marked a turning point in U.S. military 
and po liti cal history as the country became an overseas colonial power. In the 
twelve de cades since it has maintained a continuous global military presence. How­
ever, in 1898 the military— and especially the Army— was ill prepared for overseas 
operations and heavi ly dependent on civilian support. It was forced to charter, for 
instance, eigh teen of the twenty ships required to ship the initial expeditionary 
force and its supplies to the Philippines.21 It also relied on thousands of Filipino 
and Chinese laborers for construction proj ects, and transportation ser vices.22
Vastly greater logistics requirements for overseas operations impressed upon 
civilian and military leaders alike the need for the development of greater sup­
port capabilities within the military itself. As secretary of war from 1904 to 1908, 
former Philippines governor and  future president William Howard Taft “recom­
mended the formation of a general ser vice corps to replace civilian employees and 
soldiers released from line units for duty as wagon masters, teamsters, engineers, 
firemen, carpenters, blacksmiths, overseers, clerks, and laborers.” Reforms in this 
direction  were implemented during his administration and “by the time of World 
War I it had become generally accepted that enlisted ser vice troops of vari ous 
kinds should perform most of  those duties. Men who had never seen a ship  were 
or ga nized into stevedore battalions, men unfamiliar with motor vehicles  were as­
signed to truck companies, men who had never been near an Army depot  were 
assigned to run them.”23 The view that logistics and ser vice  labor was a core mil­
itary function would persist into the 1990s.
The U.S. military refers to logistics and ser vice tasks performed by uniformed 
personnel as “organic” support. The development of organic capabilities in the 
twentieth  century produced a remarkable shift in the military’s force structure. 
According to one analy sis, in World War I, the Eu ro pean theater in World War 
II, and the wars in  Korea and Vietnam, the percentage of U.S. Army personnel 
engaged in logistics and life support tasks ranged from 35  percent to 45  percent.24 
A consequence of this growth in uniformed personnel that supported  these wars 
was an, at times, tense relationship between combat forces and logistics and ad­
ministrative staff, which more often than not operated far from the battlefield. 
The famed World War II military cartoonist Bill Mauldin captured this dynamic 
in his book Up Front: “It was not enough, the doggies [frontline infantry] felt, to 
live in unspeakable misery and danger while  these ‘gumshoe so and sos’ worked 
in the comfort and safety of the city. Hell no. When they came back to try to 
forget the war for a few days,  these ‘rear echelon goldbrickers’ had to pester 
them to death. When a man is feeling like this you  can’t tell him that his tor­
mentors are  people like himself, and that they are in the rear  because they have 
been ordered to work  there, just as he was ordered to the front.”25 Mauldin was 
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not unsympathetic to  those in the rear who, as he notes,  were just working where 
they  were ordered to by the military.  Others  were not so charitable. The phrase 
“desk jockey” was a popu lar epithet hurled at  those working in the rear in World 
War II, while in Vietnam “rear echelon motherfuckers” or REMFs  were a com­
mon target of complaints from combat “grunts.”26
Even with the dedication of a substantial portion of military personnel to sup­
port activities contracting still played an impor tant role in facilitating overseas 
military operations during the two world wars and vari ous Cold War conflicts. 
American Expeditionary Forces in World War I negotiated with French authori­
ties to obtain civilian  labor and materials necessary for the construction of fa­
cilities such as barracks and hospital wards.27 In the Korean War the military drew 
heavi ly on Japa nese and Korean  labor, employing approximately 100,000 civil­
ians in  Korea and 145,000 in Japan.28 The Army’s Japan Logistical Command 
“estimated that if all the supply and ser vice functions of that command had been 
carried out without the use of Japa nese workers, an additional 200,000 to 250,000 
ser vice troops would have been required” to support operations in  Korea.29 One 
reason for the extensive reliance on civilian  labor in this conflict was that the U.S. 
was also largely responsible for the logistics needs of the South Korean Army and 
allied UN forces.30
By the time of the Vietnam War, the size of organic logistics and life support 
forces began to come  under criticism both within the military and among the U.S. 
public. In 1967 news reports suggested that only 70,000 of 464,000 uniformed 
personnel in Vietnam  were combat troops. While the Pentagon denied that this 
estimate was accurate, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara acknowledged that 
 there was room for improvement in “reducing the ratio of support to combat 
forces.”31 It was also in Vietnam that U.S. corporations started to play an increas­
ingly vis i ble role supporting troops on the battlefield, with one business publica­
tion declaring it a “war by contract.”32
Contracting was particularly pronounced in the field of military construction, 
especially during the rapid buildup in 1965–66. At its peak, Pacific Architects and 
Engineers (PAE), an Army construction and engineering contractor, had more 
than 21,000 workers in the country.33 The primary construction contractor was 
a consortium of four firms— Raymond International, Morrison­ Knudsen, Brown 
& Root, and J.A. Jones Construction— called RMK­ BRJ.34 According to a RMK­ 
BRJ document called “Diary of a Contract,” 1966 was
as wild a period as any  human being can imagine. Thousands of  people 
 were arriving from the United States, South  Korea, the Philippines and 
27 other nations; tens of thousands of South Viet nam ese  were hired and 
taught construction trade. . . .  Not the least of the prob lems being faced 
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was building the base for the contractor’s own operations— camps, 
maintenance shops, ware houses,  etc.  These competed for the  labor, ma­
terials and time which the soldiers, sailors, airmen marines understand­
ably felt  were  there to fulfill their own urgent needs. In short it was a 
period of 20­ hour days, 7­ day weeks, frayed nerves, deadlines, shortages, 
and magnificent achievement.35
The consortium even published a newspaper in both En glish and Viet nam ese 
called Vietnam Builders, which carried stories on completed construction proj­
ects and “ human interest” features such as softball games between Filipino work­
ers and U.S. soldiers.36
The use of contractors in Vietnam was not without its critics. Brown & Root’s 
contracts  were a par tic u lar object of contention due to its close ties with President 
Lyndon Johnson. The com pany had bankrolled several of his po liti cal campaigns, 
including his successful election to the Senate in 1948. In exchange Johnson 
helped Brown & Root secure hundreds of millions in federal contracts when he 
was Senate majority leader and president.37 In a rather ironic twist, in 1966 Donald 
Rumsfeld—at the time a U.S. House representative from Illinois— criticized the 
Johnson administration for poor contracting oversight and reliance on a single 
contract with RMK­ BRJ to provide the bulk of construction support: “ Under 
only one contract, between the U.S. government and this combine [RMK­ BRJ] 
it is officially estimated that obligations  will reach at least $900 million by No­
vember 1967. . . .  Why this huge contract has not been and is not now being ad­
equately audited is beyond me. The potential for waste and profiteering  under 
such a contract is substantial.”38 Four de cades  later Brown & Root would be 
called a war profiteer by many within and outside the armed forces, while the 
administration Rumsfeld worked for would be accused of po liti cal cronyism for 
steering billions of dollars in contracts the com pany’s way.39
If one steps back and examines contractor­ to­ troop ratios— which should be 
considered rough estimates— from the American Revolution to the First Gulf War 
in 1990–91, the picture we see is one of fairly consistent but not overwhelming 
reliance on civilian support, with contractor personnel constituting between 5 and 
20  percent of troop levels.40  There are two exceptions to this trend. The first is the 
Korean War, which had a 1:2.5 ratio of contractors to troops. As noted above, 
however, in  Korea the military was also responsible for providing the bulk of logis­
tics support for its South Korean and UN allies. Their total numbers  were roughly 
equal to U.S. military forces in the war. When one takes this into account, the ratio 
of contractors to military personnel in the Korean War is analogous to other wars.
The second apparent anomaly is the First Gulf War, where the contractor to 
troop ratio is estimated to have been 1:60. This does not mean that civilian  labor 
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played a minor role in the conflict. According to one military analy sis, outside 
support “was an essential part of the overall operation. All of the POL [petroleum, 
oils, and lubricants] and  water, most of the construction engineering, most of the 
port operations, and about 50  percent of the long­ haul transportation was pro­
vided by External Support.”41 The bulk of  these outside support ser vices  were 
sourced and funded by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia, for 
example, “agreed to provide, at no cost to the United States, all fuel, food,  water, 
local transportation, and facilities for all US forces in the Kingdom.”42 Such Host 
Nation Support (HNS)— and the  labor required to provide it— does not appear 
in contracting calculations  because the military did not pay for it. For this reason 
we  will likely never have a good accounting of the military’s reliance on civilian 
workers in the war. However, some of the same Gulf firms that provided support 
for the military in 1990–91, such as the Saudi Catering & Contracting Com pany 
(SCCC), would reemerge as subcontractors in Iraq in the 2000s.43
The Transformation of Logistics 
Contracting
One can trace the emergence of military logistics contracting on the scale that we 
see  today to the years immediately following the end of the Cold War. However, 
the seeds of change, as Laura Dickinson notes,  were planted in Vietnam, with mil­
itary reports  after the war making the case for “continued and increased use of 
contractors to provide logistical support on the battlefield.”44 It did not hurt that 
such prescriptions resonated with the “privatization revolution” ushered in by 
Ronald Reagan’s presidency in the 1980s.45 A key administrative change setting 
the stage for the dramatic upshift in outsourcing occurred in 1985, when the Army 
published new regulations establishing LOGCAP to “preplan for the use of civil­
ian contractors to perform selected ser vices in war time.”46  These regulations  were 
introduced in response to a directive from Congress the previous year to develop 
contingency contracting capabilities for overseas operations.47
LOGCAP contracting remained small­ scale for several years, primarily  because 
it was originally designed to be a decentralized program in which vari ous com­
ponents of an Army command would be responsible for identifying needs and 
establishing contracts. This led to critiques from officers that LOGCAP was too 
narrow and  limited to functional area support such as transportation of oil sup­
plies.48 Experience gained in Desert Storm demonstrated the need for more com­
prehensive support such as the construction and operation of full­ service dining 
facilities. Military planners also increasingly advocated a “turn­ key” approach to 
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contracting such as designating a single contractor responsible for the construc­
tion of an entire base camp and provision of all support ser vices therein.49
In 1992 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney gave Brown & Root a $3.9 million 
contract to study how LOGCAP could be reformed to better support soldiers on 
the battlefield. Brown & Root’s report suggested the program be transformed into 
a single umbrella contract that would provide support ser vices around the world.50 
Another key innovation was the call to fully integrate LOGCAP into planning for 
pos si ble overseas operations. LOGCAP’s prime contractor, the report argued, 
should be required to develop a worldwide management plan describing “the 
equipment, personnel and supporting ser vices required to support a force of up 
to 20,000 troops in 5 base camps for up to 180 days and up to 50,000 troops be­
yond 180 days.”51 In addition to this, the report recommended that the program’s 
contractor be asked to produce more than a dozen regional plans outlining de­
tailed logistics and engineering support for region­ specific planning scenarios 
used by military commanders. Such plans  were necessary  because it was envi­
sioned that the contractor would be able to deploy assets within seventy­ two hours 
of initial notice.52
Cheney took up Brown & Root’s recommendations and put the first LOGCAP 
contract  under this new scheme (LOGCAP I) up for bid. The winning bidder was 
Brown & Root, a rather curious decision since it was also the firm that wrote the 
requirements, and the government generally prohibits such arrangements. Four 
months  after the contract was announced the com pany was tasked with provid­
ing logistical support for U.S. forces in Somalia. This was followed by contracts 
to support humanitarian deployments to Rwanda and Haiti in 1994. LOGCAP 
was also utilized during military operations in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that year 
following a buildup of Iraqi forces along  those countries’ borders. The following 
year Brown & Root provided construction and logistics ser vices at Aviano Air Base 
in Italy in support of the NATO bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb forces. 
Each of  these was a fairly small­ scale operation. In total their estimated cost added 
up to $212 million.53
The first time that LOGCAP, and logistics contracting more generally, was uti­
lized on a large scale was the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia starting in Decem­
ber 1995. In the initial year of operations Brown & Root built nineteen base camps 
for U.S. troops and provided maintenance and logistics support for thirty­ two 
camps in Bosnia, Hungary, and Croatia. In total it earned over $460 million 
through the LOGCAP contract in that first year alone, more than twice as much 
as all previous operations combined.54 In 1997 Brown & Root lost its bid for the 
new LOGCAP contract (LOGCAP II) to DynCorp. Over the course of this 
contract DynCorp supported counternarcotics operations in several Central 
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and South American countries, as well as operations in East Timor and the 
Philippines.
Army officers in Bosnia, however,  were generally satisfied with Brown & Root’s 
per for mance and did not want to switch contractors midstream.55 The firm was 
therefore awarded a separate “Balkans sustainment contract.” This contract was 
subsequently extended to Kosovo when the UN mission was established  there in 
1999. In a short time roughly 5,000 Kosovars and Macedonians  were working for 
Brown & Root, making it the largest employer in the region.56 Such a large work­
force was needed  because  there was  little that the com pany was not asked to do. 
As one Army officer observed at the time, “When soldiers first step off airplanes 
in Kosovo, they are met not by their commander, but by a Brown and Root civil­
ian worker who tells them where they can pick up their gear and assigns them to 
their barracks.”57 In the end the com pany made over $2 billion from the Balkans 
sustainment contract.58
Though LOGCAP was developed by the Army, the Navy and Air Force  were 
allowed to utilize the program if needed, as they did for the 1995 operations at 
Aviano. Both ser vices also developed their own contingency contracting schemes 
modeled on the program, beginning with the Navy’s Construction Capabilities 
(CONCAP) program in 1995, which was followed by the Air Force Contract Aug­
mentation Program (AFCAP) in 1997. Perini won the first CONCAP contract, 
but lost the rebid in 2001 to Brown & Root. The following year the program was 
utilized for the construction of expanded detainment facilities in Guantanamo 
with—as discussed in chapter 3— a Brown & Root subcontractor flying in hun­
dreds of Filipino construction workers for the proj ect.59 The winning bidder for 
the first AFCAP contract, Readiness Management Support LC, was called upon 
to perform a variety of tasks worth $170 million in the first five years of the pro­
gram, including constructing refugee camps in Kosovo, refurbishing airfields in 
Ec ua dor used for counternarcotics operations, reconstructing damaged infra­
structure in Guam following Typhoon Paka in 1997, and design work at Ali Al 
Salem Air Base in Kuwait.60
In short, by the early 2000s logistics contracting for overseas operations was 
well established. Thus even before the U.S. invaded Af ghan i stan and Iraq  there 
was  little question that contractors would play a central role in supporting  future 
U.S. military operations. Before moving on to this part of our story, though, it is 
necessary to consider why contracting expanded so rapidly in the 1990s.
 There are several reasons for this transformation. One of the most impor tant, 
as noted above, was the rise of privatization, which was nourished by  free market 
proponents in the Reagan administration. In 1982 the president commissioned 
an investigation into federal government inefficiency constituted by a commit­
tee of private sector executives. The resulting report, presented two years  later, 
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advocated greater outsourcing of government provided ser vices. The commis­
sion’s chair, chemical and materials industrialist J. Peter Grace, also published an 
accompanying book extolling privatization.61 By the early 1990s the supposed 
benefits of privatization had become a bipartisan mantra, as exemplified by the 
Clinton administration’s “reinventing government” commission, which also ad­
vocated outsourcing a wide range of government activities.62 Not to be outdone, 
the Department of Defense (DoD) followed with a 1996 report on “outsourcing 
and privatization” by the influential Defense Science Board Task Force that that 
concluded that “all DoD support functions should be contracted out to private 
vendors except  those functions which are inherently governmental, are directly 
involved in war fighting, or for which no adequate private sector capability exists 
or can be expected to be established.”63
Privatization fever in the military spread well beyond logistics support func­
tions. By the end of the 1990s large swaths of military intelligence gathering and 
analy sis  were also being performed by contractors, a trend that has only acceler­
ated since 9/11. This despite the traditional view of such intelligence tasks as core 
national security competencies.64 Since the 1990s the military has also moved to 
privatize a range of social welfare provisions that it provides to uniformed per­
sonnel, from housing and health care to  family support ser vices and recreational 
programs.65 Like the military, DoS has also been radically transformed by out­
sourcing. Its development branch, USAID, experienced a 45  percent cut in em­
ployees between 1980 and 2001, turning the agency into, in the words of one 
analy sis, a “check writer to contractors.”66 Moreover, DoS has become one of the 
largest consumers of private security industry ser vices, employing thousands of 
armed contractors to protect diplomats and embassies around the world.67
As Maya Eichler demonstrates, another  factor driving the privatization of 
military  labor in the U.S. was the termination of male conscription (the draft) 
in 1973. The central ele ment of her argument is that the “introduction of the 
all­ volunteer force redefined military ser vice as a market relation, even as the 
citizen­ soldier is still invoked and symbolically significant.” Severing the linking 
between citizenship and military ser vice is consequential  because if “citizens are 
no longer required to participate in the public provision of security, the out­
sourcing of military work becomes justifiable to a much larger extent.”68 Not 
coincidentally, some of the most prominent opponents of the draft  were “Chi­
cago School” economists like Milton Friedman.
Another catalyst driving outsourcing was the dramatic downsizing of the 
military following the end of the Cold War. In 1987  there  were 2.2 million active­ 
duty and full­ time guard and reserve troops. By the end of the Clinton administra­
tion this number had fallen below 1.5 million, a more than 30  percent reduction in 
forces.69  These cuts fell disproportionately on ser vice and support components of 
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the military. The U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC), for instance, experienced 
a 60  percent reduction in personnel.70 At the same time the demand for military 
operations  rose dramatically in the post­ Cold War period.71 In response the mil­
itary became intensely concerned with improving the “tooth to tail” ratio— that 
is, outsourcing noncombat support functions so that a greater percentage of 
remaining troops are engaged in combat activities.72 As Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen put it in 1997, “We can sustain the shooters and reduce the 
supporters—we can keep the tooth, but cut the tail.”73 Cohen’s successor, Don­
ald Rumsfeld, echoed this sentiment in 2003 when he stated that “something in 
the neighborhood of 300,000 men and  women in uniform are  doing jobs that 
 aren’t for men and  women in uniform.”74 Two years  later he would proudly tell 
Congress that “mostly administrative and facilities related” duties performed by 
contractors  were “freeing up additional tens of thousands of military personnel 
for military responsibilities.”75
A smaller, more focused military also has operational and po liti cal advantages. 
For example, when force caps are imposed for a par tic u lar mission, civilian con­
tractors do not count  toward troop limits. In 1995 the military estimated that it 
needed a force of 38,000 troops to fulfill peacekeeping duties in the Balkans. Con­
gress set a ceiling of 25,000 (20,000 in Bosnia and 5,000 in Croatia), with no 
more than 4,300 of this number permitted to be reservists. The Army was able to 
manage  these restrictions  because it could turn to Brown & Root to provide 
needed logistics support without using military personnel. Indeed, the chief op­
erations planner for the Bosnian peacekeeping mission bluntly concluded that 
“the truth of the  matter is that we are in a force cap environment, be it Army end 
strength, or operational deployment. Therefore, I think it is reasonable to believe 
that LOGCAP or some form of contractor support  will always be with us and that 
it is therefore something that always should be built into the plan.”76 Five years 
 later the Clinton administration asked Congress for money for a counternarcot­
ics initiative in South Amer i ca called “Plan Colombia.” Congress approved the 
funding, but with a stipulation that no more than 500 troops could be deployed 
to support the operation. To make up capacity gaps, 300 military contractors  were 
permitted to be hired.77
Even when overseas operations do not have mandated force caps, such as the 
wars in Iraq and Af ghan i stan, the extensive use of contractors for logistical sup­
port lowers the number of military personnel that need to be deployed. This is 
especially impor tant when it comes to the po liti cally sensitive activation and de­
ployment of reservists, which have constituted a disproportionately large percent­
age of organic support and ser vice units since reforms introduced at the end of 
the Vietnam War.78 Hundreds of thousands of reservists  were called up in the first 
three years of the Iraq War, stretching reserve forces to the breaking point and 
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disrupting families and communities across the country.79 Without the extensive 
use of contractors the reserve system would likely have been overwhelmed.
A final  factor to consider is that contractor deaths are far less po liti cally 
salient— even when they are U.S. citizens— than uniformed personnel. This “dis­
posable army” does not come home in flag­ covered coffins, and is rarely men­
tioned when discussing casualties and the  human costs of war.80 As Deborah Avant 
and Lee Sigelman observed in 2010, “Military casualty figures are routinely 
collected and released. The names and  faces of military casualties in Iraq and 
Af ghan i stan are shown nightly on The PBS News Hour. Coverage of military 
deployments is virtually automatic.  There is no such coordinated or automatic 
diffusion of information about contractors, nor are  there triggers to alert the 
media. Casualty figures routinely collected and released by the military exclude 
contract personnel, thus reducing information about the  human costs of war.”81 
Contractors tend to be treated, in other words, as another category of uncounted 
civilian bodies in the vari ous U.S. wars.82
Logistics Contracting in Iraq and Beyond
The scale of U.S. military logistics contracting since the early 2000s is remark­
able. In 2001 Brown & Root, by then called KBR  after a merger with the British 
engineering and construction firm M.W. Kellogg in the late 1990s, won the bid­
ding for the third iteration of the LOGCAP contract (LOGCAP III). In total the 
com pany would be paid more than $40 billion during the life of this contract 
(2001–8), primarily for logistics support in the wars in Iraq and Af ghan i stan.83 
While LOGCAP was the largest contracting program— and KBR the largest 
contractor— during this period, it was just one of many mechanisms for contract­
ing logistics ser vices. Sourcing food supplies and delivering them to bases in the 
region, for instance, was the responsibility of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). 
In 2003 DLA contracted out the job of supplying food to troops in Iraq and Ku­
wait to a po liti cally connected Kuwaiti firm called Public Warehousing Corpora­
tion (PWC).84 In the first four years of operations it earned more than $6 billion.85 
In 2009 PWC (now called Agility), was charged with fraud and received a three­ 
year suspension from receiving further federal contracts.86 KBR and its vari ous 
subcontractors  were also the subjects of numerous claims of cost overruns and 
fraud.87
At this point it is useful to briefly introduce the types of contracts used for con­
tracting during overseas operations, which can be divided into two broad cate­
gories: “fixed price” and “cost reimbursement” contracts. With the former the 
government and contractor agree on a price for clearly specified ser vices or goods. 
30 ChApter 2
The contractor assumes the risk for cost overruns, and its profit is determined by 
the difference between the price and the cost of delivering the goods or ser vices. 
In circumstances where it is difficult to precisely specify ser vices or determine 
costs beforehand— such as operations in warzones— cost reimbursement con­
tracts are more common. With cost reimbursement contracts a price estimate is 
settled on, but the government assumes the risk of “reasonable” cost overruns due 
to contingencies. Cost reimbursement contracts usually include fees that deter­
mine a contractor’s profits based on a percentage of estimated costs, a fixed 
amount, and/or per for mance incentives.88
PWC’s food delivery contract with DLA included reimbursement for the pur­
chase price of food from suppliers and a fixed price “distribution fee” for trans­
portation of the supplies from the U.S. to bases in Iraq and Kuwait. PWC was 
accused of negotiating price discounts with favored suppliers, but not passing 
 these savings on to the government as required, thus increasing its profits.89 LOG­
CAP III was a cost reimbursement contract, with a base fee of 1  percent of esti­
mated costs and an award fee of up to 2  percent based on per for mance incen­
tives.90 Former LOGCAP III man ag er Charles Smith notes that this type of 
contract is frequently misunderstood, with most of KBR’s critics claiming that 
the com pany would increase costs of ser vices to increase its fees. However, if the 
 actual costs of work exceeded the estimate this would not produce extra fees for 
KBR, and it could even lower per for mance incentives. Instead, Smith observes, 
“the prob lem was the period between starting work and negotiating the fee cost 
base.”91 He is referring to the fact that the way LOGCAP typically worked in Iraq 
is that KBR would be issued an unpriced task order—or a modification to an 
existing order— begin work, and then negotiate the estimated cost with the gov­
ernment. This gave it a strong incentive to increase costs at the beginning of the 
contract, with the hope that they would be accepted into the final estimated cost 
base, thus increasing its fees. According to Smith, KBR pervasively submitted 
inflated cost estimates that it could not substantiate, but military superiors un­
dercut his attempts to hold the com pany accountable, eventually leading to his 
dismissal.  These charges are corroborated by Defense Contract Audit Agency au­
dits that found that “DoD contracting officials rarely challenged” KBR’s cost 
estimates even though  these estimates  were “ later found to be greatly inflated.”92
In addition to fraud and profiteering, logistics contractors in Iraq and Af ghan­
i stan have also been accused of mistreating workers, beginning with a series of 
news articles in 2004 that highlighted prob lems of trafficking and other  labor 
abuses, including wage theft and substandard living conditions.93 One of the more 
astonishing details to come out of  these articles was that the military had no idea 
just how many  people  were working for it. In the rush to build bases and imple­
ment vari ous reconstruction proj ects following the invasion, it entered into an 
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untold number of contracts with international and Iraqi firms. The largest con­
tractors like KBR in turn outsourced their tasks to a panoply of subcontractors. 
Responding to criticism that its contracting oversight in Iraq was lacking, CENT­
COM conducted an initial contractor census in December 2006. According to its 
calculations  there  were roughly 100,000 contractors in the country, not including 
subcontractors, which it was unable to estimate.94 Over the next two years it re­
fined and expanded its census efforts, culminating in the publication of the first 
command­ wide census in August 2008. As discussed in the introduction,  these 
quarterly censuses offer a useful aggregate picture of military contracting in the 
region over the past de cade. But it is pos si ble to gain a more granular understand­
ing by examining raw data from censuses conducted in Iraq between 3rd quarter 
2007 and 2nd quarter 2008 that the military released following FOIA requests by 
journalists.95 To date  these data have not been subject to analy sis, despite the fas­
cinating win dow into contracting that they offer.
The first  thing one notices is that the censuses  were a work in pro gress. Re­
porting procedures for data columns such as “mission” evolved over the course 
of the year, from at times detailed descriptions in the first census— “SST [shit­ 
sucking­ truck] ser vices. Fuel is provided for one truck located onsite. The other 
four trucks are fueled outside by the subcontractor” for a waste removal contract— 
toward more standardized and anodyne descriptions like “base support” by the 
last one. It also appears that the military was still having difficulties in accurately 
tracking subcontracted  labor, especially in cases of pyramid subcontracting where 
a subcontractor in turn subcontracts out responsibilities to another firm. The first 
census lists 2,109 contracts and a workforce totaling 136,655. By the last census 
 these figures had risen to 2,452 and 149,378, respectively. The jump in contracts 
and workers was driven in part by the troop surge taking place during this same 
period, but it also appears that a portion of this increase reflects better reporting.
The final Iraq census in 2nd quarter 2008 is not only the most refined, it also 
offers a snapshot of contracting near its peak  later that year. During this period 
the military estimated that 20  percent of the contracting workforce  were U.S. citi­
zens, 38  percent TCNs, and 42  percent LNs. The relatively large percentage of 
Iraqi workers reflected both an increase in employment for training and recon­
struction proj ects connected to the surge, and efforts by military commanders to 
direct more small logistical support contracts  toward Iraqi businesses following 
the introduction of the “Iraqi First” program in 2006.96 The majority of contract­
ing was conducted through  either LOGCAP or the ad hoc, theater­ based con­
tracting framework, Joint Contracting Command­ Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC­ I/A), 
with the former accounting for 37  percent of workers and the latter 35  percent. 
The JCC­ I/A data are the least systematic with regard to categorization and 
description of contracts. This appears to be due to its decentralized structure, 
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with twelve regional contracting offices operating across the country in 2008. 
Nonetheless, looking at the data it is pos si ble to discern that JCC­ I/A contracts fell 
 under three main areas: 1) private security, 2) reconstruction and training, and 
3) logistics support ser vices, with an emphasis on hiring Iraqi companies and 
laborers.
LOGCAP was not only the most significant contracting program in Iraq, the 
companies that received contracts  under its umbrella  were also many of the 
largest military contractors in the country. Leading the way was the prime con­
tractor, KBR, which had nearly 21,000 employees, including thousands from 
Southeast Eu rope, which composed the bulk of its TCN workforce. Following 
KBR was its largest subcontractor, Prime Proj ects International (PPI), with more 
than 10,000 workers. In total nine of the twenty largest PMCs by workforce in 
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Iraq (KBR and eight of its subcontractors)  were firms that received all or a sig­
nificant portion of their contracts through the LOGCAP program (figure 2.1).97 
The largest non­ LOGCAP contractor, with 8,795 workers, was L­3 Communica­
tions, which provided Arabic interpreters for the military.
Combined,  these nine LOGCAP firms employed over 53,000  people, with 
68  percent of them being TCNs, mostly from South and Southeast Asian coun­
tries. The prevalence of workers from this part of the world was due to the prov­
enance of KBR’s subcontracting companies, nearly all of which  were based in the 
 Middle East. Following well­ established recruiting practices and pathways, firms 
like PPI (Dubai), Gulf Catering Com pany, or GCC (Kuwait), and Serka (Turkey) 
tapped recruiting brokers and agencies in countries like India, the Philippines, 
Nepal, and Sri Lanka to amass the pool of laborers needed to fulfill their growing 
contractual obligations in Iraq.98 As I discuss in subsequent chapters, they also 
often brought with them a host of exploitative  labor practices that parallel con­
ditions experienced by  labor mi grants elsewhere in the region. Ironically, KBR’s 
2001 bid for the LOGCAP III contract proposed that the com pany would self­ 
perform most of the required work, as it did in Bosnia, rather than relying upon 
subcontractors, with the government considering this a positive aspect of the pro­
posal that would lessen risk.99
In part in response to accusations of profiteering and mistreatment of work­
ers, the military de cided to move away from a single prime contractor approach 
with its next LOGCAP award. In 2008 the new contract (LOGCAP IV) was split 
among three companies (KBR, Fluor, and DynCorp), who compete for task 
 orders.100 Similar to the Balkans sustainment contract, KBR was chosen to con­
tinue supporting military operations in Iraq  until the withdrawal of troops 
in 2011. However, its operations in Af ghan i stan  were turned over to Fluor and 
DynCorp, with the former charged with providing support to bases in the north­
ern half of the country and the latter the southern. Contracting in Af ghan i stan 
peaked in spring 2012 with more than 117,000 contractors supporting military 
operations.101
In addition to moving away from a single prime contractor, a second inno­
vation coming out of the LOGCAP IV contract is the further integration of out­
sourcing with the military’s worldwide force posture. Five of its six geographic 
combatant commands are now assigned to a prime LOGCAP contractor, while 
KBR, Fluor, and DynCorp continue to split task  orders in the sixth, CENTCOM 
(figure 2.2).102 A global logistics contracting network and workforce for a global 
military presence. We now turn to the histories that explain the prevalence of 
Filipino and Bosnian laborers in this workforce.
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It is the rare news story on foreign  labor at overseas U.S. bases that does not men­
tion workers from the Philippines. From Patap Chatterjee’s description of “cof­
fee shops run efficiently and politely by Indian and Filipino mi grant workers, who 
serve up espresso chai latte and mocha frappers” at massive bases in the  Middle 
East, to Sarah Stillman’s observation about Filipinos who “launder soldiers’ uni­
forms” in Af ghan i stan, to David Phinney’s discussion of  labor strikes in Iraq, Fili­
pino workers are ubiquitous.1  These accounts reflect the fact that many of the 
largest firms providing logistics support for the military over the past fifteen years 
have relied heavi ly on Filipino  labor. Unfortunately CENTCOM censuses do not 
provide information on the country of origin of TCNs, so it is not pos si ble to 
determine the number of Filipinos who have worked in Iraq and Af ghan i stan, but 
by all indications the Philippines has been one of the most significant sources of 
 labor. Even  after the country imposed travel bans to Iraq and Af ghan i stan, thou­
sands of Filipinos  were added to the payrolls of military contractors in the region.
Why is the Philippines one of the primary suppliers of  labor for the U.S. mil­
itary? Certainly cost is a consideration. KBR’s largest subcontractor, PPI, for ex­
ample, typically paid its Filipino workers in Iraq around $500–600 a month. But 
cheap  labor is just one ele ment. Additionally, interviews I conducted in the Phil­
ippines, along with vari ous news accounts, suggest that South Asian workers have 
tended to be paid less than Filipinos, especially when one takes into account the 
exorbitant recruiting fees they must pay back  after receiving a job— fees that are 
often split between recruiters and subcontractors.2 Thus to fully understand the 
3
COLONIAL LEGACIES AND 
LABOR EXPORT
no other nation has felt the force of American power so closely, so 
constantly throughout Washington’s century- long rise to world 
leadership. no other nation can reveal so much about the character 
of Amer i ca’s international influence, both direct colonial rule and 
diffuse global hegemony.
— Alfred McCoy
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link between current U.S. military operations and Filipino  labor requires a more 
historical perspective.
In this chapter I describe two historical formations that influence this relation­
ship. The first followed the U.S.’s annexation of the Philippines following the 
Spanish­ American War of 1898. During the subsequent colonial period, and in 
the de cades following in de pen dence when the Philippines operated as a U.S. client 
state, Filipino  labor was enrolled to facilitate a number of military and civilian 
proj ects. The second was the emergence of  labor export as a development strategy 
pursued by the Philippines in the 1970s. Part of a broader  labor import­ export 
regime between newly wealthy Gulf states and poor South and Southeast Asian 
countries that materialized that de cade, this assemblage— along with its associ­
ated practices and  labor flows— has become imbricated with U.S. military logis­
tics outsourcing through the extensive reliance on subcontracting companies from 
the  Middle East.  After examining  these two formations I conclude the chapter by 
explaining how the prevalence of Filipino  labor in the  Middle East, and the Phil­
ippines’ unique historical relationship with the U.S.,  shaped President Arroyo’s 
decision to support the invasion in Iraq, with an eye to the economic and po liti­
cal benefits she anticipated would accrue.
Making the Empire Work
The year 1898 is a momentous one in the history of both the U.S. and the Philip­
pines, the year in which  these two countries’ histories became inextricably joined 
through the former’s defeat of Spain and annexation of several of its colonies, in­
cluding the Philippines. For many scholars it also represents a transformative 
moment, the point when the U.S. transitioned from a republic to a global impe­
rial power. This transformative view was widely held by contemporaries— both 
proponents and opponents of the new colonial territories. “By the acquisitions 
made during this period, the United States has definitively entered the class of 
nations holding and governing over­ sea colonial possessions” observed William 
Willoughby, an economist appointed to an administrative position in Puerto Rico 
in 1901.3 Rudyard Kipling’s famous poem, “The White Man’s Burden” (1899) ex­
horted the U.S. to embrace colonial rule over the Philippine islands.4 Supreme 
Court justice John Marshall Harlan, a staunch critic, deemed colonial adminis­
tration of the new territories “a radical and mischievous change” and argued that 
“the idea that this country may acquire territories anywhere upon earth, by con­
quest or treaty, and hold them as mere colonies or provinces— the  people inhab­
iting them to enjoy only such rights as Congress chooses to accord them—is 
wholly inconsistent with the spirit and genius, as well as with the words, of the 
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Constitution.”5 Not all subscribe to this vision of 1898 as rupture. The historian 
Paul Kennedy asserts that “from the time the first settlers arrived in  Virginia from 
 England and started moving westward, this was an imperial nation, a conquer­
ing nation.”6 Increasingly, scholars are adopting this longer perspective, arguing 
that nineteenth­ century campaigns to exterminate and/or displace Native Amer­
icans and the annexation and settlement of vast territories across the American 
West need also be situated in the context of U.S. imperial expansion.
Regardless of one’s take on this debate, one fact is clear: from the beginning of 
colonial rule in the Philippines, as well as in the de cades following in de pen dence 
in 1946, Filipino  labor has played a crucial role in the spread of U.S. empire across 
the Pacific and beyond. As early as 1901, when the Philippine insurgency against 
their new colonial overloads was still raging, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Asso­
ciation (HSPA) began inquiring about the possibility of importing Filipino  labor 
to work on its members’ sugar plantations.7 It directed its inquiry to the Bureau 
of Insular Affairs, the newly created bureaucratic entity  under the auspices of the 
Department of War that was charged with overseeing the administration of U.S. 
overseas possessions. Founded in the aftermath of the 1893 overthrow of Queen 
Liliuokalani, ruler of the Kingdom of Hawaii, HSPA was itself a significant node 
in the new network of U.S. territorial possessions. Many of its members had been 
key figures  behind the coup and subsequently became proponents of annexation, 
a goal achieved when Hawaii was incorporated as a U.S. territory in 1898.
Assembling Filipino  labor for Hawaiian sugar plantations foreshadowed the 
current  labor export system in the Philippines. In 1915 a Philippine Bureau of 
 Labor was established to regulate  labor recruitment, supplanting the Bureau of In­
sular Affairs. HSPA recruiting agents  were required to obtain permits from the 
Bureau of  Labor to set up offices in designated provinces. Signed  labor contracts 
 were mandated, and in 1915  labor agreements began including  free transport back 
from Hawaii  after the completion of a three­ year contract. Mechanisms to mon­
itor  labor conditions  were also developed, most notably the position of resident 
 labor commissioner based in Honolulu, which was established in 1923 in response 
to petitions by Filipino plantation workers. Ultimately this did  little to improve 
the conditions of workers as the commissioner, Cayetano Ligot, typically sup­
ported plantation  owners in  labor disputes. This is not surprising since “Filipino 
government leaders remained  under the ultimate supervision and control of the 
United States” and  were “expected to act according to U.S. interests.”8 Nonethe­
less, HSPA agents did not strug gle to find willing  labor mi grants. By 1922, 
41  percent of the plantation workforce was Filipino.9 In total more than 125,000 
Filipinos had traveled to Hawaii to work on the sugar plantations by 1946.10
In the introduction to their edited volume on  labor and early U.S. empire, 
Making the Empire Work, Daniel Bender and Jana Lipman claim that “perhaps 
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the most obvious cohort of workers who built the U.S. empire are  those who la­
bored in agriculture.”11 Arguably no group filled this need for cheap, flexible, ag­
ricultural  labor more than Filipinos in the first half of the twentieth  century. In 
addition to Hawaiian sugar plantations, by the 1930s tens of thousands of Fili­
pino laborers could be found at farms across California, harvesting lettuce in Wat­
sonville, melons in the Imperial Valley, and fruit trees in the Central Valley. They 
 were also recruited to work in apple and cherry orchards in Washington and the 
hop fields of Oregon. Several thousand more  were employed in the burgeoning 
canned salmon industry in Alaska, and by the 1920s the canneries  were “a regu­
lar stop on the seasonal  labor cir cuit that stretched from Southern California to 
Alaska.”12
The demand for Filipino  labor was tied to two po liti cal and  legal developments. 
The first was a series of exclusionary immigration policies that closed off other 
 labor flows, beginning with the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), followed by an in­
formal “gentleman’s agreement” (1907) limiting Japa nese immigration and the 
creation of an “Asiatic Barred Zone” (1917), and culminating in the Immigration 
Act of 1924, which sharply curtailed immigration outside of Northern Eu rope. 
The second concerns a series of opinions issued by the Supreme Court in 1901 in 
the wake of the occupation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Known as the “In­
sular Cases,”  these opinions determined that these U.S. overseas colonies should 
be considered “unincorporated territories,” a new  legal category that situated 
them “in a liminal space both inside and outside the bound aries of the Constitu­
tion, both ‘belonging to’ but ‘not a part’ of the United States.”13 Filipinos, con­
sequently,  were classified as U.S. nationals— but not citizens— and thus  were not 
bound by the immigration laws passed by Congress. JoAnna Poblete usefully 
categorizes  those suspended in this liminal and subordinate po liti cal and  legal 
status as “U.S. colonials.” Exempt from immigration restrictions during this 
period, U.S. colonials like Filipinos and Puerto Ricans experienced remarkable 
 labor mobility. In addition to travel to the mainland, this often involved intracolo-
nial movement “from a colonized home region to another colonized location,” as 
was the case with Filipino sugar plantation workers in Hawaii.14
While their status as U.S. nationals facilitated mobility, it did not protect Fili­
pino mi grants from the experience of racism and exploitative  labor conditions. 
This was especially the case with the agricultural industry in California where they 
competed with poor whites in the  labor market, particularly following the 
migration of tens of thousands of destitute families to California following the 
Dust Bowl in the Plains. Filipinos also threatened entrenched racial hierarchies, 
especially men who dated or married white  women. Thus in the eyes of many 
white Americans at the time they represented a “foreign invasion that challenged 
Americanness, as non­ whites they  were a threat to whiteness, and as a mobile 
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workforce who did not need U.S. passports they  were regular competitors for 
employment.”15 In 1930 violent riots targeting Filipinos spread across Califor­
nia. Growing opposition to their presence culminated in the Tydings­ McDuffie 
Act (1934), which reclassified Filipinos as aliens, established strict limits on 
immigration— with the exception of the territory of Hawaii, “based on the 
needs of [sugar] industries”— and laid out a ten­ year pro cess for Philippine 
in de pen dence.
A second— and more significant for this story— labor cohort involves Filipi­
nos who worked for the U.S. military. As with agricultural work, this can be traced 
to the beginnings of colonial rule. One of the first major infrastructure proj ects 
pursued by the new colonial authorities was construction of a mountain retreat 
in Baguio conceived along the lines of hill stations built by the British in India. 
Nearly 5,000 feet up the Cordillera mountain range in central Luzon, the Baguio 
retreat, and especially the road leading to it, was a labor­ intensive undertaking. 
One of the biggest challenges facing military officials was recruiting and retaining 
workers given the low pay offered, dismal living conditions and the backbreak­
ing and dangerous nature of the work.16 In 1901 an army officer overseeing con­
struction of the road complained that “securing native laborers continues to be 
a most serious difficulty.” To overcome this prob lem the military experimented 
with the use of prison  labor in 1903, a short­ lived scheme that “ultimately proved 
costly and accomplished nothing in the way of road building.”17 Baguio is but one 
of many examples of the use of Filipino  labor in support of U.S. military objec­
tives during the colonial period. Another was the Philippine Scouts, Amer i ca’s co­
lonial army version of the Gurkhas.18 Looking for a more effective means of 
countering the ongoing insurgency, the U.S. Army incorporated the Scouts in 
1901. Initially a 5,000­ strong force, they formed the backbone of U.S. forces 
in the Philippines up to World War II.
More widespread and enduring was the use of Filipino  labor by the U.S. Navy, 
which began in 1901. By the 1920s Filipinos constituted roughly 5  percent of the 
Navy’s workforce, serving predominately as stewards who cooked, washed dishes, 
and cleaned officers’ quarters.19 Reflecting racial and colonial hierarchies that pre­
vailed, in subsequent years they often served alongside African Americans, who 
 were also relegated to  these positions.20 Even in de pen dence did not end this  labor 
arrangement. As part of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement concluded between 
the Philippines and U.S., the Navy was given the right to continue enlisting Fili­
pinos. In fact, following President Truman’s 1948 executive order to desegregate 
the armed forces, demand for Filipino stewards grew as African Americans be­
gan experiencing opportunities to rise up the ranks. By the 1960s the Navy was 
receiving as many as 100,000 applications from the Philippines a year. In addi­
tion to pay rates that exceeded most salaries in the Philippines, the prospect of 
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U.S. citizenship  after three years of ser vice was a strong inducement. Yet Filipi­
nos’ subjugate status as a “brown skinned servant force” continued.21 In 1970 a 
scathing article in the Washington Monthly characterized the Navy’s Filipino re­
cruitment program as “a remnant of colonial rule.” Pointing out that over 
80  percent of the nearly 17,000 Filipino citizens serving in the Navy worked as 
stewards, and that Filipinos constituted more than 80  percent of the steward class 
personnel in the ser vice, the article concluded that the Navy was in effect operat­
ing as a “floating plantation” that used Filipinos as an “unending source of doc­
ile, cheap, and unquestioning  labor.”22
Another remnant of colonial rule was the continued use of several bases by 
the U.S. military, most notably Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base, as stip­
ulated by the Military Bases Agreement. One of the more controversial aspects of 
this agreement in the Philippines— and that which demonstrated most clearly the 
country’s subordinate status as a former colony and now pliant client state— was 
language that gave the military exclusive jurisdiction over any criminal offenses 
committed on bases, even  those involving Filipino nationals. This grant of extra­
territorial jurisdiction contrasted sharply with the 1951 NATO Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) that expressly prohibited U.S. forces in Eu rope from exercis­
ing jurisdiction “over persons who are nationals of or ordinarily resident in the 
receiving State.”23 Following years of protests, an amended agreement in 1965 
brought jurisdictional language in line with the NATO SOFA. Yet opposition to 
U.S. bases continued, reaching a crescendo in the 1980s due to their association 
with the repressive Ferdinand Marcos regime.24 This opposition was tempered in 
part by the substantial role that the bases played in the Philippine economy. In 
1987 more than 42,000 Filipinos worked on U.S. bases, earning salaries signifi­
cantly higher than local prevailing rates. With total wages reaching $82 million, 
this represented “the second largest payroll in the Philippines, topped only by that 
of the government itself.”25 Nonetheless, following Marcos’s overthrow in the 
 People Power Revolution of 1986, several years of tense negotiations culminated 
in a decision by the Philippine government to close the bases in 1992.
The presence of Filipino  labor on military bases was not confined to the Phil­
ippines during the Cold War. In fact it was during this period that the practice of 
recruiting Filipinos to work at overseas bases flourished. From the late 1940s to 
the early 1960s thousands could be found on the occupied island of Okinawa, sup­
porting the military construction boom, working as cooks and performing vari­
ous administrative tasks.26 And during this period tens of thousands of Filipinos 
 were recruited to work for the military on Guam, Wake, and other island territo­
ries across the Pacific.27 According to military officials, Filipinos also began work­
ing at Guantanamo  after the Cuban Revolution in 1959 cut off local  labor 
flows.28 And as noted in chapter 2, Filipino engineers and construction laborers 
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 were widely employed by RMK­ BRJ and other contractors in Vietnam. By 1980 
Filipino laborers could be found as far afield as Diego Garcia.29 Several years  later 
they  were employed by the U.S. contractor Burns and Roe, which managed fa­
cilities for the U.S. Navy in Singapore.30 Indeed, if U.S. empire is defined by its 
global network of bases, as a number of scholars have argued, then tracing the 
flows of Filipino  labor that make this empire work provides a remarkable—if 
partial— mapping of critical past and pre sent nodes in the network (figure 3.1).31 
This is especially true of island bases,  whether  those located on unincorporated 
territories or sites such as Guantanamo and Diego Garcia, where the “ligatures 
between colonialism, vio lence and the law” have produced exceptional regimes 
of sovereign authority and jurisdiction.32
Exporting  Labor
The Philippines has a long history of integration with the world economy. In the 
late sixteenth  century Manila was the epicenter of a Spanish­ Pacific trade network, 
facilitated by regular visits from Chinese junks and the development of the “Ma­
nila galleon” route to Acapulco.33 Additionally, as detailed above, from the be­
ginning of U.S. colonial rule Filipino  labor was a desired commodity for both 
military and civilian proj ects on the mainland and overseas territories. So in one 
sense the emergence of  labor export as a development strategy represents a con­
tinuation and deepening of the country’s participation in global economic circu­
lation. Yet it also, as Robyn Magalit Rodriguez points out, constitutes a striking 
example of government­ promoted and ­ regulated “ labor brokerage.”34
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FigUre 3.1. Filipino  labor flows to U.S. military bases from the end of World 
War II to pre sent
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This policy was formally implemented in 1974 when Ferdinand Marcos 
introduced a new  labor code by presidential decree. This code provided the 
institutional structure for  labor export, including the creation of an Overseas 
Employment Development Board (OEDB) and National Seamen Board (NSB). 
The OEDB was charged with promoting the overseas employment of Filipinos 
(whom Philippine agencies refer to as Overseas Filipino Workers [OFWs]), over­
seeing the conditions and terms of employment on a “government­ to­ government 
basis,” and the recruitment and placement of overseas workers for land­ based 
employment, with similar duties for sea­ based workers discharged by the NSB.35 
Initially the state envisioned a phase­ out of private recruiting agencies, which 
predated Marcos’s presidential decree and  were to be replaced by government 
mono poly, but this plan was reversed in 1978 due to intense lobbying by the agen­
cies and the fact that it had become clear by then that the government was inca­
pable of responding to dynamic global  labor markets as nimbly as the agencies.36 
In 1982 the OEDB, NSB, and other administrative offices  were merged into a new 
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), which is currently 
the primary entity involved in the regulation of overseas employment. Among the 
POEA’s responsibilities are licensing recruiting agencies, regulating the recruit­
ing pro cess, marketing Filipino  labor to other countries, approving manpower 
requests from foreign employers, and monitoring overseas  labor and po liti cal 
conditions.
Demonstrating the central importance that the Philippines places on  labor 
brokerage as a means of raising capital, the code also called for mandatory re­
mittances of foreign exchange earnings by  labor mi grants.37 In this regard  labor 
export has been a  great success, with both the number of OWFs and amount of 
remittances exploding over the ensuing four de cades. According to government 
estimates, in 2015  there  were roughly 2.4 million OFWs working abroad.38 The 
following year remittances from OFWs hit a rec ord high of $26.9 billion, which 
represented nearly 10  percent of the country’s total GDP.39 Indeed, President Ar­
royo was scarcely exaggerating when in 2006 she called overseas Filipino workers 
“our greatest export” and “the backbone of the new global workforce.”40 Her rhe­
toric echoed that of her two immediate pre de ces sors, Joseph Estrada and Fidel 
Ramos, who lauded OFWs as “economic saviors” and a “major pillar of national 
development,” respectively.41 This last claim is more debatable as  there is  little 
evidence that  labor export constitutes a  viable development strategy. In fact, since 
the 1970s the Philippines has grown at a substantially slower pace than other 
emerging economies in the region such as Thailand, Indonesia, China, Malaysia, 
and Vietnam.
The primary driver of  labor export for the Philippines has been the insatiable 
demand for  labor by oil­ rich countries in the  Middle East. In 1975 just 1,500 over­
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seas workers (representing 12  percent of total OFWs)  were deployed to the 
 Middle East. By 1983 more than 300,000 Filipinos (representing more than 
80  percent of total OFWs)  were working in the region.42 Beginning in the late 
1980s East and Southeast Asia also emerged as a substantial destination as newly 
industrializing countries in the region, especially Taiwan, South  Korea, and Ma­
laysia, turned to foreign workers to make up  labor shortfalls in their export­ 
oriented manufacturing enterprises. Filipinas  were increasingly recruited for 
domestic work in the region as well. With the relative decline of this  labor flow 
since the early 2000s, the  Middle East has regained its position as the predomi­
nate destination for Filipino  labor. In 2015 more than half of the 2.4 million OFWs 
worked in one of four Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates [UAE], 
Kuwait, and Qatar).43
As massive as Filipino migration to the  Middle East is, it represents just a por­
tion of the broader  labor import­ export assemblage linking workers from poor 
South and Southeast Asian countries with Gulf petro­ states. In 1985 the foreign 
workforce in the six Gulf countries exceeded 5 million, with laborers from India 
and Pakistan providing the largest contingents of  labor.44 Twenty years  later, an 
estimated 17 million foreigners worked in the region.45  There are few jobs that 
this massive workforce does not do, from highly remunerated occupations like 
banking and petroleum engineering— typically conducted by Eu ro pean or U.S. 
“expats”—to low­ paid jobs in retail, construction, and domestic care that most 
workers from Asia are recruited to perform.
This  labor import­ export dynamic is critical for understanding the prevalence 
of military workers from South and Southeast Asian countries like the Philippines, 
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal. The reason for this is that many of the larg­
est military subcontractors are based in the Gulf states. When  these subcontrac­
tors look for  labor, they turn to long­ standing and well­ established recruiting 
pathways and firms. One example of this is Dubai­ based PPI, which employed 
nearly 4,000 workers from the Philippines at vari ous bases in Iraq in May 2004.46 
When KBR approached PPI the previous summer, the latter’s CEO, Neil Helli­
well, immediately reached out to Anglo­ European Ser vices (AES), the oldest li­
censed recruiting agency in the Philippines. According to AES’s director, Gilbert 
“Nicky” Arcilla, his relationship with the British­ born Helliwell goes back to the 
1970s “when I was selling workers for him in Saudi Arabia.”47 Thus it was natu ral 
that Helliwell turned to AES when faced with the prob lem of assembling thousands 
of workers for PPI’s contracts in Iraq in the span of a few months.
Scholars have generally attributed the introduction of the Philippine  labor 
export policies in the 1970s to increased globalization and the rise of neoliberal 
policy prescriptions advocating deregulation,  free trade, and privatization.48 
Representative of this viewpoint is Rodriguez’s claim that “in a neo co lo nial, 
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neoliberal state like the Philippines,  labor brokerage functions to address the 
failures of so­ called ‘development.’ It is a peculiar kind of ‘trickle up’ develop­
ment as individual mi grants’ earnings abroad become a source of foreign cap­
ital for the Philippine state. The Philippine state remains committed to draw­
ing direct investments from foreign capital through neoliberal economic reforms; 
however, it also heavi ly draws on ‘investments’ from its very own citizens.”49 While 
the rise of both economic globalization and neoliberal nostrums in recent de­
cades are certainly relevant, I believe greater attention should be given to  earlier 
policies and practices devised to facilitate the export of  labor— especially mili­
tary  labor during the Cold War—as  these provided critical institutional anteced­
ents for  later developments.
This is not to say that  earlier  labor migration histories have been given short 
shrift. As Rodriguez observes, “The  labor brokerage system in the Philippines is 
in large part a result of the U.S. colonial legacy in the Philippines.”50 The clearest 
example from the colonial period concerns the sugar plantations in Hawaii. As 
noted above, several ele ments of this  labor system, such as the creation of a Bu­
reau of  Labor to regulate recruiting and contracts, foreshadowed  those instituted 
in 1974. Another pertinent case involved training and placement of nurses in the 
U.S., particularly through the Exchange Visitor Program (EVP), which was es­
tablished in 1948. The EVP was originally intended to be an exchange program 
that would enable participants from around the world to work and study at spon­
soring U.S. institutions before returning home. In the early years most exchanges 
took place with Northern Eu ro pean countries. But by the late 1960s Filipino nurses 
“began to dominate participation in the program.”51 In 1965 Congress passed a 
new Immigration Act, which loosened restrictions on immigration from the Phil­
ippines and other countries in Asia and established a preference system for 
“members of the professions and scientists and artists of exceptional ability” and 
“skilled and unskilled workers in occupations for which  labor is in short supply.” 
Five years  later amendments to the EVP made it easier for participants to change 
their visa status from visitor to permanent resident. Between 1966 and 1978 ap­
proximately 7,500 EVP participants adjusted their status. Thus by the mid­1970s 
export of Filipino nurse  labor to the U.S. was a well­ established phenomenon, 
the significance of which was not lost on Marcos, who in a public speech deliv­
ered shortly before his 1974 presidential decree described it as “a market that we 
should take advantage of.”52
Enrollment of Filipino  labor by the military during the early years of the Cold 
War,  whether as Navy stewards or logistics workers at bases across the Pacific, is 
also an impor tant part of this story, and deserves greater consideration, for two 
reasons. First, between in de pen dence and 1974 this constituted a substantially 
larger flow of overseas workers than other well­ known examples, such as the ex­
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port of Filipino nurses. In Guam alone nearly 28,000 Filipinos  were recruited to 
work on military proj ects by the late 1940s.53 Second, as Colleen Woods and Al­
fred Flores have recently shown, the Philippine state worked closely with the U.S. 
government and private contractors to manage  labor flows, developing policies 
and practices that  were far more enmeshed with subsequent  labor export insti­
tutions and law in the Philippines than is currently recognized. In 1947, for ex­
ample, military construction contractor Morrison­ Knudson secured permission 
from the Philippine Department of  Labor to hire 6,000 Filipino laborers to work 
in Okinawa. To facilitate this pro cess it reached out to the U.S. embassy, which 
negotiated an exchange of notes with Philippine secretary of foreign affairs, Ber­
nabe Africa, that allowed military contractors to pro cess and transport workers 
to “desired areas without further contact with the Philippine authorities.”54 In the 
case of Guam,  labor recruitment was initially handled by Luzon Stevedoring, a 
transportation com pany founded by U.S. veterans of the 1898 war. Its owner, 
Charles Parsons, had lived in the Philippines for more than two de cades and was 
close friends with the country’s president, Manuel Roxas. According to the U.S. 
embassy in Manila, Parsons secured Roxas’s approval to export Filipino  labor to 
Guam in part “ because of its salutatory effects on employment and the balance 
of payments,” illustrating that po liti cal elites in the Philippines appreciated the 
connection between  labor export and foreign currency earnings well before the 
advent of neoliberal globalization.55
The tripartite relationship between the Philippines, the U.S. military, and 
contractors— which Woods persuasively argues is best understood as case of 
“transnational imperial collaboration”— deepened  under the Marcos regime.56 In 
1966 Marcos asked about the possibility of Filipino firms obtaining special con­
sideration for military contracts in Vietnam.57 While this was rebuffed by the U.S. 
government, construction contractors like RMK­ BRJ did turn to the Philippines 
as one of their main sources of foreign  labor. By 1969 approximately 20,000 TCNs 
(primarily Filipinos and South Koreans)  were working at military bases in Viet­
nam.58 Almost 1,000 more  were employed at Poro Point in the Philippines, con­
structing portable piers that  were then towed to Vietnam for use as temporary 
port facilities.59 In contrast to Guam, where the principal attraction of Filipino 
 labor for contractors was that they served as a low­ wage workforce paid less than 
half the wage of native Chamorro employees, the TCN workforce in Vietnam con­
sisted in the main of well­ paid skilled laborers, earning— according to a survey 
conducted by the U.S. embassy— about $6,700 a year.60
In 1968 the U.S. and Philippines concluded an offshore  labor agreement 
that provided guidelines on recruiting and employing Filipino citizens by the 
U.S. military and its contractors “in certain areas of the Pacific and Southeast 
Asia.”61 The agreement includes provisions concerning contractor and recruiting 
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documentation, remittances, transportation procedures, and employee benefits, 
including a minimum wage, holiday pay, vacation and sick leave, health insur­
ance, severance pay, living quarters arrangements, and Philippine Social Security 
benefits. Although the agreement still remains in force, a 1992 ruling by the Fifth 
Cir cuit Court of Appeals in the U.S. effectively gutted most of its provisions by 
deciding that the enumerated employee benefits are required for Filipinos di­
rectly employed by the U.S. military, but not its contractors. The decision rests 
on a distinction in the agreement between “employer” (understood as “United 
States military forces”) and “contractor” (defined as “enterprises . . .  under contract 
with the United States military forces . . .  who may wish to recruit Philippine citi­
zens in the Philippines for employment or re­ employment in the offshore areas 
defined herein”). Though the agreement states that “employment contracts be­
tween contractors and Philippine citizens  shall be consistent with the standards 
and terms established in this Agreement,” the Fifth Cir cuit found that responsi­
bility for ensuring this consistency rests with the Philippine government, not U.S. 
military authorities.62 Despite this  later court decision the 1968 offshore  labor 
agreement remains a direct—if little­ known— precursor to the  labor export system 
established by Marcos’s 1974  labor code, and the first of many bilateral agreements 
signed between the Philippines and labor­ importing countries.63
Profiting from War
Just as Marcos sought favorable conditions for Filipino firms and  labor in the Viet­
nam War, from the very outset of the U.S. invasion of Iraq Arroyo positioned her 
foreign policy to curry  favor with the U.S. in hopes that Filipino companies would 
profit from the anticipated postwar reconstruction bonanza. Indeed, despite a dis­
tance of four de cades, the parallels between  these two episodes are striking, dem­
onstrating both the durability of imperial and client­ state formations and that “the 
foreign policy of the Philippines is intimately connected with overseas employ­
ment.”64  After Marcos was elected president in 1965 he de cided— against substan­
tial domestic opposition—to send a battalion of noncombat (engineering) 
troops to Vietnam as a show of support for U.S. war efforts. In exchange the U.S. 
agreed to increase economic and military aid to the Philippines, while military 
contractors set up shop in Manila, recruiting Filipino  labor.65
Likewise, Arroyo joined the “co ali tion of the willing” in Iraq despite wide­
spread domestic opposition and also agreed to symbolically support U.S. war 
efforts by sending a small contingent of noncombat troops. And as did Marcos 
de cades before, she justified this decision in economic terms, arguing in April 2003 
that companies from countries that joined the co ali tion would “get first crack at 
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the development efforts.” Even if this was not the case, her  labor and employment 
secretary added, “I’m confident that if  they’re looking for skilled workers,  they’ll 
come to us.”66 A few days  after Arroyo assured reporters that the Philippines would 
get “first crack” at postwar work in Iraq, she issued an executive order establish­
ing a Public­ Private Sector Task Force on the Reconstruction and Development 
of Iraq. This task force was charged with facilitating “the participation of Philip­
pine companies in the rehabilitation and development of Iraqi infrastructure” and 
developing “procedures to expedite deployment of Philippine manpower and 
other ser vices in the fulfillment of contracts.”67 Three weeks  after the order the 
task force’s head, Roberto Romelo, was openly bullish on the potential windfall 
that Iraq represented. Traveling to Kuwait to pitch Filipino  labor to U.S. contrac­
tors, he suggested that 30,000 workers in Iraq would be a reasonable baseline, 
due in part to the well­ established Filipino  labor presence in the region. “I’m quite 
optimistic  because we have a track rec ord. . . .  Every one of the prime contrac­
tors I’ve spoken to say, ‘we’ve dealt with you before in the  Middle East and we 
look forward to working with you again.’ ”68
Another  factor in their  favor, Romelo argued, was the rapid deployment of Fili­
pinos the previous year to Guantanamo. “They needed it right away. Within one 
week we had  people on a plane and on the way to Guantanamo.”69 The “they” he 
was referring to was the U.S. government, which reportedly reached out “directly 
to the office of President Gloria Arroyo” in March 2002 asking for help in quietly 
assembling a team of 400 engineers and construction workers that  were tasked 
with building Camp Delta, the main detainment fa cil i ty for extrajudicial pris­
oners in the “war on terror.”70 As it would the following year, the Philippine 
government worked with AES to speed up the hiring pro cess for the benefit of 
PPI, KBR’s subcontractor for the Navy construction contract. Eventually the 
Filipino workforce on Guantanamo would grow to approximately 1,500 in 
number.71
Recruiting agencies like AES  were among the biggest supporters of Arroyo’s 
decision to participate in the postwar occupation of Iraq. They  were also the fierc­
est critics of her imposition of the travel ban in 2004, arguing that it  violated the 
rights of  those who wished to work in Iraq despite the risks.72 The agencies, led 
by AES, or ga nized a series of public protests against the ban in August and Sep­
tember in a futile attempt to force the government to reverse course. Despite this 
both AES and PPI  were feted by the Arroyo administration the following year for 
their success in facilitating the export of Filipino  labor to Iraq, with AES given a 
“Top Performer” award that recognizes especially productive recruiting agencies 
and PPI presented the “International Employer Award” for “displaying continu­
ous preferences for Filipino workers and providing them with excellent  career ad­
vancement and a generous package of employment benefits.”73
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Ten years  after this ceremony, while I was finishing research in the Philippines, 
interviewees  were abuzz with news that recruiting agencies in Manila would soon 
be looking to source up to 400 workers to support U.S. military operations at Al 
Udeid Air Base in Qatar. The headquarters for military operations in CENTCOM, 
Al Udeid was also the epicenter of the rapidly expanding air campaign against 
ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
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It is a beautiful July after noon in northeast Bosnia. I am sitting in a fash ion able 
café in Tuzla preparing for an interview with a former KBR employee named Go­
ran.  After a few minutes he arrives, wearing an expensive Oakley watch and a big 
smile. We order drinks and he starts telling me his story. Goran worked for KBR 
in Iraq for four years, beginning in 2006. Before this he was in law enforcement, 
but “it was barely a survivable salary. Like six hundred [Bosnian] marks a 
month. . . .  I was 28 years old and I  didn’t have my own car, I  didn’t have my own 
apartment.”1 Like so many  others he saw  little chance of his situation improving 
if he stayed in Bosnia. When he heard that KBR was in Sarajevo recruiting, he 
leapt at the chance. “When they came and [ were] like, ‘You want to make $56,000 
or $60,000 dollars a year?’ Fuck yeah, man! And if they offer me anything . . .  I 
mean, I  didn’t go  there to pick a job. I’m  going to take what ever they find suit­
able. So I went  there as a  labor foreman.” The reason for Goran’s excitement is 
not difficult to understand. Working for KBR in Iraq offered the opportunity to 
make roughly twenty times his Bosnian salary.
In a country with a GDP per capita of less than $5,000 and an official unem­
ployment rate that hovered around 30  percent in 2006, Goran was not alone. Since 
2002 thousands of Bosnians have worked for military contractors in the  Middle 
East, Af ghan i stan, and Africa. Thousands more also worked in support of U.S. 
peacekeeping forces in the Tuzla region in the latter half of the 1990s, many 
employed by Brown & Root as cooks, cleaners,  drivers, administrative staff, and 
construction laborers. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that for the past two 
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to tell you the truth, bosnia should be grateful for george bush. 
 because of the wars in iraq and Af ghan i stan  there’s around 10,000 
 people working  there.
— Fedja
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de cades the U.S. military has— directly and indirectly— been the most significant 
source of employment opportunities for  people in Bosnia. This reflects both the 
country’s moribund postwar economy and the scale of logistics contracting by 
the military, beginning with its peacekeeping missions in the Balkans.
Military  labor undoubtedly pays well compared to most work in Bosnia. But 
the experience of  those who have chosen this path is also marked by precarity, 
both in relation to the work itself and the marginalization of one’s social and eco­
nomic position in Bosnia. This is especially the case  after the contract ends and 
 people return home. Goran, for instance, was able to buy an apartment and car, 
help pay for his  sister’s university expenses in the U.S., and support his parents, 
who live on a small pension, but he was unable to return to his previous position 
with the police.  After months of searching he found a job with a local travel agency, 
working for commissions. However, few in Tuzla can afford expensive vacations, 
especially now that the money flowing in from the  Middle East and Af ghan i stan 
has slowed to a trickle. Gradually all of his remaining savings melted away. “I re­
member the exact day when I hit the last hundred dollars on my account,” he re­
calls. “I already started working for the [travel] agency, but  didn’t have any work 
[commissions]. Even now I’m not making any money. It’s just making ends meet. 
That’s it. When I saw my last hundred dollars in the account I had an anxiety at­
tack . . .  How am I  going to live? Yeah, that’s when you think about  going back.” As 
I describe below, the strug gle to re adjust to life in Bosnia, coupled with thoughts of 
finding another job abroad, is common among Bosnians who have done this work.
This chapter traces the impact of military contracting on the social and eco­
nomic fortunes of individuals and communities in Bosnia over the past twenty 
years. I begin by outlining the employment of Bosnians as LN  labor for U.S. peace­
keeping forces in the late 1990s and early 2000s, explaining why this was concen­
trated in the northeast of the country. I also argue that this phenomenon needs 
to be situated within an analy sis of the broader peacekeeping economy of post­
war Bosnia. Following this I describe the shift to working for contractors in Iraq 
and Af ghan i stan, a shift that often led to a dramatic upgrade in pay and status—
at least initially. Fi nally, I explore the duality of prosperity and precarity experi­
enced by Bosnian workers, with a focus on how the latter has been profoundly 
 shaped by social, economic, and po liti cal conditions in Bosnia.
The Peacekeeping Economy in  
Postwar Bosnia
In December 1995 U.S. Army soldiers serving as part of the multinational Im­
plementation Force peacekeeping contingent crossed the Sava River into Bosnia. 
 the WAges oF peACe And WAr 51
They  were accompanied by Brown & Root which, as noted in chapter 2, was the 
com pany contracted  under the LOGCAP program to provide logistics support. 
The primary motivation for using LOGCAP, according to one of the chief plan­
ning officers, was the force reduction caps imposed on the military “JCS [Joint 
Chiefs of Staff] and the President defined some force caps on the number of troops 
we could have. That posed our next dilemma  because our troops­ to­ task estimate 
was well above the 25,000 troop cap for total U.S. commitment. . . .  LOGCAP was 
immediately identified as one of the methods by means of which we could re­
duce the dependence on uniformed ser vice members and meet our construction 
and ser vice requirements within the force caps we  were being asked to accept.”2 
Brown & Root was charged with providing a broad range of support, including 
base camp construction and maintenance, laundry, showers and latrines, food ser­
vice, bulk fuel storage, and transportation of supplies into the country and among 
dozens of camps.
To carry out  these tasks Brown & Root relied heavi ly on local  labor. Almost 
immediately upon arrival in Bosnia it started recruiting as it scrambled to set up 
and manage three initial “force provider” camps in Tuzla and the nearby town of 
Lukavac, which would become the primary logistics depot in the region. Thus 
from the beginning one’s chance of getting this work was  shaped by the contin­
gent fact of where you lived. Sanja, a college student from Lukavac with  little more 
than knowledge of En glish at the time, illustrates this dynamic:
Every body has a dif fer ent story. My story  wasn’t nice. My  mother got 
sick. I was in the first year of college and she got sick, breast cancer. It 
was ’95. It was almost the end of the war. The situation was all bad. No 
money, nothing. You know how it was. Actually you  don’t know. You 
 weren’t in the war. But anyway, we needed money and I had to find a 
solution. KBR was  here [Lukavac]. The military was  here. So I applied— 
actually it was not KBR it was Brown & Root at that time— and I got a 
job in the coke plant [in Lukavac]. So they had a camp in  there and I 
started to work for the MWR [Morale, Welfare and Recreation center]. 
They had a library in the MWR and that’s where I started.
Another successful applicant, Djenan, met two Brown & Root  human resources 
employees in the lounge of the  Hotel Tuzla, where his  uncle worked. They told him 
to come to their office in Lukavac if he was interested in a job. Speaking with a south­
ern Texas twang and colloquialisms picked up during nearly fifteen years’ work with 
U.S. contractors, he describes the chaotic scene at the office in early January 1996:
It was a small office where all the small shops [in Lukavac] are. I was 
like, “This is the com pany?” I  didn’t  really realize the magnitude of it 
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yet.  There  were a shitload of  people out front. Every one in Lukavac knew 
[they  were hiring] by then. Somehow I managed to get through the 
 people and knock on the door. I was waving some resumes of mine. They 
let me in and I went upstairs and had an interview with  these two guys. 
It went on for like 20 minutes. They asked me all sorts of questions. My 
En glish  wasn’t near as good as it is  today, but it was ok, and they said 
“Ok,  we’ll give you a call.” I was walking away and thinking, “What is 
 going on?” You see they had all  these [Bosnian] rednecks coming in 
too. I  didn’t realize they  were plumbers and what have you. . . .  Sure 
enough they called me a few days  later. It was like, “Be in Lukavac at 
7 a.m. [tomorrow] at the cultural center.”
Within months Brown & Root, Navy Seabees, and Air Force Red Horse engi­
neers built a network of more than two dozen camps across northeast Bosnia (fig­
ure 4.1). The center of this network was a series of bases scattered around the 
Tuzla region, anchored by a former Yugo slav air base southeast of the city. In a 
short period of time this would be transformed into Ea gle Base, the main base of 
operations for U.S. forces in Bosnia. A second cluster of camps  were established 
north of Tuzla in the Posavina region to enforce the demobilization of the armed 
forces of the Federation and Republika Srpska (RS) along the Inter­ Entity Bound­
ary Line (IEBL) that divided Bosnia’s two substate po liti cal entities. The Posavina 
region contained some of the most bitterly contested territory of the war, espe­
cially the corridor  running through Brčko that connected the two halves of the 
RS, which was considered one of the most likely potential flashpoints for renewed 
conflict due to its strategic importance and still­ unresolved status  after the war.3 
A third, southern band of camps stretched along a strategic road connecting 
Vlasenica in the RS and Kladanj in the Federation, and the road extending south 
from Kladanj to Sarajevo. Fi nally, U.S. forces and Brown & Root contractors set 
up logistics hubs in Hungary and Croatia, and  were based at Butmir, the multi­
national peacekeeping headquarters in Sarajevo.
The location of U.S. bases in Bosnia was a product of the decision to divide 
peacekeeping responsibilities in the country into three zones. In addition to the 
American zone in the northeast, British troops led operations in northwest Bos­
nia, and French troops  were based in the south. Nordic, Rus sian, and Turkish 
peacekeepers also manned sites to the west and east of Tuzla in the American zone. 
 After the first year of peacekeeping operations most of the small outlying camps 
 were closed, leaving U.S. forces even more concentrated around Tuzla.
As noted in the introduction, the peacekeeping missions in the Balkans in the 
1990s (Bosnia and Kosovo)  were the first time when the number of contractors 
are estimated to have reached parity with deployed troops. The majority of  these 
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 were local hires. According to one study commissioned by the military, Bosnians 
made up 80  percent of Brown & Root’s workforce in the country.4 In addition to 
this they worked in base post exchange (PX) offices and as interpreters for the 
Army, with 300 employed in the latter role by the end of 1996 according to for­
mer interpreters I have interviewed. Brown & Root and the military also con­
tracted with local firms for supplies of construction materials like gravel and 
lumber, transportation equipment, and the completion of vari ous infrastructure 
and reconstruction proj ects. In April 1996, for instance, the military’s regional 
contracting office in Tuzla signed a contract worth 2 million deutsche marks 
with the firm Tuzla Putevi for repair work on the road between Tuzla and the 
Croatian border.5 In short, though  there is no hard data on the total number of 
Bosnians in the Tuzla region working for the U.S. military and the vari ous con­
tracting firms supporting it in the years immediately following the war, I believe a 
conservative estimate would be more than 10,000.6
It is useful to view this workforce through the lens of what Kathleen Jennings 
calls the “peacekeeping economy,” which she defines as “the economic multiplier 
effect of peacekeeping operations via direct or indirect resource flows into the lo­
cal economy.”7 According to Jennings,  there are several ele ments that constitute 
the peacekeeping economy. The first is formal employment with international 
organ izations and peacekeeping forces. Following the war, thousands of Bosnians 
 were hired as proj ect officers, interpreters, or support staff by major international 
organ izations operating in the country such as the Organ ization for Security 
and Cooperation in Eu rope (OSCE), the Office of the High Representative, and 
the UN. Like work for military contractors, this constituted a significant and 
distinct employment sector in the country.8 In addition to formal employment, 
the peacekeeping economy also consists of informal work for international staff; 
the development of industries that cater to internationals like restaurants and 
bars,  hotels and apartments, and the sex industry; and investments in postwar 
reconstruction of infrastructure and housing.9
The peacekeeping economy constitutes a significant portion of economic 
activity in the immediate years following a war, especially in small countries like 
Bosnia that host a sizable international presence. At the same time its effects are 
also highly uneven spatially, as they tend to be concentrated in the national capi­
tal and cities where international organ izations and peacekeeping troops are lo­
cated. Consider the impact of the peacekeeping economy on Tuzla in the late 
1990s. The first  thing to note is that the city and its surrounding region is rela­
tively small, with less than 500,000  people living in Tuzla Canton. Tuzla itself is 
one of the oldest inhabited settlements in Bosnia, due to its saline lakes that have 
been utilized for salt production for centuries. During the time of socialist Yugo­
slavia it became an industrial city known for coal mining, chemical production, 
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and metal working.  These jobs offered security in employment and housing. Fol­
lowing the war, many of  these industries strug gled to regain their footing due to 
a combination of war time destruction and theft of infrastructure and equipment, 
disinvestment, and lack of competitiveness on international markets. As a result, 
industrial centers like Tuzla faced especially difficult economic conditions. Thus 
it is difficult to overstate the impact that the rapid recruitment of roughly 10,000 
 people working in support of U.S. forces, as well as thousands more employed 
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by international organ izations, and the burgeoning ser vice economies offering 
food, entertainment and housing for international staff— including the emergence 
of a large sex industry catering to international civilians and peacekeepers— had 
on the local economy.10
 Going to War
Significantly for  those in the Tuzla region, just as the peacebuilding intervention 
in Bosnia was beginning to wind down in the early 2000s U.S. military activities 
in the  Middle East  were ramping up. So the transition from work in Bosnia’s 
peacekeeping economy to a distant war economy was, for many individuals, made 
without a significant break in employment. One­ third of  those I interviewed in 
Bosnia, for instance, started out as Brown & Root employees in the late 1990s. 
Several more served as military interpreters or worked for organ izations like the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and OSCE before finding positions 
with military contractors in the  Middle East and Af ghan i stan.
Brown & Root employees who followed the com pany (then known as KBR) 
to Iraq and Af ghan i stan in the early 2000s experienced a distinct upshift in pay 
and status. In Bosnia they had been classified as LNs and paid wages that  were 
linked to local salaries. According to  those I interviewed, depending on skills and 
job category wages with Brown & Root in Bosnia ranged from one and a half to 
three times the average salary in Bosnia. This pay range roughly corresponds with 
Catherine Baker’s research on local military interpreters with the British Army 
in Bosnia, who earned two to three times the  going wages.11 Salaries paid by KBR 
in Iraq and Af ghan i stan  were much higher than this, where even individuals with 
no previous experience, like Goran,  were able to earn more than $50,000. Long­
time employees recruited for positions requiring technical skills and/or experi­
ence, like quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) supervisor or procurement 
officer, could make up to $80,000.
The increase in pay was also accompanied by an increase in status. As LNs, 
Bosnians working for U.S. peacekeeping forces  were not able to shop at the PX 
stores or use MWR facilities during off hours.12 They  were also subject to repeated 
security screening procedures by the military, with one worker recalling that  these 
occurred “ every six months, for three to four hours.” And when entering and 
walking around bases their movement was closely monitored and circumscribed. 
To give one example, in May 1997 an article titled “Be Not Afraid” appeared in 
The Talon, a weekly newspaper produced by the Army’s public affairs office at 
Ea gle Base, describing a demonstration of military police dog capabilities. The 
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purpose of this demonstration was to reassure local Brown & Root employees 
who found the dogs “frightening” and “aggressive” during searches and patrols 
on bases.13
In Iraq and Af ghan i stan the military classified Bosnians as TCNs, but as KBR 
employees they stood apart from and above  others working for the com pany’s sub­
contractors. When I asked Elvis, a former military interpreter in Bosnia who 
began working for KBR in the 2000s,  whether the label TCN was ever applied to 
KBR’s Bosnian workforce in Af ghan i stan, he replied, “In KBR I heard the term 
OCN [Other Country National] or TCN, which is the same shit, maybe like three 
times in four and a half years. . . .  You  were a KBR employee and you  were treated 
as such,  unless your point of origin was a  matter of statistics.” As a KBR employee 
Elvis enjoyed a variety of privileges, including possession of a Common Access 
Card (CAC), issued by the DoD or badges that allowed access to military dining 
facilities (DFACs), MWR centers, and PX stores.
The 2008 decision to split the LOGCAP IV contract among three firms— KBR, 
Fluor, and DynCorp— stimulated a second wave of hiring in the Tuzla area.  Under 
this new contract KBR retained logistics support in Iraq and the Gulf states but 
Fluor and DynCorp  were given responsibility for operations in Af ghan i stan. Both 
companies faced a need for  labor, especially following President Obama’s deci­
sion in  favor of a troop surge in Af ghan i stan in 2009. Fluor and DynCorp quickly 
set up recruiting offices in Tuzla. The response was remarkable, as illustrated by 
the following vignette from Larisa Jasarevic, an anthropologist who studies debt, 
divination, and informal markets in postwar Bosnia, about a 2011 visit to a well­ 
known fortune­ teller in Tuzla:
I have been casually visiting Zlata since 2006. In 2011, I found the cups 
[used for divination, reading Turkish coffee remains or ‘mud’] much 
larger and the scope of her vision extended to keep up with the migra­
tion of economic opportunities, from regional, largely informal market 
trade to more transnational pursuits of fortune with American defense 
contractors (KBR and Fluor International) in Af ghan i stan and Iraq. 
Among  those who seek her out . . .  many work for or are applying to 
Fluor International or  else dating, desiring, marrying, and other wise car­
ing for men employed or seeking employment in Af ghan i stan and Iraq. 
A young  woman, anxious about her protracted engagement, walked out 
of Zlata’s room with assurances about the date for her wedding and, just 
as exciting, news of her  future husband’s job offer in Af ghan i stan.14
One Bosnian magazine described the phenomenon another way in 2009 when it 
claimed that the “mass departures to Af ghan i stan” of  people from Lukavac rep­
resented their “answer to the recession” in Bosnia.15
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At the same time, jobs with Fluor and DynCorp  were usually accompanied by 
a reduction in pay and status relative to U.S. contractors and other TCNs. The 
reason is that for the new contract (LOGCAP IV) the Pentagon directed its prime 
contractors to bring salaries for direct hires more in line with prevailing wages in 
countries that they come from—or at least a more reasonable premium to pre­
vailing wages than what had been paid by KBR  under LOGCAP III. DynCorp, 
for instance, classified its employees according to four categories: 1) Expats 
(Americans), 2) Foreign National United Kingdom (FNUK), 3) Foreign National 
Eu ro pean (FNE), and 4) Foreign National Asian (FNA).16 Pay and privileges  were 
roughly equivalent for expats and FNUK employees. My interviews suggest that 
DynCorp paid FNE workers (which  were primarily from Bosnia, Macedonia, and 
Kosovo) less than KBR, with salaries for most positions between $30,000 and 
$50,000. This, of course, was still far more than one could earn in Bosnia—if you 
could find a job. Fluor also set up a tiered classification system that distinguished 
between com pany staff, Americans hired on contract, West Eu ro pean employ­
ees, East Eu ro pe ans, and workers from Asia.  Under this system Bosnians and other 
workers from the Balkans (tier IV) earned 45  percent of what Americans and West 
Eu ro pe ans  were paid for the same jobs.17
Fluor’s and DynCorp’s classification schemes did not just govern pay, they also 
reflected com pany cultures that set their American and West Eu ro pean workers 
apart from Balkan and Asian employees. According to Elvis, who also worked for 
Fluor in Af ghan i stan, “Fluor was very insensitive  toward that. It was OCN this, 
OCN that.” Damir, who also worked for both KBR and Fluor, highlighted the dif­
ference between the two companies with the following story:
Damir: I think in KBR all guys  were the same, you know. Americans, 
Bosnians, Macedonians. Some guys from Eu rope. All  were the same.
Me: Do you mean same in terms of money or same—
Damir: The rules  were all the same. Rules. For Americans, for me. In 
Fluor it was not the same.
Me: Can you explain?
Damir: The first time I went with Fluor and landing in Bagram, some 
HR [ Human Resources] guy from Fluor come pick us up. And that 
flight had some American guys, some Bosnians, Macedonians, some 
Filipinos, some countries from Asia. And that American guy [in HR] 
came and said, “American guys go on that side. And some Eu rope 
guys— from Germany or France—go with American guys.” And then 
he said “Bosnians, Macedonians, and Asians, go on the other side.” 
And first bus came to pick up American guys and second bus came 
to pick us up. And at that time I see it is not the same as KBR.
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Disgusted with Fluor’s treatment of longtime former KBR employees from Bos­
nia, Damir worked just two months with the com pany before returning home.
The greatest decrease in pay and status was experienced by Bosnians who  were 
recruited on “Asian” contracts with DynCorp. This practice began in 2010 ac­
cording to several former DynCorp employees I talked with. The typical Asian 
contract paid between $900 and $1500 a month— less than many who worked 
for KBR as local employees in Bosnia in the 1990s made. Recruiters also falsely 
promised that Bosnians would be able to switch over to a “Eu ro pean” contract 
when they arrived in Af ghan i stan. One applicant, Diana, was told, “ After three 
months, you can change the position.  You’re not  going to stay on this position. I 
can guarantee you that.” It took her two years to obtain a Eu ro pean contract. An­
other Dyncorp employee, Edin, recalls: “When I finished one Asian contract, I 
asked them, ‘Are you  going to give me now Eu ro pean contract,  because I’m from 
Eu rope? Maybe Bosnia is not in Eu ro pean Union, but it’s still in Eu rope.’ They 
said, ‘No way. If  you’re  going to sign this one, sign. . . .  If you  don’t want to sign, 
 we’re  going to buy you a ticket [home].’ I said, ‘Ok, buy me the ticket. Put me 
on the first plane. I want to go home.’ They said, ‘It’s no prob lem. Just go in your 
tent.  They’re  going to call you tomorrow and give you your ticket.’ ” Despite the 
dramatic reduction in salary, DynCorp did not find a shortage of applicants 
willing to work in Af ghan i stan on Asian contracts. In 2010 a Bosnian magazine 
estimated that more than 5,000  people from the Tuzla region  were working in 
Af ghan i stan and Iraq, with thousands more looking for the chance to join 
them.18 For many, clearly, the opportunity to work abroad— even in a warzone 
for as  little as $900 a month— was preferable to struggling to survive in Bosnia’s 
depressed postwar economy.
The Duality of Prosperity and Precarity
The intersection of well­ paying but precarious work and the more general con­
dition of precarity in postwar Bosnia has produced a paradoxical duality of pros­
perity and precarity for Bosnians involved with military contracting over the 
past twenty years. One sign of prosperity is the construction of several new 
apartment buildings in Lukavac and Tuzla that are informally called “Iraq” and 
“Af ghan i stan” due to the large number of  people who have worked in  those 
countries who have purchased flats, often with cash. Another is the consumption 
of luxury goods like the watch that Goran wore to his interview. Expensive 
watches seem to be especially popu lar status symbols with Bosnian men. One 
individual I talked with spent three months’ salary on a Tag Heuer watch in 
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Dubai during his first leave from Af ghan i stan. His wife, he recalls, was less than 
pleased. Vacations to the Adriatic coast are also popu lar among workers, who re­
ceive a month’s leave from KBR and Fluor three times a year.19
The con spic u ous consumption of goods like cars, vacations, expensive watches, 
and clothes is frequently remarked upon. Indeed, one does not need to spend much 
time in the Tuzla region to pick up an undercurrent of resentment  toward  those 
who have worked in Iraq and Af ghan i stan, mixed with criticism that many have 
squandered their money on frivolous purchases. Yet most  people I talked to 
spent the bulk of their earnings on more prosaic  things such as housing, helping 
their  children attend university, supporting parents who live on meager pen­
sions, or giving money to siblings and extended  family members who are strug­
gling to get by.
For  those like Sanja and Djenan who joined Brown & Root shortly  after the 
Yugo slav wars and then followed KBR or other firms to the  Middle East and Af­
ghan i stan in the 2000s, this work essentially constitutes a professional  career, 
spanning the majority of their working lives.  After finishing his contract with 
Fluor for the Ebola mission in West Africa in 2015, Elvis, for instance, had spent 
nearly two de cades working for the military or one of its logistics contractors. In 
addition to amassing  career earnings far larger than pos si ble for all but the most 
fortunate—or po liti cally connected—in Bosnia, nearly all of the longtime KBR 
employees that I spoke with also appreciated the chance to earn promotions and 
pay increases, as the following exchange with Esad illustrates:
Esad: The com pany [KBR] was  great to us. It is very hard to find a com­
pany like that  here.
Me: In what ways was it a good com pany to work for?
Esad: Giving us an opportunity to prove ourselves. To— how to say— 
you had a lot of opportunities working with that com pany. Where 
you started and where you finished.  There was no discrimination. If 
you are smart and can do your job you can move up.
Me: So how many times did you apply?
Esad: How many times did I get promotions?
Me: Yeah.
Esad: Hmmm . . .  five or six. And I applied for maybe ten or fifteen jobs, 
I  can’t remember exactly.
Esad began working with Brown & Root as an “assistant truck driver with SST, 
trash.” Basically his job was to hook up the “shit­ sucking trucks” to latrine tanks 
and make sure they did not hit equipment or buildings when backing up and 
navigating the main camp in Lukavac. By the end of his time a de cade  later he 
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was working in KBR’s administrative center in Kuwait “putting reports together” 
on the com pany’s operational activities in Iraq and Kuwait. This type of  career 
trajectory is not uncommon among Bosnians who began working with military 
contractors in the 1990s.
On the other hand,  there are several aspects of the peacekeeping and war 
economies that fuel precarity, both in relation to the work itself and the margin­
alization of one’s social and economic position in Bosnia. The first, obviously, 
involves the risk of severe injury or death while working in an active warzone, as 
evidenced by the death of multiple individuals from the region. Another  factor is 
the highly contingent nature of employment— both in regard to the ubiquity of 
short­ term contracts and the fact that workers can be immediately terminated 
for violating any one of myriad rules regulating life on military bases. This leads 
to a situation that Catherine Baker, who has researched the position of military 
interpreters in postwar Bosnia, aptly calls “prosperity without security.”20 Addi­
tionally, salaries paid by both peacebuilding organ izations in Bosnia and mili­
tary contracting firms abroad do not include contributions to state employment 
or pension funds. This means that workers are not able to build up credits for 
retirement benefits. Nor are they eligible for unemployment benefits when their 
job ends.
As impor tant as  these  factors, though, are other more existential dimensions 
of precarity linked to the peacekeeping and war economies, especially the ways 
in which this type of work socially and eco nom ically marginalizes individuals in 
Bosnia, which pre sents a number of challenges when their contracts end.21 One 
way this occurs is through a social distance developed through enculturation of 
the mind­ sets and business practices of foreign colleagues, organ izations, and 
companies. Longtime workers like Djenan do not just talk like Americans, they 
have also picked up dif fer ent habits and ways of thinking  after interacting with 
U.S. troops and civilians for years on end that make it difficult to reacclimate 
themselves to life in Bosnia. Tatijana, who has spent her entire life working for 
international organ izations in Bosnia and KBR in Iraq, highlighted this as her big­
gest challenge.
I’m not even sure if I could function in a work system around  here. I’ve 
honestly never worked for a local com pany in my entire life. I’m not just 
talking about the money. It is just the way  things work. The efficiency of 
it. Around  here it’s like, yeah,  we’ll get to it. You’ll get your money when 
you get it. I’m used to working a system where I know I have to do this, 
this, this, and this and do it well to be able to keep my job and get my 
money at the end of the month. Well, the economy around  here sure 
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 doesn’t function like that. It’s who you know, who  you’re related to, and 
stuff like that. That’s how you get a job and that’s how you keep it. It 
 doesn’t  really  matter what your qualities are or what you bring to the 
 table with your experience and skills and knowledge. It’s about network­
ing and, basically, it’s obvious. It’s nepotism.
Echoing her, Sead, who worked for DynCorp in Af ghan i stan, insisted that his rela­
tively brief time with the com pany was a blessing: “I  didn’t stay too long over 
 there. It was only two years and two months. But I know  people who stayed more 
than five years. And when you come home  you’re just lost. You  don’t have too 
much contact with your other friends. You  don’t have contact with your mom, 
or maybe with the wife or with your child.  Because over  there you change as a 
man, a person, like another person. I think it is bad if you stay too long over  there.” 
Samir, who has worked for several international organ izations in Bosnia over the 
past two de cades, put this issue to me most succinctly and poetically when he 
stated, “ After fifteen years with the IC [international community] we  don’t be­
long  here [Bosnia] any more. We are an in­ between  people.”
Another aspect of marginalization  people report is that their experience and 
skills are not valued by Bosnian employers— who also fear that they  won’t work 
for low­ wage salaries— making it even harder to return to the local economy. Ivan, 
who worked for KBR and DynCorp for sixteen years starting in 1996, told me: 
“The prob lem is . . .  nobody’s  going to employ a man who is 40 years old with­
out any kind of experience. Local experience.  There is a kind of, how do you say, 
I  can’t find the word, the locals they do not like  people who worked for rich com­
panies. They think,  you’re full of money, you  don’t need a job, ‘Why [do] you 
need a job? You just spent 10 years working for KBR earning $7,000 to $10,000 
bucks per month.’ ”  After struggling to make a living in Lukavac, he returned to 
Iraq to work for the logistics ser vices com pany, Sallyport, in 2016. This percep­
tion was also articulated to me by a business owner in Tuzla, who bluntly ex­
plained why he tends not to hire  those who have worked for PMCs in the  Middle 
East: “You have somebody that spent ten­ plus years abroad. He lost the feeling of 
 things in Bosnia. Completely useless. He got used to being paid quite a lot. He 
cannot get paid a lot  here. So the motivation for the job is questionable. . . . [He] 
is prob ably waiting for another proj ect to go off [to].” Esad’s experience  after 
returning home in 2007 illustrates the strug gle that many returning workers say 
they face:
Me: What was the biggest challenge [when you came back home]?
Esad: For two years I was applying for jobs in Bosnia. And I  didn’t even 
get an interview. That was the biggest challenge.
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Me: What kind of jobs  were they?
Esad: They  were logistics, transportation. Even as a truck driver. And I 
did not get interviewed.
Me: Did  people tell you why?
Esad: Yes, they tell you. They say  because of incomplete paperwork, or 
say, “You  don’t have the experience.”
Me: They  don’t count experience with KBR?
Esad: No, they  don’t . . .  You have to have about a year or two years’ ex­
perience in the field you are looking for. But in Bosnia. And I  don’t 
have it. I spent twelve years with KBR.
Me: So they  don’t count your work  here in Bosnia with KBR [as experi­
ence]  either?
Esad: No, they  don’t. I  don’t know why.
 After years of applying he eventually found work as a cab driver. Nearly every one 
he knows is in a similar situation. “Sometimes at coffee when I meet  people who 
 were over  there, we ask, ‘Have you found a job?’ And every body is depressed 
 because they  haven’t found a job. It is miserable.”
One alternative to working for someone  else is to open your own business. But 
as Enis, who worked for Fluor in Af ghan i stan for several years, explained to me, 
in a country like Bosnia this too has its downsides.
I was like, “Ok I am  going home and I got some money saved. And I am 
 going to open my own business and live off it, and that’s it.” But [ there 
are] so many risks to opening your own business. From the state— 
papers, laws, unethical competition. [And then] criminals and security. 
So it  really, the time is so bad that I do not dare to invest in anything. 
 Because if I slip then I am fucked. The other day a friend who runs his 
own business— printing, making advertisements— said, “Enis, listen to 
me. I am your friend. If you want to open anything, open a cold beer 
and shut the fuck up and enjoy it.”  Because when he showed me his busi­
ness, how much  people owe him, or how much he owes to his suppliers, 
it’s a vicious cycle. It’s hard for him just to somehow stretch enough to 
pay the guys that work for him, or pay the taxes to the state. So I am 
looking around, applying to local companies.
The challenge of reintegrating with society extends beyond work, as illustrated 
by the following quote from Srdjan, who has worked for several military contract­
ing companies in Bosnia, Iraq, and Af ghan i stan since 1995: “The main strug gle 
is to get resocialized back into civilian life. Especially in Bosnia: unemployment, 
the po liti cal situation, missed growing of  children, failed marriages. Facing the 
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real ity of this life  here. And some guys just  can’t find themselves. And again they 
apply for another mission. . . .  Because unfortunately  there  aren’t many options 
 here, to get employed, have a regular life. So  people,  after some time they get disap­
pointed” (italics mine). The phrase “facing the real ity of this life  here” is significant 
for a  couple of reasons. The first is that I heard variations of it from multiple  people 
when describing their current strug gles  after returning from Iraq or Afghanistan— 
strug gles that echo  those experienced by returning veterans in the U.S. More 
impor tant, though, is how the phrase succinctly references the general experi­
ence of precarity in postwar Bosnia that is linked to a range of po liti cal, social, 
and economic conditions.22 That is, precarity in reference to not just a postsocial­
ist economy marked by high unemployment and the loss of economic security, 
but also to endemic ethnonationalist rhe toric, po liti cal uncertainty, and the on­
going strug gle to return to a “normal life” in the aftermath of violent ethnic 
cleansing and displacement.23 One example of the pervasive experience of existen­
tial precarity in Bosnia is provided by a stunning 2017 news story by the journalist 
Gordana Kne2ević that examines the increasingly widespread use of antidepressant 
and antianxiety drugs. According to medical statistics Kne2ević cites, in a coun­
try of roughly 3.5 million  people  there now are 4.3 million prescriptions for the 
antianxiety drug bromazepam and more than a million prescriptions for vari ous 
antidepressant medi cations.24
In 2014 protests against po liti cal dysfunctionality, corruption, unemploy­
ment, and unpaid wages and pensions by publicly owned companies erupted 
in Bosnia. Nationalist po liti cal parties’ offices, and government buildings— 
including the Presidency Building— were set on fire while tens of thousands 
marched in cities across the country.25 The initial site and epicenter of protests 
was Tuzla. Several scholars have argued that this can be explained by the fact 
that Tuzla is an eco nom ically depressed former industrial city that has also 
been a center of left­ wing, anti­ nationalist politics in the country since the early 
1990s.26
I believe that in addition to their location, the timing of the protests is also 
explainable, in part, by the fact that over the two years prior to 2014 employment 
in the distant war economy contracted in conjunction with the drawdown of 
troops in Af ghan i stan. While the loss of employment of a few thousand individ­
uals may seem small, the multiplier effect of  these jobs in Tuzla is significant. As 
Enis pointed out to me, “Try to imagine for a city or area like this, when you have 
one com pany delivering 5,000 paychecks  every week, multiplied with their fami­
lies. So like 20,000  people directly connected, or earning, putting bread on the 
 table. And it’s gone.” In addition to supporting multiple  family members, the 
earnings and consumption of workers have also boosted a variety of industries 
in Tuzla, from construction and real estate, to auto sales, restaurants, and travel 
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agencies. This injection of money from the peacekeeping and war economies over 
the previous twenty years masked, to an extent, the degree of economic precarity 
in the region. As this money has dried up in recent years, frustration with “the 
real ity of this life  here” has mounted. In the end, the temporary prosperity pre­
sented by military  labor has not offered an escape from po liti cal and economic 
precarity in Bosnia.
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The U.S. military’s ability to proj ect force across the globe rests on the im mense 
logistical resources it can bring to bear, without which the variety of operations 
it has carried out since the end of the Cold War would not be pos si ble. Yet it is 
the rare analy sis of warfare— now or in the past— that gives sufficient attention 
to the import of logistics. One exception is a classic, but little­ known, text on the 
topic written a  century ago by Marine Corps col o nel George Thorpe, who drew 
upon the analogy of theater to illustrate the key role that logistics plays:
Strategy is to war what the plot is to the play; Tactics is represented by 
the role of the players; Logistics furnishes the stage management, acces­
sories, and maintenance. The audience, thrilled by the action of the play 
and the art of the performers, overlooks all of the cleverly hidden details 
of stage management. In the conditions now adhering to the drama it 
would hardly be incorrect to assert that the part played by the stage di­
rector, the scene shifter, the property­ man, and the lighting expert equals, 
if it does not exceed in importance, the art of the actor. . . .  Logistics is 
the same degree of parvenu in the science of war that stage management 
is in the theater.1
As Thorpe perceptively noted, stage management depends on a diverse pool 
of  labor and expertise. Logistics, he argued, is also a multifaceted enterprise with 
activities ranging from transportation of supplies to care of wounded troops.
Conducting the wars in Iraq and Af ghan i stan, as well as rapidly expanding coun­
terterrorism operations in Africa, has involved the movement of a tremendous 
5
SUPPLYING WAR
strategy, like politics, is said to be the art of the pos si ble; but surely 
what is pos si ble is determined not merely by numerical strengths, 
doctrine, intelligence, arms and tactics, but in the first place, by the 
hardest facts of all:  those concerning requirements, supplies avail-
able and expected, organ ization and administration, transportation 
and arteries of communication.
— Martin van Creveld
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amount of goods and  people along lengthy and complex supply lines, the con­
struction and maintenance of hundreds of bases— many the size of small cities—
in remote and challenging environments, and the provision of a panoply of life 
support ser vices like food, laundry, showers, and billeting for ser vice members. 
Consider the remote Arba Minch drone base in Ethiopia that was operational 
between 2011 and 2015. According to military documents, two medium alti­
tude drones, one MQ­9 Reaper and one MQ­1 Predator, flew from this fa cil i ty, 
providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) coverage over 
Somalia.2
Drone operations from Arba Minch  were contingent on extensive logistics 
networks and the diverse  labor of military and civilian workers. If we focus on 
the  people, technologies, and bases that enabled  these flights, we would note that 
the flights  were supported by military personnel and facilities across the globe, 
through a division of  labor that the military refers to as “remote split opera­
tions.”3 From ground station operators and mechanics at Arba Minch to pi lots 
and sensor operators at Cannon Air Force Base in New Mexico (in 2013 Arba 
Minch operations  were led by the 33rd Special Operations Squadron, based out 
of Cannon) to teams conducting data pro cessing, exploitation, and dissemina­
tion in a variety of locations, in total a single Reaper Combat Air Patrol of four 
drones requires the work of approximately 170 military personnel.4 Drone opera­
tions are also sustained by sophisticated sensor technologies, ground control sys­
tems, surveillance and geo­ intelligence software, satellite communications, and 
data relay stations such as the massive Ramstein Air Base in Germany, which 
serves as the primary conduit for data feeds from African drone bases.5
And then  there are the civilian logistics spaces and  labors that animated this 
small outpost of empire. Military personnel at Arba Minch received bimonthly 
deliveries of food from DLA contractor Seven Seas Shipchandlers, a Dubai firm 
that shipped containers by sea from Bahrain to Djibouti City’s port, and then 
hauled them overland to the fa cil i ty. In addition to food supplies regular fuel de­
liveries for the drones  were provided by the French oil and gas conglomerate, 
Total S.A., as part of a $51 million DLA contract.6 Contractors also worked with 
military personnel on site, including drone mechanics provided by the U.S. cor­
poration AECOM.7 The military enrolled local sites and  labor as well. A 2015 life 
support ser vices contract, for instance, stated that the chosen contractor, a large 
nearby tourist lodge, would provide “131 bed spaces, office space for the Medics, 
Chaplain, Defense Operations Center, gym, laundry, internet, space to host a 
closed cir cuit tele vi sion (CCTV), as well as NIPRNET [a U.S. military network 
for unclassified data] access/operations.”8 In addition to staff required to  house 
and feed this contingent, the lodge was expected to supply guards for  hotel secu­
rity. Further afield, it is likely that analy sis of drone data was provided by em­
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ployees at one or more of the Pentagon’s favored intelligence contracting firms 
in the Washington, DC, area.9 In sum, the work required to sustain Arba Minch 
was remarkably extensive given that the base hosted only two drones.
The above example highlights two central ele ments in the support of overseas 
wars. The first is logistics space, which I define as the networked spaces of supply 
and support, including infrastructure, sites, equipment, information, and tech­
nologies that ensure the flow and maintenance of military  people and goods.10 
Of pivotal importance  here is the U.S. “global supply archipelago” of facilities lo­
cated in dozens of countries across the world, including the vari ous bases con­
structed and maintained in the  Middle East, Af ghan i stan, and multiple African 
countries.11 Military operations also depend on civilian logistics infrastructure, 
from ports and ware houses to rail and road networks to border crossings and air­
ports. Echoing Deborah Cowen’s observation about manufacturing occurring 
across logistics space rather than at a single site, it is not inaccurate to describe 
war as taking place along and through a global network of logistics spaces, not 
just on the battlefield.12
The second ele ment— which brings the entire supply network to life—is 
logistics  labor. As outlined in chapter 2, this  labor is performed by an assemblage 
of contracting firms employing thousands of  people from around the world. This 
is even the case with the military’s most impor tant logistics entity, U.S. Transpor­
tation Command (TRANSCOM). TRANSCOM coordinates the military’s global 
transportation system, moving a staggering amount of goods and  people around 
the world by sea, air, and land. In just a single year (from October 2011 to September 
2012), for instance, it conducted more than 31,000 airlift missions, transporting 
more than 650,000 short tons of cargo and nearly 1.9 million passengers.13 While 
airlift is critical, especially for movement of personnel, more than 90  percent of 
goods are transported by sea. In 2011 TRANSCOM’s sealift branch, Military 
Sealift Command (MSC), estimated that “since the start of operations in Iraq and 
Af ghan i stan, MSC ships have delivered nearly 110 million square feet of combat 
cargo, enough to fill a supply train stretching from New York City to Los Ange­
les. MSC ships have also delivered more than 15 billion gallons of fuel— enough 
to fill a lake 1 mile in dia meter and 95 feet deep.”14 Mirroring trends across the 
armed forces, TRANSCOM now relies heavi ly on contractors. In 2016 it esti­
mated that commercial entities provided 90  percent of surface transportation 
(truck and rail), 55  percent of sealift support, 30  percent of airlift cargo, and 
80  percent of airlift passenger transport for worldwide contingency operations.15
The wars in the  Middle East and Af ghan i stan, and counterterrorism operations 
in Africa, have each involved distinctive combinations of logistics spaces and  labor, 
 shaped by geopolitics, physical geography, emergent war time conditions, and 
preexisting economic relations and infrastructure. This has produced, in turn, 
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dif fer ent supply challenges and operational characteristics. Indeed, while the 
goal of logisticians is to ensure the smooth flow of  people and goods, disturbances 
and constraints always lurk, especially in the realm of military logistics.16 In Iraq 
and Af ghan i stan, for example, insurgents frequently targeted truck convoys and 
FOBs. In addition to causing supply disruptions, this also compelled, as discussed 
in the introduction, labor­ exporting states to impose bans on citizens traveling to 
 these countries to work for military contractors.  These dynamics are absent in 
counterterrorism operations in Africa, where the greatest challenges involve dis­
tance and rudimentary logistics infrastructures. Consequently the military has 
been much more reliant on airlift to support “small footprint” operations. It is 
now time to examine the logistics spaces and  labors of military operations in 
Iraq, Af ghan i stan, and Africa.
Iraq: Building, Maintaining,  
and Sustaining Baseworld
In 2005 an incredulous New York Times reporter wrote a story about life at Camp 
Liberty, part of Victory Base Complex surrounding the international airport in 
Baghdad. Contrary to expectations of basic amenities and oppressive heat the 
base, he asserted, had “the vague feel of a college campus” where troops lived in 
air­ conditioned trailers, surfed the internet during off hours, worked out in gyms 
with modern equipment and a variety of exercise classes, and ate at dining halls 
that offered “a vast se lection of food and beverages, ethnic cuisine nights, an ice 
cream parlor and, occasionally, a live jazz combo.”17 Four years  later the paper 
would feature another story about bases in the country, noting that while a part 
of the Iraqi landscape they  were in many ways “a world apart from Iraq with work­
ing lights, proper sanitation, clean streets and . . .  thousands of contractors and 
third­ county citizens to keep them  running.”18
The scale of the military’s base network in Iraq at the height of operations was 
enormous. So too was the logistics  labor required to construct and maintain it. 
Due to the dependence of the former on the latter, the geo graph i cal distribution 
of contractors is useful for limning the military’s presence. This is especially the 
case with LOGCAP workers,  whether employed by KBR or one of its many sub­
contractors. As noted in chapter 2, LOGCAP personnel constituted the largest 
portion of contractors in Iraq in 2008 (37  percent) when the number of troops 
in the county reached its peak. The reason for this is that through LOGCAP the 
military could contract KBR to conduct an incredibly wide range of ser vices 
( table 5.1). Core LOGCAP tasks involved base support activities such as laundry, 
food, billeting, morale, MWR, facilities management, waste and sewage disposal, 
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pest control, firefighting ser vices, and  water and power production. KBR also fre­
quently provided materials management and operations support (but not pro­
curement) for the military’s vari ous supply classes. This involved activities such 
as tracking materials, operating ware houses, and managing bulk fuel distribution. 
In addition to this the com pany performed a number of other ser vices, from en­
gineering and construction to transportation, ice production, and mortuary af­
fairs support.
So what does the military’s baseworld in Iraq look like from the perspective of 
logistics  labor? Drawing on data from the 2nd quarter 2008 contractor census, 
figure 5.1 shows bases according to the size and composition of the LOGCAP 
workforce. Concerning the former I have divided the bases into four tiers, based 
on the number of workers. LOGCAP contingents varied substantially, from just 
thirteen  people at a small FOB called McHenry near the town of Hawija to more 
than 8,700 workers at Victory Base Complex. The smallest tier of sites with fewer 
than 100 LOGCAP employees, like McHenry,  were often FOBs with 1,000 or 
 tAble 5.1. Logistics ser vices provided by KBR in Iraq through LOGCAP III 
contract
Base life support services Supply operations and material 
management (not procurement)
Other operations and services
Facilities management Class I: Subsistence (food and water) Engineering and construction projects
Laundry services
Food services Class III: Petroleum, oil and
lubricants (POL)
Mortuary affairs
Morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) Class IV: Construction materials Retrograde operations
Vector and pest management services Class V: Ammunition Postal operations
Hazardous material storage Class VI: Personal demand items (soap,
toothpast, snacks, beverages, cigarettes,
personal electronics, batteries, etc)  
Ice production
Power generation and electrical
distribution
Class VII: Major items (missle systems,
helicopters, tanks, other vehicles, mobile
machine shops, etc) 
Medical services
Billetting Class VIII: Medical supplies Test, measurement and diagnostic
equipment (TMDE) services 
Water production Class IX: Repair parts
Waste and sewage management
Firefighting and fire protection
Clothing exchange and repair 
Personnel support (badging, etc)
Class II: Clothing, administrative and
housekeeping supplies, individual 
equipment (weapons, tents, tool kits, 
communications gear, etc) 
Transportation (movement control, cargo 
transfer, port/terminal operations, motor 
pool operations and maintenance, line 
haul, etc)  
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fewer troops. At the other end of the spectrum the largest tier of bases with more 
than 2,000 LOGCAP workers  were all, with the exception of the International 
Zone (IZ) complex, situated around airfields used for flight operations.19 The 
majority of  these large bases also served as key logistics hubs (which I discuss 
below).
At most bases in Iraq TCNs constituted the majority of LOGCAP laborers, a 
pattern produced in large part by KBR’s reliance on subcontractors from Turkey 
and Gulf states, whose workers  were almost exclusively recruited from South and 
Southeast Asia. Several thousand additional TCNs— mainly from Bosnia, Mace­
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donia, and Kosovo— worked directly for KBR, scattered among bases across the 
country. Exceptions to the prevalence of foreign  labor fell along two lines: 1) small 
bases where a handful of KBR employees from the U.S. represented the bulk of 
LOGCAP support personnel (i.e., McHenry, Brassfield Mora, Caldwell, and Pali­
woda), and 2) bases located in predominately Shia­ populated portions of the 
country (i.e., Al Hillah, Echo, Delta, and Scania), where KBR subcontracted a sig­
nificant portion of its work to local companies that used Iraqi LN  labor. In con­
trast, bases located in predominately Sunni­ inhabited sections of the country had 
 either only a handful of Iraqi LOGCAP employees or none at all. This does not 
mean that LNs did not work at  these bases, just that  those who did  were typically 
contracted directly by the military through the JCC­ I/A framework. For instance, 
in Balad— the second­ largest base in the country by number of LOGCAP work­
ers with nearly 8,200— more than 1,100 LNs provided base support and construc­
tion ser vices through JCC­ I/A contracts. The remaining outlier among LOGCAP 
sites when it comes to the composition of  labor was Harbur Gate, the primary 
crossing point for goods between Turkey and Iraq, where a small contingent of 
KBR employees and a local com pany split duties.
The sprawling baseworld in Iraq did not come ready­ made.  Every fa cil i ty, from 
small FOBs to large air bases with tens of thousands of troops, was the product 
of massive construction investments and  labor. As Tom Englehart observed in 
2009, the country was “a Pentagon construction site.”20 One journalist working 
for the DoD’s own newspaper, Stars & Stripes, reported that by 2010 the military 
had spent more than $2.1 billion dollars on base construction proj ects in Iraq 
since 2004, with plans for an additional $323 million in proj ects to be completed 
before withdrawing at the end of 2011.21 As astounding as this figure sounds, it is 
likely on the low side. For instance, at just a single base— Balad— construction 
proj ects worth more than $240 million  were completed, initiated, or allocated 
funds between the beginning of 2004 and September 2005 according to a now 
declassified, but heavi ly redacted, base master plan.22 This included $11.8 mil­
lion for a wastewater treatment plant, $12.6 million for an aviation mainte­
nance fa cil i ty, $23.8 million for hospital construction and a class VIII ware house, 
$7.4 million for a postal distribution center, $25 million for a fixed­ wing hanger, 
$2.3 million for a new Army and Air Force Exchange Ser vice (AAFES) shopping 
center . . .  and the list goes on. In total  there  were nearly thirty proj ects in this 
less­ than­ two­ year period. Two years  later the base continued to be a hive of 
activity, a “ giant construction proj ect, with new roads, sidewalks, and structures 
 going up” everywhere.23
In addition to constructing a new baseworld, by the time the number of uni­
formed personnel in Iraq reached its apex in 2008 the military had developed an 
extensive supply network to sustain operations. The linchpin holding this together 
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was Kuwait. How impor tant was the country for both Iraq and wider operations 
in the region? One indication is that over 80  percent of U.S. military forces tran­
sited Kuwait while rotating in and out of CENTCOM, with roughly 1,750,000 
troops passing through in 2008 alone.24 Similarly, the majority of supplies— from 
equipment to food to fuel— entered and exited Iraq from Kuwait. A remarkable 
2009 DoS cable titled “A Big Footprint in the Sand: The U.S. Presence in Kuwait” 
details the multifaceted role this “indispensable ally” played.25 The document be­
gins by noting that the U.S. received over $1.2 billion annually in benefits such as 
“ free access to bases, waived port and air support fees, customs waivers, subsi­
dized fuel and other ser vices.” Bases that Kuwait offered “essentially open access” 
to the military included Ali Al Salem Air Base (the primary airport for moving 
U.S. forces to forward deployed sites across CENTCOM), Camp Buehring and 
the surrounding Udairi Range fa cil i ty (used for “spin­up” or predeployment train­
ing before heading to Iraq), Camp  Virginia (the main staging site for military 
convoys to Iraq), and Camp Arifjan, (the largest surface logistics center in the 
country and home to nearly 5,000 contractors). The military also had access to 
Kuwait Navy Base and Shuaiba, a large industrial port south of Kuwait City, while 
the DLA’s prime food delivery contractor for Iraq, the Kuwaiti firm PWC (re­
named Agility in 2006), utilized the country’s largest commercial port, Shuwaikh 
(figure 5.2).
One of the more extraordinary ele ments of Kuwaiti logistical support involved 
border crossings, where the U.S. was given nearly unlimited control over the flow 
of  people and supplies. One example of this, as discussed in the introduction, was 
Kuwait’s decision not to enforce travel bans to Iraq imposed by  labor ­ exporting 
countries in 2004. Another is the development of border crossings exclusively ded­
icated to the transit of goods and equipment by the U.S. military, co ali tion part­
ners, and military contractors. The first of  these, Navistar, was built next to Al­ 
Abdali, the primary civilian border fa cil i ty between Iraq and Kuwait. In 2005 
Kuwait signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that acknowledged the 
“trust placed in the United States by Kuwait for day­ to­ day management of the 
Co ali tion Forces Crossing [Navistar].”26 The MOU also announced plans to build 
a new dedicated military crossing in the desert expanse several dozen kilo meters 
to the west, which began operations in 2007.
This new fa cil i ty, called Khabari or K­ Crossing, had several advantages from 
the military’s perspective. First, all northbound military and contractor convoys 
 were allowed to stage at Camp  Virginia and other bases in Kuwait and then pass 
through Khabari without pro cessing by Kuwaiti border authorities.27 Second, 
 there was no Iraqi government presence in the vicinity of Khabari, further facili­
tating the unimpeded flow of supplies.28 Third, the new route was shorter and 
safer. The Navistar crossing and main supply route (MSR) arcing through south­
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ern Iraq passed through several towns prior to reaching the first two logistics hubs 
south of Nasiriyah (Camp Cedar II and Tallil Air Base), increasing the risk of im­
provised explosive device (IED) attacks and hijackings. In contrast, the new 
route from Khabari to  these bases was a relatively straight shot through desert with 
“virtually no habitation.”29
Another impor tant aspect of Kuwaiti support involved fuel. From late 2002 
to March 2005, the country supplied aviation fuel to the military  free of charge 
and from 2005 to the end of 2008 it sold fuel at below­ market rates.30 It also ap­
proved the military’s prewar construction of a fuel pipeline that ran from Mina 
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Abdullah refinery in the southeast corner of the country to Camp  Virginia, and 
then forward to a pump station at the border in the northwest of the country, 
not far from where Khabari would eventually be built. Just hours  after the invasion 
commenced, military engineers began extending the pipeline, called the Inland 
Petroleum Distribution System (IPDS), through the Iraqi desert. IPDS consisted 
of thousands of nineteen­ foot­ long, six­ inch­ diameter sections of aluminum pipe, 
joined by coupling clamps. Due to aluminum’s high thermal reactivity, changes 
in temperature could cause the pipeline to shrink or expand by two feet for 
 every fifty sections, thus expansion loops  were required at regular intervals, as 
 were smaller pump stations  every twenty kilo meters. In a remarkable display of 
engineering capability, by late April the completed pipeline— with a through­
put capacity of 720,000 gallons of fuel daily— extended to Tallil and Cedar II, 
360 kilo meters away from Mina Abdullah.31
As the military settled into its occupation of Iraq, it required a more robust 
and flexible fuel distribution system than IPDS, which was a tactical solution de­
signed for use during the outset of operations. By early 2009 nearly 1,500 DLA­ 
contracted trucks a day  were traversing the region delivering gasoline, diesel, and 
aviation fuel from Kuwait, Jordan, and Turkey to a series of large bases located 
along the military’s MSR network that served as primary fuel storage sites (fig­
ure 5.2). From  these facilities fuel was then distributed to the rest of the bases in 
the country. In total the military consumed more than 1.5 million gallons of fuel 
a day, the vast majority of this being jet fuel.32 More than 60  percent came from 
suppliers in Kuwait. DLA also shipped fuel to ports in Jordan (20  percent) and 
Turkey (13  percent), where it was then loaded onto trucks bound for Iraq.33 Par­
adoxically only a small fraction of the military’s fuel needs was provided by sup­
pliers in Iraq, even though the country possesses some of the largest oil reserves 
in the world. In one of history’s many ironies, U.S. dependence on fuel imports 
to sustain operations stemmed from the collapse of Iraq’s refining capabilities due 
to infrastructure damage during Operation Desert Storm and the imposition of 
sanctions in the de cade following.
Af ghan i stan: The Geopolitics of  
Supplying a Logistics Island
Perhaps the defining difference between the Iraq and Af ghan i stan campaigns con­
cerns the spaces and geopolitics of logistical support.34 In the former an exten­
sive road network facilitated the flow of goods, and preexisting Iraqi military 
installations— most notably large air bases situated throughout the country— 
could be developed to serve as logistics hubs. Even more impor tant was Kuwait’s 
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willingness to serve as the primary staging area for personnel and material, en­
abling use of its modern port facilities and airfields, spin­up training at desert 
bases, U.S. control over border operations, and reliable provision of refined fuel 
products. In addition to Kuwait, goods to Iraq could be routed through Turkey 
and Jordan, both U.S. allies. The military’s supply chain for operations in Iraq, 
in sum, was relatively short and robust.
Af ghan i stan, in contrast, is more akin, as Pierre Belanger and Alexander Ar­
royo have observed, to a “logistics island.”35 To begin it is a landlocked country. 
One of the closest ocean­ going ports, Chabahar in Iran, is more than 900 kilo­
meters from the nearest Iran­ Afghanistan border crossing. For geopo liti cal rea­
sons, Iran is not a  viable option for transiting U.S. or NATO co ali tion military 
supplies into Af ghan i stan. Instead, for much of the war the military’s primary 
ground line of communication (GLOC) has run through Pakistan. This is an in­
credibly long supply route with two branches (figure 5.3). The first extends from 
the port of Karachi, to Quetta and the Chaman border crossing, then on to the 
massive base at Kandahar Airfield (KAF), the military’s main logistics depot in 
southern Af ghan i stan roughly 900 kilo meters away. The second, longer— 
approximately 1,700 to 2,000 kilo meters depending on the route taken through 
Pakistan— and more perilous branch to Bagram Air Base, the primary logistics 
center in the north of the country, runs from Karachi to Peshawar, through the 
Torkham border crossing, and then over Khyber Pass into Af ghan i stan. Transit 
of goods from Karachi to Kandahar or Bagram typically takes one to three weeks. 
But accidents, strikes, and delays at the border crossings have often produced sig­
nificant delays, forcing the military “to bud get months for travel that should 
take days.”36
In addition to long supply lines and frequent delays, utilizing Pakistan as the 
primary logistical conduit to Af ghan i stan has presented several other limitations 
and deficiencies for the U.S. military compared with operations in Iraq. First, due 
to Pakistani government restrictions, troops, weapons, and ammunition must be 
flown to bases in Af ghan i stan, whereas in Iraq the military had the option of stag­
ing troops and equipment in Kuwait and then traveling overland to bases. Sec­
ond, the GLOC through Pakistan is much less secure than routes through Kuwait, 
Turkey, or Jordan, with supply operations in the former plagued by pilferage and 
attacks on trucks, bridges, and staging areas. Part of the prob lem is the inability 
of U.S. personnel to oversee the flow of goods. As AMC’s deputy commander ac­
knowledged in 2010, “Once the piece of equipment gets off the boat at Karachi, 
no American [soldier] touches it—it is all contract [ labor]  because of the po liti­
cal situation in Pakistan.”37 Consequently the military has increasingly turned 
to remote technologies such as radio­ frequency identification tags, shipping 
container intrusion monitoring devices, and satellite tracking to combat the 
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prob lem of en route theft.38 A bigger issue has been the inability of Pakistan to 
prevent militants from carry ing out attacks within its territory, a prob lem that 
was especially acute around Peshawar and the Torkham crossing in 2008–9. In 
December 2008, for instance, around 300 cargo trucks and military vehicles 
 were destroyed in a series of attacks on staging yards in Peshawar.39
The most significant challenge, however, has been the fraught geopo liti cal re­
lationship between Pakistan and the U.S. Though nominally allies, contradictory 
interests and mutual distrust pervade the relationship, a tension colorfully cap­
tured by one se nior U.S. diplomat’s characterization of the two countries as “fren­
emies.”40 Indeed, despite public praise by U.S. officials calling Pakistan a crucial 
partner for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns in the years  after 
9/11,  behind the scenes  there is deep concern that the country supports, or at least 
tolerates, the activities of vari ous extremist groups within its borders who in turn 
carry out attacks against U.S. forces in Af ghan i stan. Following the 2011 raid on 
Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad— and reports that he had been hid­
ing out in this military town located only fifty kilo meters from Pakistan’s capital 
for years— such suspicions swelled. Pakistani po liti cal and military authorities in 
turn have their own concerns, including fear that the U.S. is increasingly orient­
ing itself  toward their main rival, India.41 Another irritant from Pakistan’s point 
of view are drone strikes— and occasional cross­ border raids— conducted primar­
ily in the country’s northwest borderlands, the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA). Drone strikes began in 2004, peaked in 2010, and continue to the 
pre sent day. In total more than 400 strikes have been conducted killing up to 4,000 
 people, nearly a quarter of them civilians.42
In 2008 the U.S. began to put into motion long­ standing plans to develop the 
Northern Distribution Network (NDN) for Af ghan i stan, with the goal of reducing 
reliance on the Pakistani supply route. This was not a completely new concept. 
As far back as 2005 DLA had begun sourcing fuel from Azerbaijan and Kazakh­
stan, with roughly 30  percent coming from  these two countries by the end of 
2007. Additionally, prior to 2005 TRANSCOM shipped some food and con­
struction materials across Eu rope to Af ghan i stan by rail.43 It also used air bases 
in Uzbekistan (Karshi­ Khanabad, known as K2, 2001–5) and Kyrgyzstan (Manas, 
2001–2014) as transit centers for flying personnel into Af ghan i stan.44 In addi­
tion to insecurity in Pakistan the NDN initiative was motivated by two further 
calculations. First, troop levels in Af ghan i stan  were growing— even before the 
Af ghan i stan surge implemented by President Obama in 2009— which led to 
worries about a lack of surplus capacity along the Pakistan route.45 Second, U.S. 
officials  were concerned that Pakistan might threaten to close the border as 
geopo liti cal leverage, or in response to cross­ border operations. This was not a 
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theoretical concern as Pakistan closed the border for several days in 2008  after 
the bombing of a military outpost in FATA.46
The NDN was originally constituted by two distinct routes, each with their own 
variants (figure 5.3). The first “Rus sian” route began at the Latvian port of Riga 
(with operations  later expanded to include Tallinn and Klaipeda in Estonia and 
Lithuania) where cargo was loaded onto trains.  After traversing Rus sia, Kazakh­
stan, and Uzbekistan by rail, goods  were then unloaded at the Uzbek border town 
of Termez and then driven to their final destinations in Af ghan i stan. Alternatively 
cargo would be unloaded in Kazakhstan and then hauled by truck though Kyr­
gyzstan and Tajikistan and then into Af ghan i stan at the Nizhny Pyandzh border 
crossing. In 2015 Rus sia rescinded transit permission across its territory, thereby 
closing off this northern cir cuit. The second “Caucasus” route begins at the Geor­
gian port of Poti.  After crossing Georgia and Azerbaijan by rail, cargo is then 
ferried across the Caspian to Kazakhstan, where it is then reloaded onto trains 
that end at Termez. As with the Rus sian route a variant of this approach utilizes 
line haul across Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan into Af ghan i stan.47 In 
2010 the military also began shipping goods through the port of Mersin in 
Turkey, even using overland transport from DLA ware houses in Germersheim, 
Germany, to feed into this second supply line.48
The first NDN shipments began in 2009, and by June 2011 nearly 40  percent 
of supplies to Af ghan i stan  were being delivered via the network despite the fact 
that this was nearly three times more expensive than routing cargo through Pak­
istan.49 U.S. reliance on the NDN routes increased dramatically  later that year in 
the wake of the decision by Pakistan to close its borders to Afghanistan­ bound 
military supplies for eight months following a U.S. military attack on two bor­
der posts that resulted in the deaths of twenty­ four Pakistani soldiers in Novem­
ber. The military also relied upon the NDN to facilitate retrograde— military 
speak for removal—of equipment during troop withdrawals beginning in 2012, 
while at the same time increasingly utilizing airlift to move equipment to sites in 
the  Middle East and Eu rope, where it is subsequently loaded onto ships for de­
livery back to the U.S.50
Any analy sis of the NDN needs to go beyond a narrow economic calculation 
of shipping costs as its development has also affected politics and  human rights 
in the region. The linchpin through which the vast majority of cargo enters Af­
ghan i stan, for instance, is Uzbekistan, an authoritarian state with one of the worst 
 human rights rec ords in the world.51 Or as it was put more delicately by the U.S. 
embassy in Tashkent in 2009 when it was cultivating Uzbek support for the NDN 
scheme, “A non­ democratic regime with a troublesome  human rights rec ord in 
the center of a strategically impor tant, but unstable region.”52 It is also a country 
that is extremely sensitive to criticism along  these lines. Beginning in late 2001 
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Uzbekistan granted the U.S. use of an air base at K2 in the south of the country. 
In exchange the U.S. provided more than $200 million in military hardware and 
surveillance equipment the following year.53 Uzbekistan also received support for 
its campaign against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a group of radical mil­
itants that  were also fighting alongside the Taliban in Af ghan i stan.
This geopo liti cal quid pro quo was not to last. In May 2005 Uzbek security 
forces killed several hundred protestors in the southern city of Andijan, leading 
to calls for an international investigation by  human rights groups, DoS, and a 
number of U.S. senators. Of par tic u lar concern for critics  were reports that mil­
itary hardware provided by the U.S. was used in the attack.54 Angered by  these 
criticisms and fearful that Andijan might be used as a pretext for a “color 
revolution”— especially following the collapse of the ruling regime in neighbor­
ing Kyrgyzstan just months before in the Tulip Revolution— Uzbekistan’s presi­
dent, Islam Karimov, moved quickly to evict the U.S. from K2. The realpolitik 
lesson U.S. officials learned was “to not push Central Asian regimes too hard on 
democracy and  human rights issues, especially when impor tant security coop­
eration and basing rights  were at stake.”55 It was a lesson they would not forget 
during subsequent NDN operations, leading to accusations that they  were “white­
washing . . .  abuses” of the Karimov regime and other states in the region.56
Arguably the most striking difference between Iraq and Af ghan i stan concerns 
the practice and geopolitics of logistics operations within each country. Consider 
the distribution pro cess for food supplies to bases in the two countries in 2008, 
which was supervised by DLA. In the case of Iraq military escorts would meet 
truck convoys at the Kuwaiti border (Khabari) and then travel with them to one 
of the primary logistics centers in Iraq (figure 5.3). From  there truckers would 
unload their goods or pick up new escorts that would travel with them to their 
final destination.  After deliveries  were completed the trucks  were then escorted 
back to Kuwait, where the pro cess would begin again. In Af ghan i stan, in contrast, 
trucks carry ing DLA foodstuffs  were not provided with military escorts,  whether 
hauling supplies to the two primary logistics hubs in the country (Bagram and 
Kandahar) or delivering goods directly to FOBs. Also, rather than entering im­
mediately trucks  were required to stage outside a FOB for at least twenty­ four 
hours in a “cooling yard” where they  were inspected for IEDs by contractors or 
Afghan National Army personnel. Upon completion of delivery, truckers then re­
turned to supply ware houses, again unescorted.57 As with food, DLA deliveries 
of fuel in Iraq  were accompanied by military escorts at all times while military 
escorts  were generally not provided for fuel trucks in Af ghan i stan.58 A 2009 Host 
Nation Trucking (HNT) contract that simplified supply operations by awarding 
contracts to six prime trucking contractors in Af ghan i stan codified this practice 
by stating that the “contractor is responsible for all security” and convoys should 
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be conducted “in de pen dently, without military escorts,  unless other wise deter­
mined by the USG [U.S. government] at its sole direction.”59
Unprotected logistics supply lines, of course, are inviting targets for any  enemy. 
Truck convoys in Af ghan i stan have been frequently attacked— and with deadly 
results. According to one military briefing, attacks on convoys resulted in nearly 
100 fatalities between December 2005 and February 2008.60 As supply operations 
expanded the following year in response to the troop surge, attacks and casual­
ties mounted. Trucking companies reacted by turning to private security com­
panies to protect their convoys, a strategy that was mandated by the 2009 HNT 
contract. In practice, however, private security companies are often  little more 
than thinly disguised fronts for local warlords who run what amounts to a pro­
tection racket, demanding bribes in exchange for refraining from attacking trucks 
that transit territories they control.61
Even more concerning is ample evidence that a significant portion of the fees 
earned by Afghan security companies have ended up in the pockets of the Tali­
ban and other insurgents, perhaps as much as 10  percent of logistics contracts— 
amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars— according to an explosive report 
by The Nation’s Aram Roston in 2009.62 As one U.S. contractor in this article ob­
served, “the Army is basically paying the Taliban not to shoot at them.” Paki­
stan’s subsequent closure of the border would demonstrate that this quote was 
not an exaggeration— and that the practice of paying the Taliban not to attack 
truck convoys is not  limited to Af ghan i stan. Following the reopening of the bor­
der in July 2012, a series of news accounts suggested that the Taliban was more 
adversely affected by the suspension of the Pakistan GLOC than the U.S. mili­
tary. According to one Taliban commander, “The NATO supply [route] is very 
impor tant for us,” and in fact, “stopping  these supplies caused us real trou ble” as 
“earnings dropped down pretty badly. Therefore the rebellion [in past months] 
was not as strong as we had planned.”63
Two years  later John Sopko, head of the Special Inspector General for Af ghan­
i stan Reconstruction, the U.S. government watchdog for military and civilian 
reconstruction efforts in Af ghan i stan, sharply castigated military officials for their 
inaction in relation to this prob lem:
As I have pointed out in our last six quarterly reports, the Army’s refusal 
to suspend or debar supporters of the insurgency from receiving gov­
ernment contracts  because the information supporting  these recommen­
dations is classified is not only legally wrong, but contrary to sound 
policy and national­ security goals. I remain troubled by the fact that our 
government can and does use classified information to arrest, detain, and 
even kill individuals linked to the insurgency in Af ghan i stan, but appar­
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ently refuses to use the same classified information to deny  those same 
individuals their right to obtain contracts with the U.S. government. 
 There is no logic to this continuing disparity.64
Actually  there was a logic. It was just an insidious one. Several Afghan secu­
rity contractors suspected of funneling protection payments to the Taliban  were 
po liti cally connected and ostensibly co ali tion allies. Among  those highlighted in 
Roston’s article  were Watan Risk Management, which was run by two cousins of 
Af ghan i stan’s then­ president, Hamid Karzai, and NCL Holdings, run by the son 
of the then­ defense minister, Abdul Rahim Wardak.
The irony of supply operations in Af ghan i stan providing a key source of fund­
ing for insurgents waging war against U.S. forces is that the decision not to pro­
vide military escorts was motivated in part by a concern for casualties that this 
would entail. In Iraq, attacks on truck convoys in 2004 compelled the U.S. to bol­
ster military escorts, in part to head off travel bans by labor­ exporting states like 
India and the Philippines. Though ultimately unsuccessful in achieving this goal, 
the practice continued throughout the occupation of that country. Providing mil­
itary escorts, however, carries significant risks for U.S. troops. In early 2011 Ste­
ven Anderson, a se nior military logistician who was in Iraq in 2006–7, estimated 
that approximately 1,000 U.S. personnel had been killed while on “fuel­ related 
missions in Iraq and Af ghan i stan,” with the bulk of casualties occurring in the 
former theater.65 Remarkably, this represented nearly one­ quarter of all battle­
field deaths suffered in the two conflicts to that point. Another particularly evoc­
ative article in Armed Forces Journal the following year referred to the “direct link 
between fuel [demand] and casualties” as “logistical fratricide.”66
As noted above, logistical operations in Iraq  were relatively straightforward 
compared to  those in Af ghan i stan. Therefore the decision not to provide mili­
tary escorts for truck convoys in the latter— which was made in late 2003 or early 
2004— made sense, initially.67 In the end, however, attempts to avoid logistical 
fratricide have just displaced the prob lem and ultimately provided the monetary 
fuel for insurgent operations across the country. Logistics contracting in Af ghan i­
stan amply illustrates, in  others words, Derek Gregory’s argument that “the business 
of supplying war produces volatile and violent spaces in which— and through 
which— the geopo liti cal and geo­ economic are still locked in a deadly embrace.”68
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Africa: Developing the Sinews of Support 
for Counterterrorism Operations
In contrast to bases in the  Middle East and Af ghan i stan facilities in Africa tend 
to be small and austere. At one level this reflects the military’s preference for a 
small footprint approach to deployment in Africa Command (AFRICOM) that 
eschews large bases in  favor of a network of small, relatively unobtrusive “lily 
pads” that facilitate force projection across the continent.69 But as the following 
vignette from a Navy SEAL who served as commander of several dozen opera­
tors at Camp Simba in Manda Bay,  Kenya, in 2005 illustrates, this also reflects 
the difficulty of supplying personnel in Africa: “We had no fresh fruit or vegeta­
bles at Manda Bay. Our supply officers in Djibouti tried to get us fresh fruit, but 
it was difficult to transport an orange from Eu rope to Djibouti, from Djibouti 
to Mombasa, and from Mombasa up to Lamu. We ate peaches soaked in syrup 
packaged in MRE bags.”70 Military pre sen ta tions, reports, articles, and  theses on 
Africa almost inevitably include comments about the logistical challenges that 
operations pose due to the “tyranny of distance” and underdeveloped transporta­
tion infrastructure on the continent.71 Consequently, in recent years the U.S. 
military has focused attention on the development of more robust logistics net­
works, with an assemblage of contractors playing a key role in providing ser vices.
Contracting facilitates two related operational priorities on the continent. First, 
it allows the military to maintain a relatively low profile, even as it operates from 
dozens of facilities, including several drone bases and SOF compounds (fig­
ure 5.4).72 Due to Africa’s vast size, contracted air transportation is key, and is of 
par tic u lar importance for SOF teams who conduct operations across a wide swath 
of the Sahel, Maghreb, and Central and East Africa, and who rely on U.S.­ based 
flight contractors. In 2016, for instance, Special Operations Command, Africa 
(SOCAFRICA) issued a solicitation for two he li cop ters based out of a previously 
unknown base in Arlit, Niger, to provide support for military operations in the 
“North and West Africa Area of Operations,” which includes the countries of Mali, 
Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin, Mauritania, Senegal, 
and Burkina Faso. Notably the contract language specified that “aircraft  shall not 
be painted in a color that is close to military colors and paint schemes. A conserva­
tive, predominately white, civilian­ style paint scheme is preferred.”73 Contracting 
documents indicate that the main hubs for fixed­ and rotary­ wing air transporta­
tion for SOF operations include Entebbe in Uganda, and Niamey in Niger.
Airlift works well for small, mobile SOF teams. But as the military expands its 
presence across the continent, the cost and limitations of transporting goods and 
equipment by air has precipitated efforts to develop “adaptive” logistics networks 
that utilize international and African surface transportation firms. In 2011 one 
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of the first such initiatives, dubbed “the new spice route,” combined sealift with 
line haul by local truck companies to move goods between several bases and tem­
porary forward operating locations (FOLs) in  Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and 
Djibouti.74 Following the successful completion of this operation the aforemen­
tioned Dubai firm Seven Seas Shipchandlers was awarded a two­ year contract by 
the DLA to make twice­ monthly refrigerated and dry goods truck deliveries to 
three facilities in the “Ethiopia Operational Deployment Zone”: Camp Gilbert at 
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Dire Dawa, the drone base at Arba Minch, and an unknown fa cil i ty in Negele.75 
This was followed by another two­ year contract in 2013. Nothing is known about 
Negele, though it is pos si ble to infer from the contract that a similar number of 
personnel (~100+)  were located  there as  there  were at Arba Minch, which sug­
gests that it was a key SOF base for missions in Somalia. Seven Seas Shipchan­
dlers and its subcontractors also regularly deliver supplies to Camp Simba, 
which,  according to 2016 contracting documents, has expanded into a fa cil i ty 
that hosts a steady state population of “approximately 325 military personnel with 
potential surges up to 510 personnel.”76 In recent years AFRICOM has developed 
a surface distribution contracting network that extends across the entire conti­
nent, beginning with a 2014 award for contracts worth up to $10 million each to 
five dif fer ent companies “to perform surface transport and distribution of gen­
eral cargo within all fifty five (55) nations of the AFRICOM AOR and Egypt.”77
The use of civilian contractors to the reduce the visibility of military opera­
tions in Africa extends beyond logistics to ISR as well, the best examples being 
two previous manned surveillance operations— codenamed Creeksand and Tusk­
ersand—in West and Central Africa, respectively.78 As with air and ground trans­
portation, contracted ISR operations are by design intended to be as low­ profile 
as pos si ble to reassure “host nations” that are “uncomfortable with U.S. military 
platforms.”79 Tender documents and contracts often include specific language on 
the number of personnel, the flight and surveillance equipment to be used, and 
aircraft appearance, such as a solicitation from 2010 that states that operations 
must “pre sent a relatively inconspicuous pre sen ta tion, including but not  limited 
to: (i) no distinctive US or military markings, other than the required US regis­
tration number and placards, and (ii) no ‘one of a kind’ platform which would 
invite attention. Aircraft should have a ‘slick’ appearance with  little to no exter­
nal variation (i.e., antenna arrays, baggage pods, fuel pods).”80 Small, unmarked, 
civilian planes favored by contractors, such as the Pilatus PC­12 and Beechcraft 
King Air series, also have the added benefit of requiring only a handful of  people 
to operate and being capable of flying out of remote and rudimentary airfields if 
necessary.
In addition to an unobtrusive presence logistics contracting also facilitates AF­
RICOM’s stated goal of organ izing force posture “to maximize operational flex­
ibility and agility.”81 Contractors provide base operations and life support ser vices 
to the growing number of U.S. military sites and operations in Africa. In some 
cases— such as SOF facilities and drone operations in Niger, Cameroon, and 
Somalia; small bases in Uganda, Central Africa Republic, Demo cratic Republic of 
the Congo, and South Sudan that  were used in counter­ Lord’s Revolutionary 
Army operations; and OUA— these contracts are awarded through established 
channels such as LOGCAP.82 In other instances ad hoc solicitations or no­ bid con­
 sUpplying WAr 87
tracts are used due to the small size of the base, temporary duration of opera­
tions, or difficulty in identifying qualified providers. In 2015, for instance, the 
Marine Corps solicited bids to provide base support ser vices for up to four months 
for twenty­ four troops conducting training exercises with the Ugandan military 
at Camp Singo in Uganda in the fall.83 The U.S. frequently uses Camp Singo— 
which is located approximately seventy kilo meters northwest of Kampala— for 
training exercises with Ugandan and other African military contingents, and has 
even established a small fenced compound with buildings, tents,  water tanks, and 
generators.84 But rather than permanently stationing troops  there, it rotates them 
in as desired, relying on short­ term contracts for base and life support.
The development of contracting capabilities in Africa has been accompanied 
by the emergence of an increasingly dense network of sites that facilitate the move­
ment of U.S. personnel and equipment across the continent. Foremost among 
 these are Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs), which the DoD characterizes as 
facilities “with  little or no permanent U.S. presence, maintained with periodic 
Ser vice, contractor, or host nation support.”85 CSLs are typically located at large 
airports and are valued  because they provide “a foothold for conducting the full 
range of military options, forced entry, humanitarian relief, NEO [noncomba­
tant evacuation operation], peacemaking, peace keeping, and other stabilization 
operations.”86 Following the September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Beng­
hazi, Libya, that resulted in the death of U.S. ambassador Christopher Stevens, 
AFRICOM began upgrading several CSLs into staging bases for use by Special 
Purpose Marine Air­ Ground Task Force, Crisis Response (SPMAGTF­ CR) teams 
as part of a strategic shift that military documents and online resumes refer to as 
the “new normal” or Operation New Normal.87  These expanded CSLs are, accord­
ing to one military article, capable of hosting “within hours . . .  nearly 200 troops 
for as long as they need to stay.”88 News accounts and contracting documents sug­
gest that SPMAGTF­ CR bases exist or are being set up in Ghana, Gabon, Sene­
gal, Niger, and Uganda, with SPMAGTF­ CR units also operating out of larger 
military bases in Djibouti, Spain, and Italy (figure 5.4).89 In addition to CSLs and 
Marine staging bases, the Navy also utilizes a number of African ports for fuel 
bunkering. Moreover, all of  these sites are supported by an extensive network of 
logistics nodes across Eu rope and the  Middle East, and existing strategic airlift 
and sealift channels and sites maintained by TRANSCOM.90
AFRICOM’s growing logistics network, in conjunction with an increasingly 
robust assemblage of contractors, ranging from small African trucking firms to 
massive multinational corporations, supports more than 1,700 SOF troops on the 
continent.91 It also facilitates a remarkably large number of military actions, from 
joint training exercises with dozens of African and Eu ro pean militaries (12 in 
2015), to security cooperation activities (400 in 2015), to military operations 
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(75 in 2015), all while promoting flexibility and a low­ on­ the­ ground profile that 
belies this activity.92 This in turn has deepened po liti cal and military entangle­
ments between the U.S. and African governments, especially in the realm of coun­
terterrorism activities.
Similar to the case of securing logistical support in Central Asia for operations 
in Af ghan i stan, the po liti cal effects of  these entanglements have often been del­
eterious. Four of the countries that AFRICOM has established the closest coun­
terterrorism partnerships with have experienced successful or attempted military 
coups in recent years: Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Niger (2010), Mali (2012) and 
Burkina Faso (2014 and 2015). In the case of Mali, the coup was led by Captain 
Amadou Haya Sanogo, a participant in “several” U.S. military training programs, 
while the leader of the most recent coup attempt in Burkina Faso, General Gil­
bert Diendere, was the country’s “point person on the U.S. Trans­ Sahara  Counter 
Terrorism Partnership.”93 Chad, another key partner, has seen several attempted 
coups against an authoritarian government led by Idriss Deby, who himself came 
to power though a coup in 1990. As the Oxford Research Group remarked in a 
2014 report, “The pursuit of counterterrorism operations and basing or logistics 
infrastructure across the Sahel­ Sahara is dependent on maintaining relationships 
and status of forces agreements with national governments,” with the result be­
ing that  these states have become “largely immune from pressure to improve their 
repressive treatment of citizens and po liti cal opponents” due their status as reli­
able partners in the “war on terror.”94 In other words, for po liti cal and military 
elites in the Sahel, binding themselves to AFRICOM’s counterterrorism assem­
blage can be useful for better securing their own authority and privileges against 
potential challengers. This dynamic is not  limited to Africa—or Central Asia—
as the U.S. has “repeatedly collaborated with murderous, antidemo cratic regimes 
and ignored widespread evidence of  human rights abuses” in countries that it 
relies upon for overseas bases of operation.95
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The previous chapter identified logistics spaces and  labor as two foundational ele­
ments of military operations. While the former receives more attention, it is the 
latter that animates war.  Whether drone flights at remote locations in Africa or 
counterinsurgency campaigns in the  Middle East, the U.S. military depends on 
the beating heart of logistical  labor. Due to the increase in contracting, the com­
position of this  labor is increasingly civilian and foreign rather than American 
and uniformed. Consequently the military is now inextricably entangled with the 
business of transnational  labor acquisition, as uncomfortable as it is with acknowl­
edging this fact.
Assembling a constantly shifting workforce of hundreds of thousands of indi­
viduals from around the world is itself a massive logistical undertaking, one that 
involves its own distinctive combinations of sites and  labor. It depends on a vast 
“migration infrastructure” of “systematically interlinked technologies, institu­
tions, and actors that facilitate and condition mobility.”1 Some ele ments of this 
migration infrastructure, like recruiting agencies, government bureaucrats 
and websites, are well known, while  others, such as  hotels and suburban malls, 
less so.
In this and the following chapter I trace the vari ous routes traversed by Filipi­
nos and Bosnians who have worked in the  Middle East, Af ghan i stan, and Africa 
over the past two de cades. The focus of this chapter is  legal, or vis i ble,  labor pro­
curement, while the next examines trafficking and under ground recruiting 
channels. In practice, of course,  legal and illegal recruiting can be rather difficult 
to neatly delineate, and thus it is better view them as positions along a spectrum 
6
ASSEMBLING A TRANSNATIONAL 
WORKFORCE
 there  were so many  people in the streets. Maybe a thousand 
 people. . . .  you would register [with the recruiting agency] and then 
wait,  because you never knew when your name would be called. if it 
was called and you  weren’t  there you missed your chance  because it 
 wouldn’t be called again.  After one week i heard my name.
— Danilo
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rather than dichotomous categories. How, for instance, should one categorize the 
experience of Bosnians who signed Asian contracts with DynCorp  because they 
 were falsely promised that they would be able to switch over to a Eu ro pean con­
tract when they arrived in Af ghan i stan? Despite this deception, I include their 
accounts  here due to the relative lack of coercion experienced by Bosnians com­
pared to the examples of trafficking from South and Southeast Asian countries, 
such as the case of the twelve Nepalese workers killed in Iraq.
For both Filipino and Bosnian workers, the experience of gaining employment 
with logistics contractors has been greatly influenced by their countries’ respec­
tive histories of involvement with the U.S. military, and the Philippines’ position 
as a labor­ exporting state, as discussed in chapters 3 and 4. This has produced 
distinct recruiting pro cesses, as well as differences in the types of firms that seek 
 labor in each country, as illustrated by the following two stories. The first, told 
by Carlos, is at once both serendipitous—in his telling— and indicative of the fran­
tic atmosphere accompanying the mad dash by KBR’s largest subcontractor, 
PPI, to amass thousands of Filipino workers in early 2004 to fulfill its contractual 
obligations in Iraq.
Carlos: I was visiting my wife in Manila. She was a secretary at a school 
near Anglo [AES]. And I saw many  people in the streets. And I just 
got curious.  People sleeping in the street, waiting for an opportunity. 
I saw when I was riding by in a jeepney. So I  stopped.  Because  every 
time I go to Manila I bring my passport and résumé. Then I went to 
 people and asked— I met friends from Pampanga— and they said, 
“They need workers in Iraq, salary is $600 a month.”
Me: So what was the interview like?
Carlos: They asked me about international cooking. How to cook a 
steak, how long, how to make a sauce. I passed all  those questions. 
“OK you are hired. You can go in three days.” I  didn’t even go back 
home to Pampanga, I just waited  there for three days!
Me: Did you tell your wife?
Carlos: I just told my wife, “Bring me some clothes, I need this and 
this.” She said, “Why?” “ Because I am  going to Iraq.”
Me: Did you see your  children?
Carlos: I  didn’t see my  children, only my wife,  because she was work­
ing in Manila. And I left my wife three months pregnant at that time. 
I was  really lucky.  Because many Filipinos  were waiting a month or 
more, but only three days for me.
Carlos’s experience can be contrasted with Asim’s account of obtaining a po­
sition with KBR in 2006:
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Me: How did you get the job?
Asim: I applied online actually. I applied online and one day some 
 woman [working for KBR] called me and said, “Are you still inter­
ested in the job?” “Of course I am.” She asked me if I had a passport. 
She asked “Can you come tomorrow in Sarajevo?” I said, “Why not?”
Me: Where in Sarajevo?
Asim: A  hotel, the Holiday Inn. First I spoke with one guy. A big Amer­
ican guy, a bull like me. He asked  simple questions. He wanted to 
know if I understand, you know, can we speak same En glish language. 
He asked  simple questions about how I travel, what kind of car I drive, 
what kind of weather is outside.  After that I had a conversation with 
three dif fer ent  people about the job.
Me: What kind of job did you apply for?
Asim: I was electric, electric mechanic. That was my first job down  there.
Me: So construction of buildings and wiring?
Asim: Yeah. And I passed all  those tests. And seven or ten days  after they 
sent me to Amer i ca, to Houston. I was in Houston for like four weeks. 
And  after that a straight flight to Dubai, and  after Dubai, Baghdad.
For Filipino workers like Carlos, obtaining a job with a subcontractor such as PPI 
was with few exceptions mediated by recruiting agencies, like AES, which serve 
as the linchpin of the  labor export system established by the Philippines. In the 
absence of such a system, Bosnian job seekers like Asim navigate an alternative 
world populated by  hotels and websites offering job postings or information on 
the recruiting practices of prime contracting firms like KBR. In the following two 
sections I examine further the distinct temporalities and geographies of recruit­
ing in the two countries. The chapter concludes with a brief consideration of the 
logistics involved in assembling a global workforce.
Recruiting Agencies, Body Shops,  
and Fast  Labor Acquisition
Recruiting agencies occupy a prominent place in Filipinos’ accounts of obtain­
ing a job with military logistics firms. This is even the case for many who found 
work in Iraq and Af ghan i stan  after travel bans  were imposed, and agencies could 
have their licenses revoked for working with contractors seeking  labor for proj­
ects in  those countries, as I discuss in the next chapter. The reason for this is that 
while the state regulates  labor export it is the agencies that serve as  labor brokers 
that connect foreign firms with Filipino workers.2 In simplified form, the pro cess 
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proceeds as follows. First prospective employers select a recruiting agency to 
help them fulfill their  labor needs. This is facilitated by  labor niche specialization, 
as the thousands of firms competing for business tend to specialize in certain 
regions and/or occupations to increase their competitiveness.3  After selecting 
an agency prospective employers then register with the POEA, which provides 
accreditation allowing them to seek Filipino  labor. This step can  either be done 
directly or by their chosen firm. At this point the agencies take center stage, re­
cruiting qualified workers and pro cessing them for foreign deployment.4
One significant fact about the industry is that almost all recruiting agencies 
are based in the Metro Manila region, typically operating out of small, nonde­
script office buildings.  There are several reasons for this spatial agglomeration of 
operations. The most impor tant is that being located in the capital next to regu­
lating agencies and foreign embassies facilitates rapid acquisition of required gov­
ernment documents and overseas visas. In addition to this, certification and 
testing for certain occupations, such as sea­ based workers and performing art­
ists, is concentrated in Manila. The city is also host to a large number of occupa­
tional schools and universities that focus on training workers for overseas jobs. 
More generally, as the country’s primate city Manila offers the largest potential 
pool of skilled and unskilled  labor.5
Consequently, living or working in Manila, as Carlos’s story above illustrates, 
greatly increases the chances of learning about overseas opportunities,  whether 
through happenstance or personal connections. One example of the latter path­
way is provided by Flora, who also began working for PPI in 2004: “I have always 
wanted to work overseas.  Because I wanted to give my  mother a comfortable life. 
I applied as a domestic helper [before] but  wasn’t hired. I heard about the job 
 because the secretary of Mr. Helliwell [Neil Helliwell, the CEO of PPI] lived on 
the same street as me. Her  sister is my childhood friend. Her  sister approached 
me and asked if I wanted to work in Iraq. And I said, ‘Yes, why not?’ ”
PPI was just one of several companies seeking  labor in the Philippines shortly 
 after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Another prominent one was the Turkish firm Serka, 
which was awarded a subcontract by KBR for staffing and management of sev­
eral DFACs at bases in northern Iraq in summer 2003. Michelle, the wife of one 
of the first workers hired by Serka, remembers that “in October 2003 when we 
 were riding in a bus  there was a newspaper advertisement for bakers and cooks 
at U.S. bases, and a good salary. When he [her husband] came back from Saudi 
[Arabia] we opened a bakery, but you  can’t make much money  here. So we saw 
the advertisement [that said] ‘Baker $800’ and came to the agency, Blazing [Star]. 
He was in the first batch to go to Iraq. Pro cessing was only 10 days. . . .  This was 
the same time that Bush was  here visiting Arroyo.” Like several Filipino workers 
I interviewed, Michelle’s husband had previous experience in the Gulf region, 
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working as a chef for years in Saudi Arabia. Michelle wanted to work in Iraq too, 
but was told by Blazing Star that Serka did not permit  couples to work in the 
DFACs. So instead she de cided to serve as a local recruiter for the agency.
Local recruiters are another essential component of the overseas recruiting net­
work in the Philippines. Located in villages and towns outside Manila, or on its 
outskirts, they work with agencies to advertise opportunities with neighbors, 
friends, and  family. In exchange they are typically paid a fee for each person they 
successfully direct to an agency. A former PPI employee in Iraq who now works 
as a local recruiter in her village told me she receives 1,000 pesos per person, which 
is roughly $20. Local recruiters may also provide guidance for the application pro­
cess. Michelle estimates that she helped more than 100  people get a job with 
Serka in the de cade  after her husband went to Iraq. Roughly half of  these  were 
from her barangay (village or neighborhood). What is remarkable about this is 
that few had previous experience in the food ser vice industry, and most of the 
men— who constituted the majority of recruits from her neighborhood— did not 
even have rudimentary cooking knowledge. So Michelle devised an informal two­ 
to­ four week cooking and baking “boot camp,” turning construction workers 
and tricycle  drivers into bakers, pastry chefs, and kitchen assistants. “They  didn’t 
know anything when we started. I had to teach them the basics about flour,” Mi­
chelle recalls. “I even approached bakeries  here and asked them if they would let 
the men work without pay for a  couple of weeks so they would be able to learn 
more about it.”
In some cases local recruiters have preexisting personal or familial connections 
with recruiting agencies. AES enrolled  family and friends in the Pampanga re­
gion northwest of Manila, where the Arcilla  family is from. This involved setting 
up temporary satellite recruiting centers in homes according to several workers 
from the region. One, Sam, recalls that “the recruiter was from my barangay, Santa 
Lucia.  There was a  family in that area, which is an extended  family of Arcilla and 
they recruited a lot of  people from that area. And I was just  really lucky when I 
had the chance to work for PPI.  Because I saw this big line when I was passing 
through [Santa Lucia]. I was working as a factory worker. . . .  So I asked one guy 
and he said they are hiring in Iraq for PPI. And I applied.” One consequence of 
this extensive Pampanga­ based recruiting network was a remarkable spatial con­
centration of PPI’s Filipino workforce. Prior to the imposition of the travel ban 
in summer 2004, roughly 70  percent of its workers came from the Pampanga re­
gion, according to AES rec ords.6 The effect could be even more pronounced at 
the level of a barangay containing perhaps a few thousand  people, with dozens 
working on bases in Iraq.
At this point it may be useful to discuss a distinction among military contrac­
tors that shapes  labor needs and one’s recruiting and work experience. In most 
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cases companies  either receive a direct contract from the military to provide spe­
cific services— for example, PWC, which was tasked with shipping food to bases 
in Iraq through its massive DLA contract—or are subcontracted by a prime con­
tractor like KBR for certain tasks, such as  running DFACs on a base, which is what 
Serka was subcontracted to perform. Companies like Serka and PWC come to 
the Philippines looking to fulfill well­ defined  labor needs (kitchen staff and truck 
 drivers, respectively). Hence Michelle’s boot camp to provide her neighbors with 
a basic set of cooking skills and knowledge that would allow them to pass the 
screening pro cess devised by Serka’s recruiting agency.
A second type of logistics firm is what I call body shops. Body shops are com­
panies that have multiple contracts or subcontracts covering a range of responsi­
bilities. Several of KBR’s largest subcontractors in Iraq, such as PPI, Kulak, and 
GCC, began as or evolved into body shops. Another prominent body shop in Iraq 
was First Kuwaiti General Contracting. In addition to holding several subcontracts 
with KBR, First Kuwaiti was also a significant DoS contractor whose tasks in­
cluded construction of a massive new embassy in Baghdad and  running the em­
bassy’s DFAC for the security guard force. In contrast to companies like Serka that 
have specific  labor requirements, body shops provide a variety of ser vices requir­
ing a large pool of unskilled or semiskilled  labor.7 A partial accounting of work 
performed by PPI employees I interviewed is illustrative. Their jobs have included 
construction, washing laundry, serving food in DFACs, guarding Iraqi day labor­
ers, cleaning soldiers’ living quarters,  running MWR facilities, cleaning latrines, 
driving buses on bases, and cata loguing inventory in ware houses.
Filipinos’ accounts of the recruiting pro cess and life on bases make clear that 
body shops tend to see their workers as fungible commodities that can be deployed 
and redeployed to perform what ever task has the greatest immediate need. Nei­
ther Sam nor Carlos, for instance, worked in the fields that they originally ap­
plied for. In Sam’s case he was told by the local recruiter in Santa Lucia that PPI 
was looking for administrative assistants. When he got to the main office in Ma­
nila, AES staff said they wanted masons and carpenters.  Because of his experi­
ence in a factory the com pany de cided to hire him as a construction “engineer.” 
Another early PPI hire, Angel, was recruited as a ware house man.  After a year of 
this work, he recalls, “PPI needed [LN] escorts, so they trained us.” This job en­
tailed  going outside the base and picking construction day laborers from among 
the throngs of Iraqis looking for work: “We would go outside the gate. And we 
 were escorted by military  because we  don’t have a gun. And we go outside and if 
the com pany need 100 person we select  there. We went to a place like a cottage 
where  there was more than a hundred  people sitting around waiting. And we 
would pick the workers needed.” Angel was chosen for this job  because he spoke 
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some Arabic as a result of time working in Saudi Arabia in the late 1970s and  doing 
reconstruction and cleanup work “in Kuwait in 1991  after the war.”
PPI workers hired during  those early hectic months also describe a minimal­
ist recruiting and vetting pro cess in which an applicant’s skills and experience  were 
secondary considerations. Flora recalls that interviews—if one can even call them 
that— were conducted in groups of ten to twelve applicants at once. The first in­
volved an AES employee who “asked how we found out about the job. And that’s 
it.” Following this she was escorted with the other applicants into a room with 
Neil Helliwell. “The only question he asked was, ‘ Aren’t you afraid of  going to a 
warzone?’ I said, ‘No.’ ” Shortly afterward she was informed that she was hired. 
Another PPI employee, Fidel, also remembers meeting Helliwell with ten other 
applicants: “The interview was not very hard. Just, ‘OK. You want to go to Iraq. 
Why? Are you willing?’ ‘Yes sir, I’m willing sir.’ ‘OK. What’s your category? What 
do you know? What’s your job?’ Like this. . . .  At that time if any position is avail­
able you grabbed it. It was very easy  because this Neil Helliwell, he knows that 
Filipinos are— what did he call it?—we can be put in a dif fer ent place, very easy 
to train, like, ‘flexible Filipinos.’ ” Fidel applied as a ware house man and forklift 
driver, which matched his experience. Upon arriving in Iraq he was assigned to 
 house keeping, where he worked for the next two years before transferring to a 
ware house position.
That body shops figure prominently in cases of trafficking and egregious  labor 
abuses in Iraq and Af ghan i stan is not unrelated to their dehumanizing view of 
workers as commodities. First Kuwaiti, for example, recruited dozens of Filipi­
nos to work on its embassy proj ect in Iraq  under false pretenses, originally prom­
ising them jobs at luxury  hotels in Kuwait and Dubai. As for PPI, according to 
one former KBR administrator, in 2004 its man camp at Victory Base Complex 
in Baghdad “looked like a concentration camp” with workers standing in lines 
waiting to be served “curry and fish heads from big old pots” and eating “outside 
in 140 degree heat.”8
Despite this, many I talked with echo Carlos and Fidel in describing themselves 
as “lucky” to get hired by subcontractors like PPI and Serka. They cite several 
 factors that makes employment on military bases in the region more desirable 
than similar positions for civilian proj ects in  Middle East. Perhaps the most 
impor tant is that  these jobs tend to pay more than nonmilitary work. A salary of 
$600 a month for washing laundry, $450 working as a kitchen assistant, or $800 
as a baker could be $100–400 more than the same job in Saudi Arabia or the 
UAE. Moreover, companies in  those countries often deduct expenses for  either 
accommodation or food, resulting in an effective monthly wage $100–200 less 
than stated in a formal contract. Such deductions are not applied to workers on 
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military bases. Similarly, for positions in the  Middle East, recruiting agencies 
often charge successful applicants fees of several hundred dollars.  These fees os­
tensibly cover pro cessing and  labor expenditures. They also bolster profit mar­
gins, with foreign employers offloading  these costs onto  labor mi grants. In 
2003–4 military contractors  were so desperate to quickly amass large work­
forces that they instructed their agencies in the Philippines to waive recruiting 
fees, instead paying them sufficient amounts per employee to cover both pro­
cessing costs and profit margins. In fact, Serka’s original agency partner, Blazing 
Star, was fired when the com pany learned that it was still charging recruits several 
hundred dollars despite  these extra payments.
A final  factor is the relaxation of age restrictions. Several  people with experi­
ence in the region told me that companies in the  Middle East refuse to hire older 
workers, with cutoffs ranging between thirty­ five and forty years of age depending 
on the com pany and industry. On bases in Iraq and Af ghan i stan  these restrictions 
have tended to be substantially looser. One Serka worker I interviewed was nearly 
sixty when he was hired. Another PPI employee— who worked in the region for 
more than a de cade prior to 2003, including for military contractors in Kuwait 
repairing oil infrastructure following the first Gulf War in 1991— recalls, “At the 
time I was forty­ nine, and Anglo [AES] had an age limit of fifty,  because it was a 
warzone. At that age, in other places, work is not allowed.”
 These  factors— especially the lack of recruiting fees and relaxed age 
restrictions— reflect the im mense pressure subcontractors  were  under to assem­
ble a large pool of workers to perform contracted tasks in 2003–4. As noted in 
chapter 2, KBR’s bid for the LOGCAP III contract stated that the com pany would 
self­ perform most of the required work. While this was feasible for relatively 
smaller operations like the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, such 
plans  were overwhelmed by the immensity of  labor requirements to support mil­
itary campaigns in the  Middle East. Following the end of the first phase of opera­
tions in Iraq in May 2003, the military insisted on a rapid scaling up of logistical 
support. That month Army officers ordered KBR to establish more than thirty 
DFACs at bases across the country, with the expectation that troops would be able 
to eat “franks and beans” and other hot food by July 4th. In the ensuing months 
the com pany “went from supporting tens of thousands to supporting hundreds 
of thousands,” necessitating the turn to subcontractors.9
Another prob lem KBR and other military contractors faced concerning  labor 
was that they  were initially barred by the U.S. government from hiring Iraqis due 
to security concerns. Indeed, PWC’s first response to the travel bans in 2004 was 
to inquire with the U.S. embassy in Kuwait about the possibility of hiring Iraqi 
 drivers, a request that was turned down. Former KBR supervisor Mike Lamb also 
identified this as a key reason his com pany turned to subcontractors from the re­
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gion to acquire the necessary  labor: “ Going into this war, the original intention 
was to use Iraqis for  labor. . . .  We  were  going to use locals. We  were  going to help 
the economy. We  were  going to hire  people who  were unemployed. But for secu­
rity reasons we hired  labor that has been working in the  Middle East for de cades. 
Indonesians, Filipinos, Indians . . .  had been working in countries like Kuwait, 
Dubai, Saudi Arabia. And they  were [working for] companies that already had 
the supply lines for the  labor.”10 With a supportive government and a well­ 
developed recruiting industry, the Philippines was a logical supply line to turn to 
for  labor needs.
No com pany assembled a larger workforce in  these first few hectic months than 
PPI. By early September 2003 its recruiting efforts in the Philippines  were in full 
swing. In the ensuing seven months the com pany sent more than 4,000 workers 
to Iraq, an average of nearly 150 a week. Every one I talked with who was hired by 
the com pany in this period highlighted the crowd of applicants outside the AES 
office. According to Nicky Arcilla, at its peak the agency was receiving 1,500–2,000 
applications a day.11 Thousands of  people like Danilo— mostly from Pampanga 
and towns near Manila— slept on the street and sidewalks outside the agency 
 because it was too difficult to go home  every night and they feared losing a job if 
their name was called when they  were not  there. Eventually nearby residences 
started to sell food and offer use of their showers and toilets for a fee.
It was not just the recruiting pro cess that was rushed. Isko recalls an equally 
fast deployment schedule: “ After your name was called you would be sent directly 
to the rooftop [of the AES office] and not allowed to go home again.  Because to­
morrow might be a flight. Once the flight was scheduled you went to the airport 
and signed the contract  there.  After this we went directly to the special immigra­
tion lane for PPI workers. All passengers on the plane  were PPI—200 plus!” Such 
expediency was facilitated by foreign embassies and the Philippine government, 
who worked closely with recruiting agencies and subcontracting companies to 
speed up pro cessing. Though not  going into detail, Arcilla acknowledges that his 
com pany received “special privilege[s] . . .  to pro cess them [workers], expedite 
the papers” from the POEA.12 Likewise, at the peak of Serka’s hiring binge the 
Turkish embassy devoted resources to pro cess more than a 100 visa applications 
in less than a day, a task that would typically take a week.
When the Philippines imposed its travel ban to Iraq in August 2004, authori­
ties estimated that nearly 5,000 Filipinos recruited through official channels  were 
already working in the country for military contractors (this total did not include 
truck  drivers hauling goods from Kuwait to Iraq), with 1,000 more in transit at 
Dubai and another 6,000 “in the pipeline to go to Iraq.”13 Eventually a good num­
ber of  these 7,000  people caught up in the ban would find their way to bases in 
Iraq or Af ghan i stan,  either through their own means or with the help of recruiters 
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that continued to ply their trade for military contractors despite the ban and 
threat of delicensing. That, though, is a story to be told in chapter 7. Before this 
I need to describe the Bosnian recruiting pro cess, which differs significantly from 
the Philippine one.
Navigating Websites,  Hotels,  
and Shifting Prime Contractors
Whereas the Philippines has a robust recruiting ecosystem and a well­ developed 
institutional framework that facilitates  labor export, companies looking to the Bal­
kans for  labor have had to develop their own procedures and provide their own 
recruiting manpower. Consequently  there are significant differences in the re­
cruiting pro cess in the region, as well as the type of military contractors that seek 
 labor.  These differences are manifest in the distinctive narrative anchors and spaces 
highlighted by  those I talked with in Bosnia. In contrast to Filipino workers, whose 
world is populated by subcontractors, recruiting agencies, and government poli­
cies and bureaucrats, Bosnian narratives stress a shifting constellation of LOG­
CAP prime contractors, websites, and  hotels scattered across multiple continents.
In comparing experiences of Bosnian and Filipino laborers, it is necessary to 
start with the observation that the Bosnian state is completely absent in  either reg­
ulating or facilitating overseas  labor recruitment by foreign firms. This stark 
contrast with the Philippines has a number of implications, not least concerning 
how one can periodize recruiting practices and histories for  these two flows of 
 labor. For Filipinos the key disjuncture centers on the Philippines’ imposition of 
travel bans— first to Iraq in 2004 and subsequently to Af ghan i stan in 2007.  Those 
hired prior to the bans encountered a recruiting pro cess and actors that are 
broadly similar to  those who apply for similar jobs in Asia and the  Middle East, 
with the exceptions highlighted above. Following the bans, recruiting was pushed 
under ground, altering pathways and increasing risks for both workers and local 
recruiters. In Bosnia the critical juncture is the transition from the LOGCAP III 
contract to its successor, LOGCAP IV, at the end of 2008. This transition, as I 
described in chapter 4, led to a significant downshift in pay and status for Bosnians 
recruited  under the new contract, particularly  those who work for DynCorp in 
Af ghan i stan. It also altered the recruiting and deployment pro cess, which has 
become more truncated.
 Under the LOGCAP III contract, KBR, which was the sole prime contractor, 
was the main recruiter of Bosnian  labor.14 This was directly related to Brown & 
Root’s logistics support for U.S. peacekeeping forces in Bosnia since 1996. Indeed, 
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most of  those recruited during the first years of the wars in Af ghan i stan and Iraq 
transitioned directly from jobs with the com pany in Bosnia. This was fortunate 
timing for  those who made the jump, as the peacebuilding mission was begin­
ning to wind down in the early 2000s. Moreover, Bosnians who joined KBR’s 
proj ects in CENTCOM experienced a substantial uplift in pay and status, with 
salaries that  were comparable to American employees holding similar job titles.
All Bosnian KBR hires  under LOGCAP III— whether existing employees or 
new hires— were required to go through a lengthy recruiting and deployment pro­
cess. The first step was submitting application materials online at the com pany’s 
jobs site. This was necessary even for  those who found out about an opportunity 
from friends or former man ag ers who had transferred to Iraq or Af ghan i stan. In 
fact, during the mad dash to acquire  labor in 2003 KBR temporarily placed a mor­
atorium on hiring workers who  were still employed by the com pany in Bosnia 
due to the large number who  were being poached to join proj ects in the  Middle 
East.  After posting a résumé, applicants would wait for an email or call from KBR 
recruiters asking them to come to a  hotel in Sarajevo for interviews.  Those who 
passed the interviews and received a job offer then waited for KBR to arrange a 
U.S. visa and flight to Houston where they underwent medical tests and received 
several weeks of training at KBR’s Greenspoint Mall deployment center along­
side U.S. recruits. Once this was complete new hires  were flown to Iraq, Kuwait, 
or Af ghan i stan.
Greenspoint Mall and its surrounding environs has a reputation for being run­
down and violent, having suffered the fate of many other suburban malls in the 
U.S. in recent de cades. One news story about KBR’s American employees put it 
this way: “Dimly lit and often eerily vacant, Greenspoint  isn’t an ideal place to 
spend one’s last weeks before  going off to war. The mall  can’t shake its old 
nickname— ‘Gunspoint’—it took on  after a spate of violent crimes in the mid­
1990s. A few days  after Thanksgiving 2007, as the holiday shopping season 
began, Greenspoint was evacuated  after a murder­ suicide at the Body Luxuries 
lingerie store.”15 Several Bosnian KBR employees had similar impressions of the 
area. Elvis sarcastically recalls: “It was such a safe area [the mall] that they actu­
ally had to put a police station in it. That weekend as I arrived they shot the cop. . . . 
The place is eerie. Between six in the morning and four in the after noon  there 
is not a soul alive.” Another individual recounted an attempted mugging as he 
walked from a nearby  hotel to KBR’s deployment fa cil i ty in the shuttered Mont­
gomery Ward department store. Despite this,  others enjoyed their time in Hous­
ton. Fedja remembers that the large number of recruits from Tuzla made the 
deployment pro cess feel “like on a school camp . . .  70 per cent of the  people I 
knew  there.” For Sanja, the deployment center is where she met Laura, a KBR 
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recruit from Houston, “one of the best  people I have ever met in my life. I can 
call her my best friend.”
As KBR expanded its recruiting in Bosnia during the 2000s, more and more 
of  those it hired had no prior experience working with the com pany or other mil­
itary contractors. This situation was even more common with the second wave 
of hires stimulated by the LOGCAP IV contract, which awarded Fluor and Dyn­
Corp support responsibilities for Af ghan i stan. One consequence of this shift is 
that websites and online forums have become increasingly impor tant exchanges 
for information,  whether rumors about employment opportunities, discussions 
of working conditions with dif fer ent companies, or suggestions for navigating the 
recruiting pro cess. The most popu lar of  these websites, slobodni . net, hosts a ded­
icated, moderated forum titled “LOGCAP Poslovi” (LOGCAP Jobs). Threads 
and posts within this forum range widely. One can find a copy of DynCorp’s test 
to determine English­ language proficiency (along with an answer key); informa­
tion about technical exams for  those applying for electrician or plumbing posi­
tions; rates and qualifications for sudski tumači (court interpreters) in Tuzla who 
can provide official translations of police reports required for background checks; 
updates on pay scales for specific positions and proj ects; discussions of the con­
ditions that cause one to fail health exams (high blood pressure and bad teeth 
are the most common culprits); memorials for compatriots who have died while 
working in Iraq and Af ghan i stan; and detailed debates about com pany policies, 
such DynCorp’s decision to offer Asian contracts to Bosnian applicants. This last 
topic is the subject of a separate thread that has generated nearly 100 posts, which 
have been viewed more than 12,000 times.  These numbers are dwarfed by the gen­
eral threads for KBR, Flour, and DynCorp, which combined have more than 
22,000 posts that  were viewed more than 3 million times between late 2009, when 
LOGCAP Poslovi was established, and July 2017.
Web portals that cover local news are other key sites for information. A 
Lukavac­ based portal, sodalive.ba, for instance, has published dozens of articles 
on recruiting events in Tuzla, life on military bases as a contractor, and the effect 
that this phenomenon has had upon economic and social relations in region over 
the past de cade, with headlines such as “Recruiters for Fluor Have Arrived in Tu­
zla” (February 6, 2017), “Lukavac Residents’ Search for a Better Life Leads to 
Af ghan i stan” (January 31, 2012), and “Youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina— 
Afghanistan or a Luxury Cruise Ship?” (March 11, 2013).16 This last article high­
lights the disillusionment of youth in Bosnia, who are increasingly desperate to 
leave the country due to high unemployment, low pay and the po liti cal situation, 
comparing the experiences of  those who choose to work as waiters or hospitality 
staff on cruise ships and  those who sign on with Fluor or DynCorp in Af ghan i­
stan. The article struck a nerve among readers, generating nearly fifty comments, 
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most of them about work and life in Af ghan i stan. For several years sodalive.ba 
was edited by a former KBR employee from Lukavac who worked for more than 
a de cade with the com pany starting in 1996. In 2016 he again left Lukavac to work 
for a U.S. PMC that has several logistics contracts to support operations against 
ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
In addition to websites,  hotels loom large as significant spaces in nearly  every 
account. From the Holiday Inn at Sarajevo to the Marriott and the Wyndham in 
Greenspoint, and from the Mövenpick and the  Grand in Dubai to the Le Meridien 
in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Bosnians have circulated through dif fer ent networks 
of  hotels which define, in part, distinct recruiting pro cesses and deployment path­
ways developed by each military contracting firm. Indeed, by the end of my inter­
views in Bosnia I found that I could reliably identify the com pany  people worked 
for, as well as period of employment, just by the list of  hotels— and activities that 
took place at them— that they mentioned in their stories.  Hotels, in other words, 
have constituted critical infrastructural nodes in the accumulation of military 
 labor from the Balkans, giving them a geopo liti cal and geo­ economic signifi­
cance that has not been adequately appreciated to date.17
 Hotels serve a variety of functions. First, and most significantly, all three LOG­
CAP prime contractors (KBR, Fluor, and DynCorp) use them as bases for recruit­
ing in the Balkans. Rather than establish permanent offices in the region, the 
companies rent out blocks of  hotel rooms or conference spaces that serve as 
temporary recruiting centers. KBR alternated between two  hotels in Sarajevo: 
the Hollywood, located next to the airport and the headquarters of the NATO­ 
led peacekeeping mission, and the downtown Holiday Inn, made famous as the 
home of international media covering the siege of the city in the early 1990s.18 
Fluor and DynCorp use  Hotel Tuzla in downtown Tuzla, which has the advan­
tage of putting them at the epicenter of the country’s military  labor pool.
 Hotels also operate as sites for predeployment training and as waystations while 
waiting for necessary paperwork. One KBR employee, Rena, recalls a cohort of 
recruits before hers waiting for transit visas to Dubai for three months at the Mar­
riott in Houston. The cause of this delay was temporary travel restrictions the 
UAE put upon  people from the Balkans following a spectacular jewelry heist by 
the infamous Balkans­ based “Pink Panthers” gang in 2007.19 To save money and 
speed up the deployment pro cess to Af ghan i stan, both Fluor and DynCorp have 
rejected KBR’s strategy of sending workers to the U.S., instead flying them to 
Dubai for health exams and abbreviated training courses held at  hotels like the 
Mövenpick or  Grand (DynCorp), or bringing in staff to conduct training at the 
 Hotel Tuzla before deployment (Fluor). In addition to saving money, this indi­
cates the lower status that Bosnian hires have experienced while working for the 
two companies, who unlike KBR have drawn a clear line dividing American from 
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non­ American direct hires. For its Ebola support mission in West Africa, and 
more recent contracts to provide logistics support for SOF forces and drone op­
erations in the Sahel and Horn of Africa, Fluor has moved its training program 
to  hotels in Dubai, where workers also wait for necessary visas before flying to 
Niger, Uganda, Cameroon, and Somalia.
Fi nally,  hotels figure prominently as rest and recreation sites. As part of its ben­
efits package, KBR offered employees in CENTCOM three paid vacations a year 
 under its LOGCAP III contract, including covering travel costs between military 
bases and home. This policy has been followed by Fluor and DynCorp— though 
in reduced form by the latter which offers two vacations a year, with travel 
expenses covered only for the first. For  those working in difficult warzone condi­
tions, a night or two layover in Dubai, Istanbul, or Tashkent pre sents an oppor­
tunity for shopping, entertainment, or just lounging at the  hotel’s pool. Shopping 
is especially popu lar for  those routed through Dubai, who load up on goods at 
the malls to bring back as gifts for  family and friends. Elvis, who worked in Af­
ghan i stan in the early 2000s, remembers KBR using a two  hotel system in Tash­
kent, which was the main hub for transit to and from the country at the time: “It 
was the Sheraton and Le Meridian. One was for [ people  going] in, the other was 
for [ people  going] out. They  didn’t want  these two groups of  people mixing.” Ac­
cording to Elvis, Le Meridian, the outbound  hotel, took full advantage of regular 
flights of workers leaving Af ghan i stan with money to burn and looking to “blow 
off steam.” “The Le Meridian was prob ably the most expensive  hotel on the face 
of the planet at the time. They  were charging six bucks for a can of Heineken . . . 
Breakfast was 15 dollars. Hookers  were everywhere. Shit,  every night  there was 
like a platoon of them. Of course suckers  were falling in love, spending their 
money, drinking their money, and  going back to Af ghan i stan broke,  dying.”  Here 
the contrast with Filipinos employed by subcontractors is instructive.  These com­
panies do not offer vacations— paid or unpaid— forcing workers to stay on bases 
without trips home for the length of their contract, often two or more years. Ad­
ditionally, while subcontractors are obligated to pay for flights to and from home, 
they do not cover accommodation during layovers, forcing workers to sleep in 
the airports.
As noted above, the transition from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV represents a 
significant dividing line for Bosnian workers, with the Pentagon pushing prime 
contractors to lower salaries for direct hires from Southeast Eu rope. Even KBR 
lowered its pay scale for new Bosnian recruits to Iraq and Kuwait. Lena, who was 
hired in late 2008, remembers: “They told us in the  middle of the pro cessing [in 
Houston] that they  were  going to cut our pay.  People started to scream and yell.” 
This led the com pany to delay implementation of this decision  until the group 
 after hers. KBR lost Af ghan i stan to Fluor and DynCorp  under the new contract, 
 AsseMbling A trAnsnAtionAl WorkForCe 103
and the Iraq War was winding down, so its recruiting efforts dropped off sub­
stantially at this point. Far more  people have been affected by the differential pay 
policies implemented by Fluor and DynCorp, which make a distinction between 
American, West Eu ro pean (primarily Britons), East Eu ro pean, and Asian direct 
hires.
DynCorp’s decision to offer both Eu ro pean and Asian contracts to Bosnian 
workers beginning in 2010 has been especially contentious. One issue, obviously, 
is the dramatic difference in pay, with Asian contacts paying $12,000 to $18,000 
a year and workers performing the same jobs  under a Eu ro pean contract typi­
cally earning three times this amount. What angers  people the most, however, are 
the false promises made by local recruiters— that is, Bosnians hired by DynCorp 
to run recruitment in the country,  under the supervision of an American man­
ag er— that applicants who signed an Asian contract could easily switch over to 
Eu ro pean positions and pay when they arrived in Af ghan i stan. In one case a lo­
cal recruiter was beaten by  family members of a worker who found out he had 
been duped. Several DynCorp employees told me they  were convinced that local 
recruiters’ pay was linked to the number of  people they could convince to sign 
Asian contracts, given the amount of money the com pany could save in  labor 
costs.
The Logistics of Assembling a 
Transnational Workforce
While the concept of logistics originates with the supply of military operations, 
it has taken on wider connotations over the past  century. As Edna Bonacich and 
Jake Wilson observe, “Its meaning has been expanded to refer to the management 
of the entire supply chain, encompassing design and ordering, production, trans­
portation and warehousing, sales, redesign and reordering. This entire cycle of 
production and distribution is now viewed as a single integrated unit that requires 
its own specialists for analy sis and implementation.”20 Thus from a commercial 
standpoint logistics is concerned with the circulation of commodities, getting 
goods—be they sneakers, flat screen TVs, or cars— from one place to another. 
With the advent of global supply chains this is an incredibly complex and diffuse 
pro cess, involving a “network of infrastructures, technologies, spaces, workers and 
vio lence that makes the circulation of stuff pos si ble.”21 This is what Deborah 
Cowen means when she refers to the production of commodities  today as occur­
ring “across logistics space rather than in a singular place.”22
This focus on the logistics of commodity production and distribution is in­
sightful, but I want to argue for a broader consideration of logistics. One that is 
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attendant to both goods and  people. For logistics does not just underpin the trans­
national circulation of goods, but— increasingly— labor as well. Consider the 
cargo ships that haul goods across the oceans. As the shipping industry global­
ized in recent de cades national carriers have been displaced by companies that 
register ships  under a flag of con ve nience in countries like Panama and Liberia. 
This allows them to avoid stricter regulations, especially concerning  labor costs 
and standards, imposed by traditional shipping centers like Britain and Greece. 
Ship  owners also began outsourcing operations to other firms that are responsi­
ble for assembling crews that now often resemble a veritable United Nations of 
 labor.23 As with U.S. military logistics workers, Filipinos constitute one of the larg­
est contingents of seafarers, and the sites, pro cesses, and actors involved in re­
cruiting  labor for both industries are remarkably similar, though the POEA does 
separate out land­ and sea­ based recruitment and employers for administrative 
purposes.
Transoceanic shipping, in short, is now highly dependent on the acquisition 
of a global workforce. It is just one of many economic sectors;  others that draw 
extensively on transnational  labor supply chains to staff their workforces include 
cruise ship operators, transoceanic fishing fleets, logistics firms supporting 
humanitarian and peacekeeping operations around the world, and large corpo­
rations that dominate worldwide oil, gas, and mineral extraction. To  these indus­
tries can be added the massive  labor import­ export regime between wealthy Gulf 
petro­ states and poor Asian labor­ exporting countries. All together this admit­
tedly partial accounting of the phenomenon represents millions of  people circu­
lating through dif fer ent, but frequently overlapping, transnational  labor supply 
chains.
The point I want to make  here is that for  these industries and countries, as with 
military contractors, assembling a global workforce is itself a complex undertak­
ing, one populated by its own logistics spaces and  labor, including recruiting agen­
cies, websites, transportation companies,  hotels, government bureaucrats, and 
 labor brokers. While  there is a  great deal of excellent research concerning  those 
who perform logistics  labor for commodity production and distribution— such 
as driving trucks, sorting and packaging goods at ware houses, and unloading cargo 
at ports—to date the logistical infrastructures and  labors involved in assembling 
large­ scale global workforces have not attracted the attention of  those who study 
logistics. This is an oversight, I believe. Certainly, when it comes to the global  labor 
system that the U.S. depends on to maintain its overseas military empire, both 
the Serka employee who serves food at a DFAC at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, 
and the Manila recruiting agency that pro cessed her, are equally impor tant parts 
of the story.
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On May 15, 2004, the U.S. embassy in Kuwait convened a briefing with repre­
sentatives from major contractors providing logistics support for the U.S. mili­
tary in Iraq and Kuwait. This meeting followed stories  earlier that month in the 
Indian newspaper Hindustan Times, alleging trafficking and physical abuse of In­
dian citizens working at U.S. bases in Iraq. Impressing upon the assembled 
group that “the scandal was very big in India,” embassy officials encouraged firms 
to their review hiring and work practices and respond to Indian embassy inqui­
ries concerning the status of their employees, noting that “a forward­ leaning tack 
by U.S. contractors” would be “good public relations, at the very least.”1 Days  later 
India imposed the first travel ban to Iraq by a labor­ exporting state.
From U.S. diplomats’ point of view, the most explosive claim in the news ar­
ticles was that U.S. troops beat Indian laborers— who worked as cooks at the U.S. 
base Q­ West (also known as Endurance) near Mosul— and facilitated their traf­
ficking into Iraq. The embassy in New Delhi mobilized immediately following the 
publication of  these articles in early May, tracking down the named workers and 
their recruiting agency and conducting its own interviews. Two days  later it com­
posed a widely distributed cable detailing findings. Titled “Mission Debunks 
Media Reports of Abuse of Indian Workers by the U.S. Army,” the document tri­
umphantly declared that it found the reports “to be exaggerated and largely 
false,” concluding that “ there is no evidence that American soldiers  were part of 
the trafficking of  these workers” and no evidence “they  were beaten by Ameri­
cans.”2 What is more in ter est ing is what this investigation confirmed— specifically, 
the workers’ allegations of trafficking and physical abuse.
7
DARK ROUTES
 because of you i became very rich. other wise, if you did not help me 
get workers from the philippines how can i have my business inside 
the base?
— Se nior executive of a logistics subcontracting com pany to an under ground 
recruiter in Manila
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The outline of this series of events is as follows. In August 2003 several men 
each paid a Mumbai­ based recruiting agency, Subhash Vijay Com pany, $1,600 
to obtain food preparation jobs in Kuwait. According to the agency, it obtained 
visitor visas to Kuwait for the men for GCC, which stated that they would be con­
verted to worker visas upon arrival. Instead the Indians  were met by unknown 
men at the airport in Kuwait, their passports and papers  were confiscated, and 
they  were loaded into a van that drove them to Q­ West. One of the men inter­
viewed by embassy officials described his experience on the base as “unmention­
able,” while another stated that their supervisors made them work up to twenty 
hours a day and would beat them if they did not agree to work  these hours. Re­
sponding to  these facts the cable tepidly concluded that the embassy’s investiga­
tion “indicates  these Indians appear to be victims of unscrupulous Indian and 
Gulf­ based manpower agencies” and that “it is pos si ble” U.S. contractors “had 
overall responsibility for conditions” at Q­ West (which the embassy mistakenly 
identified as “Crew West”). Following this investigative ‘exoneration,’ DoS and 
DoD officials turned their attention to cajoling the government of India to re­
scind its travel ban, efforts that met with temporary success in early June  after 
military officials presented it with a draft of protocols to improve living condi­
tions for TCNs in Iraq.3
Most of the egregious examples of trafficking and other  labor abuses have been 
perpetrated by subcontracting firms like GCC that hail from Turkey or the Gulf 
states. Companies from the latter countries, in par tic u lar, are notorious for abys­
mal treatment of their largely South and Southeast Asian workforces.  Human 
rights organ izations such as Amnesty International and  Human Rights Watch 
have repeatedly documented  labor abuses suffered by foreign workers in the re­
gion, with the prob lem particularly widespread in the booming construction in­
dustry.4 In relying on firms like GCC to provide  labor, the military has in effect 
imported these exploitative  labor practices onto its bases in Iraq, Af ghan i stan, 
and other countries in the region. At the same time, it has continuously tried to 
minimize responsibility for trafficking and other  labor abuses committed by its 
contractors, instead defining oversight authority and jurisdictional powers in the 
narrowest pos si ble terms. Consequently,  these abuses have continued to be per­
petrated by contractors and recruiting agencies in the de cade and a half since 
they first emerged in Iraq. But the prob lem of abusive  labor and recruiting 
practices need also be understood in relation to the confluence of two further 
dynamics connected to changes in military contracting in recent de cades: 1) the 
offshoring of  labor and 2) the downsourcing of risk. The former is directly re­
lated to the shift in logistics  labor from uniformed and American to civilian and 
foreign, while the latter is a product of complex and lengthy  labor supply chains 
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associated with subcontracting that foster moral detachment and obfuscate re­
sponsibility for  labor conditions.
This chapter explores  these issues in three parts. First, I describe instances and 
types of trafficking and  labor exploitation perpetrated by military contractors, 
situating them within the dynamics of offshoring and downsourcing. Next, I ex­
amine illegal recruiting practices that flourished following the 2004 travel ban to 
Iraq and 2007 ban for Af ghan i stan imposed by the Philippines.  These bans pushed 
recruiting of  labor to bases in  those countries under ground, increasing workers’ 
precarity. Yet the experience of Filipino workers I interviewed also demonstrates 
a range of agency and initiative on the part of  those who traversed  these dark 
routes. Their stories also highlight the role that military contractors have played 
in undermining labor­ exporting countries’ travel bans. I end the chapter by re­
turning to the question of oversight, analyzing rationales by military officials to 
justify minimal oversight responsibility for trafficking by their contractors and 
drawing parallels to the offshoring of  labor and supply chains by U.S. corpora­
tions in recent de cades.
Offshoring  Labor and Downsourcing  
Risk through Subcontracting
Trafficking of workers to Iraq, Af ghan i stan, and other military bases in CENT­
COM has continued unabated since KBR first de cided to outsource most of its 
 labor needs to subcontractors in 2003. More than a de cade  later, for instance, an 
investigation by journalists Samuel Black and Anjali Kamat found substantial evi­
dence that employees of Fluor’s and DynCorp’s subcontractors in Af ghan i stan 
 were deceived and exploited by recruiting agencies. Of the seventy­ five current 
and former workers they interviewed, “65 said they paid agents fees ranging from 
$1,000 to $5,000. Many said their monthly salaries, generally $400 to $800, ran 
several hundred dollars short of what they  were promised. Some paid fees, only 
to be ware housed by an agent for months and never receive a job. Nearly every­
one we talked to was still paying back loans.”5 Three years before Black and Ka­
mat published their findings, former military auditor and  lawyer Sam McCahon 
testified before Congress that such practices  were widespread, and hence the U.S. 
government was responsible for allowing trafficking to flourish on its bases in the 
region.
Even though he [a victim of  these trafficking schemes] now knows he 
was deceived, he is helpless. If he speaks to anyone with the government 
he is terminated immediately and sent home. (The prime contractor 
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typically instructs its employees that they are forbidden to inquire or 
report trafficking conditions of subcontractors, thereby completing the 
conspiracy of silence and mitigating detection of the crime.) The victim 
cannot quit  because he has the outstanding loan to the loan shark. He 
must remain, working 12 hour days, 6 to 7 days per week in the com­
bat zone. By the time he completes two to three years, he has still not 
retired the debt. He is an indentured servant to the U.S. government 
contractor.6
As McCahon noted,  these debts place workers in a position of involuntary 
servitude— unable to refuse jobs they are given regardless of working conditions, 
deception about place and type of employment, or discrepancies between prom­
ised and  actual salaries. Another way to describe this phenomenon is debt bond­
age, a form of trafficking to which “workers around the world fall victim . . .  when 
traffickers or recruiters unlawfully exploit an initial debt the worker assumed as 
part of the terms of employment.” Significantly, the definition I quote  here comes 
from DoS’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report, which notes that such practices 
are illegal  under U.S. law.7
One of the more notorious cases of trafficking, which is illustrative of the scale 
and depth of the prob lem, occurred in 2008 in Iraq. That spring a Kuwaiti sub­
contractor, Najlaa International Catering Ser vices, received several DFAC con­
tracts from KBR. In anticipation of  labor needs, it contracted with manpower 
firms in India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh to recruit approximately 1,000 
workers who paid up to $5,000 each in exchange for the promise of work in Iraq. 
Najlaa flew the men to Baghdad, confiscated their passports, and put them up in 
a windowless ware house, where they spent three months— without pay— due to 
unrelated mobilization failures that caused Najlaa to be unable to begin its DFAC 
contracts in September as planned. In December the men staged protests outside 
of the ware house, which was adjacent to Baghdad’s international airport, bring­
ing their situation to the attention of reporters. The next month KBR rescinded 
its contracts with Najlaa, leaving the men without jobs. Eventually,  under pres­
sure from the U.S. government, KBR found work for several hundred of them and 
arranged for the repatriation of the rest. However, for  those who  were repatri­
ated the ordeal was far from over as they still owed thousands of dollars to credi­
tors with  little chance of earning enough to repay their loans.8
Body shops figure prominently in cases of trafficking and  labor abuses. In 2006 
First Kuwaiti recruited dozens of Filipinos to work on its embassy proj ect in Iraq 
 under false pretenses, originally promising them jobs at luxury  hotels in Kuwait 
and Dubai. Rory Mayberry, a former com pany medic, testified about this scheme 
before Congress in 2007.
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First Kuwaiti man ag ers asked me to escort 51 Filipino nationals and to 
make sure that they got on the same flight as I was headed to Baghdad. 
Many of  these Filipinos did not speak any En glish. I wanted to help them 
to make sure that they got on the flight ok, just as my man ag ers had 
asked me. We  were all employees of the same com pany was my feeling. 
But when we got to the Kuwait Airport, I noticed that all their tickets 
said that we  were  going to Dubai. I asked why. A First Kuwaiti man­
ag er told me that Filipino passports do not allow Filipinos to fly to Iraq. 
They must be marked  going to Dubai. The First Kuwaiti man ag er added 
that I should not tell any of the Filipinos that they  were being taken to 
Baghdad.
As I found  later,  these men thought that they had signed up for jobs 
to work in Dubai  hotels. One fellow I met told me in broken En glish 
that he was excited to start a new job as a telephone repairman. They 
had no idea that they  were being sent to do construction work at the Em­
bassy.
Well, Mr. Chairman, when the airplane took off and the captain an­
nounced that we  were headed to Baghdad, all you know what broke out 
on the airplane. The men started shouting. It  wasn’t  until the security 
guy working for First Kuwaiti waved an MP­5 in the air that the men 
settled down. They realized that they had no other choice but to go to 
Baghdad.9
Mayberry’s testimony was echoed by John Owens, a First Kuwaiti construction 
man ag er on the proj ect, who recalled boarding a chartered flight from Kuwait to 
Baghdad and noticing that all of the other com pany workers had tickets that stated 
that their destination was Dubai. When he asked another man ag er about this he 
was told, “ Don’t say anything. If Kuwaiti customs knows  they’re  going to Iraq 
they  won’t let them on the plane.”10 When the plane landed in Baghdad all of the 
men  were smuggled past customs into the Green Zone.
In addition to trafficking, workers in Iraq and Af ghan i stan have frequently ex­
perienced a host of other  labor abuses ranging from squalid and inadequate liv­
ing conditions to wage theft. Owens observed First Kuwaiti workers “verbally and 
physically abused” and having “their salary docked for as much as three day’s pay 
for reasons such as being five minutes late.”11 Wage theft is perhaps the most 
common form of exploitation perpetuated by subcontractors. This takes two pri­
mary forms. The first involves paying wages that are substantially less than ini­
tially promised. The journalist Sarah Stillman provides a good example of this in 
her gripping account of two Fijian  women, Vinnie and Lydia, recruited to work 
in Dubai in 2007 with promises of salaries ranging from $1,500 to $3,800 a month. 
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When they arrived in Dubai the subcontractor that they worked for, Kulak (a body 
shop from Turkey), told them the jobs  were actually located in Iraq and they would 
be paid only $700 a month.  After being passed on to another Turkish subcon­
tractor their pay was again cut in half.12 Another variation of this form is reneg­
ing on promised salary bumps  after a promotion or a designated length of time 
working for a com pany.
A second form of wage theft involves refusing to pay for overtime or hours 
worked beyond the terms of a contract. For example, contracts that Filipino DFAC 
workers signed with Serka in 2003 indicated that their schedule of work would 
be eight hours a day, six days a week, with their monthly salary based upon this 
forty­ eight­ hour workweek (figure 7.1).13 Yet  every one of the former Serka work­
ers that I interviewed stated that they worked twelve­ hour shifts, seven days a 
week, with no additional pay for the extra thirty­ six hours worked each week. This 
is not unusual as twelve­ hour workdays with no days off is standard for TCNs 
working for subcontracting companies.14
As mentioned above, the provenance of subcontracting companies that have 
been implicated in the most egregious cases of trafficking is not immaterial. Nearly 
all hail from Turkey or Gulf states where such practices are widespread. Also rel­
evant, in my view, is that body shops like GCC, First Kuwaiti, PPI, and Kulak 
view their largely unskilled workforce as a disposable commodity. This is well il­
lustrated by the not uncommon phenomenon of passing workers on to other 
firms—as happened to Vinnie and Lydia— and Najlaa’s abandoning its workers 
FigUre 7.1. 2003 Serka contract for Filipino worker in Iraq
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at the ware house in Baghdad  after its contracts with KBR  were first delayed and 
then fell through.
 There are two other dynamics that are impor tant for understanding the 
prevalence of  labor abuses in connection to military contracting. The first is what 
Darryl Li calls the offshoring of military work: “The so­ called privatization rev­
olution has also been an offshoring revolution, with U.S. contractors frequently 
overseeing an even larger set of foreign subcontractors and workers. . . .  TCNs in 
par tic u lar work on U.S. bases  under military authority while lacking most of the 
protections of American law, local regimes, or their home governments. They are 
often employed by non­ U.S. companies subcontracted by American corpora­
tions, paid a fraction of what American contractors and soldiers make, and can 
be easily deported if deemed noncompliant.”15 In framing military contracting 
as offshoring, Li draws a parallel to the strategy of offshoring manufacturing that 
numerous U.S. corporations have pursued in recent de cades. Though  there are 
differences, this is an instructive comparison. The primary driver of offshoring is 
a desire by companies to lower costs, shifting manufacturing from expensive U.S. 
 labor to cheaper countries like Vietnam, China, and Bangladesh. Savings come 
not just from lower wages, but also less stringent  labor and environmental stan­
dards in  these countries. The result is that offshore workers are paid significantly 
less and have access to few of the  legal safeguards that U.S. workers enjoy. In sim­
ilar fashion, military contracting is driving a shift in the composition of the 
workforce from uniformed and American to civilian and foreign, with an atten­
dant decrease in wages and  labor standards. This is especially the case for TCNs, 
who are caught in a  legal limbo in which neither U.S. nor local  labor laws apply. 
In effect, overseas military bases operate as exceptional spaces, jurisdictional voids 
where  these workers have  little to no  legal recourse when subject to  labor abuses 
by employers.
Another, related, manner in which the lens of offshoring is productive involves 
the military’s desire to disentangle as much as pos si ble logistics operations from 
 legal and po liti cal constraints.  Here the relevant analogy is the offshore oil and gas 
industry. As Hannah Appel compellingly demonstrates through her ethnographic 
examination of oil extraction in Equatorial Guinea, the “offshore” does not merely 
refer to the location of the oil rigs off the country’s coast, but is actively created 
through vari ous practices that serve to disentangle operations as much as pos si ble 
from the messiness of the “onshore.” The key to this, Appel argues, is modularity—
of  labor regimes, contracts, technology, and infrastructure— that tends  towards 
“internal containment.” She explains:
Modular or prefabricated structures do not require changing the 
 zoning code but, instead, come with an anticipatory relationship to 
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place and time— legally compliant, mobile, without foundation, im­
permanent, and disposable or reusable elsewhere. So too with offshore 
oil platforms, contracts and subcontracts, and mobile  labor forces. 
 These are work­ intensive efforts to create juridical and even geographic 
spaces in which companies can abide by their own rules, bring their 
own technologies, infrastructures, evidentiary and  legal regimes, and 
 people— laborers,  lawyers, technicians, consulting firms, specialists, 
and man ag ers.16
As with military logistics, a fundamental aspect of modularity in the offshore drill­
ing industry involves the extensive use of subcontracting and foreign  labor, 
which serves to insulate companies from regulatory oversight.
The second dynamic— the downsourcing of risk—is directly related to com­
plex and lengthy  labor supply chains. As the journalist Cam Simpson, who wrote 
a power ful book detailing the experiences of the twelve trafficked Nepalese men 
and their families, puts it:
 There is no single villain pulling strings from the top, but instead, sev­
eral individual actors who make up an overall chain of conduct. It is an 
inherently transnational enterprise that utilizes a global supply chain 
extending across multiple countries, and it requires an extensive trans­
national network of recruiters, contractors, subcontractors, parent 
corporations, and subsidiaries crossing jurisdictions, countries, and 
continents. The sheer number of actors involved allows each to point 
a fin ger somewhere else—to someone below him in the supply chain, 
or someone above—or simply to deny his own individual piece of re­
sponsibility.17
Consider the example of the Indian workers at Q­ West that I began this chapter 
with. Subhash Vijay had hired them to work for GCC, which was a subcontrac­
tor for Alargan Group (a Kuwaiti firm), which in turn was a subcontractor for 
The Event Source (a U.S. firm), which in turn was the com pany originally sub­
contracted by KBR, the military’s prime contractor ( table 7.1).18  There  were, in 
other words, four layers of subcontractors and recruiting agencies between the 
workers and the military’s prime contractor. The  labor supply chain that the two 
Fijian  women, Lydia and Vinnie, traversed was of similar length and complexity. 
They  were first approached by a local recruiter in their neighborhood in Suva, 
who directed them to Meridian Ser vices Agency, which was recruiting workers 
for Kulak. Kulak in turned passed the  women on to a fellow Turkish firm, Nasa, 
which was a contractor for AAFES, the DoD organ ization that manages the mil­
itary’s PX stores around the world ( table 7.1).
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Both of  these lengthy  labor supply chains are relatively straightforward 
compared to the convoluted case of the Nepalese workers. As with the Indian and 
Fijian examples, the twelve men’s journey began with a local recruiter, who put 
them in touch with Moon Light Con sul tant, a recruiting agency in Kathmandu. 
Moon Light was working with a Jordanian recruiting agency, Morning Star for 
Recruitment and Manpower Supply, which was promising work at Le Royal, a 
luxury  hotel in Amman. Upon the men’s arrival, however, Morning Star imme­
diately passed them on to Bisharat, a shady Jordanian  labor broker that supplied 
workers for KBR’s Jordanian LOGCAP subcontractor, Daoud & Partners 
( table 7.1). Bisharat  housed the men in compounds in Amman for several weeks 
before arranging a convoy of taxis to take them to U.S. bases in Iraq, a risky jour­
ney that the men did not survive.
Following Amanda Wise, I argue that  these chains of  labor recruiters and 
contractors— which she points out are characteristic of transnational  labor 
“pyramid subcontracting”— obfuscates responsibility for working conditions and 
fosters a sense of moral detachment whereby military officials and prime con­
tractors deem  labor abuse a prob lem that largely lies outside their remit. It also 
contributes to the dehumanizing treatment of workers as a “disposable army” of 
 labor.19 In short, lengthy  labor supply chains engendered by subcontracting in­
duces a downsourcing of responsibility and risk— which ultimately falls on work­
ers themselves in the absence of effective oversight of subcontractors’ actions.20
Legally, one means through which risk and moral responsibility is downsourced 
is by reference to “privity of contract,” a doctrine that limits the rights or obligations 
of third parties to contracts. The Army’s manual on operational contracting states 
that when the U.S. military enters a contract with a prime contractor such as KBR, 
and the prime contractor in turn makes separate contracts with subcontractors,
The prime contractor has privity with their first­ tier subcontractor, but 
the government has no privity with any of the subcontractors at any tier; 
 tAble 7.1 Transnational military  labor supply chains
Local recruiter (India)► Subhash Vijay (India)► GCC (Kuwait)►
Alargan Group (Kuwait)► The Event Source (U.S.)► KBR (U.S.)►
U.S. military
India Labor
Supply Chain
Fiji Labor
Supply Chain
Nepal Labor
Supply Chain
Local recruiter (Fiji)► Meridian Services Agency (Fiji)►
Kulak (Turkey)► Nasa (Turkey)► AAFES (DoD Agency)
Local recruiter (Nepal)► Moon Light Consultant (Nepal)►
Morning Star for Recruitment and Manpower Supply (Jordan)►
Bisharat (Jordan)► Daoud & Partners (Jordan)► KBR (U.S.)►
U.S. military
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therefore, the government contracting officer cannot direct the prime’s 
first­ tier, nor any lower tier, subcontractors. This term is impor tant to 
the Ser vice commander in that only the prime contractor has direct re­
sponsibility to the government. This fact can limit the directive ability 
of Ser vice commanders, through the cognizant contracting officer, to di­
rectly enforce contractor management policies on subcontractors and 
their employees.21
Read cynically, the Army’s invocation of privity of contract is very useful for wash­
ing its hands of oversight responsibility. And in fact, this is exactly the argument 
that prime contractors in turn have used to justify their lack of responsibility for 
monitoring  labor abuses by subcontractors. The vice president in charge of con­
tracting for one LOGCAP prime contractor, for example, bluntly told Sam Mc­
Cahon that his com pany was taking no mea sures to mitigate trafficking  because 
“we have no privity of contract with the subcontractors’ employees, so it’s not 
our prob lem.”22 We  will return to the question of privity of contract in the final 
section of this chapter, following an examination of illegal recruiting that flour­
ished in the Philippines  after the country’s imposition of travel bans to Iraq and 
Af ghan i stan.
Under ground Recruiting and Navigating  
the Travel Bans
Illegal recruiting of  labor for the U.S. military is not just a  matter of trafficking. 
Indeed, arguably the most traveled dark route has involved the under ground 
recruitment of workers from labor­ exporting states like India, Nepal, and the 
Philippines in the years  after they imposed travel bans to Iraq and Af ghan i stan. 
Despite the bans, the military directly supported the continued importation of 
workers from  these countries due to its im mense  labor needs. This is demon­
strated most clearly in its efforts to pressure Kuwait not to enforce the travel bans 
at its border crossings in 2004, as discussed in the introduction. For years the 
military ignored the overwhelming presence of Filipinos, Indians, and Nepalese 
working on U.S. bases. Fi nally, in summer 2010 CENTCOM issued a memoran­
dum ordering contractors in Iraq to comply with “TCN laws” by repatriating 
workers from countries with existing travel bans (at the time this included Nepal 
and the Philippines).23 By then the drawdown of troops was in full swing and 
thus the need for  labor had abated, rendering this shift in stance rather hollow. 
 Later in the year the military extended this order to Af ghan i stan. In 2011 the 
Philippines responded by modifying its travel ban to Af ghan i stan, exempting citi­
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zens who had existing contracts with companies working on military bases.24 
Effectively this grandfathered in  those already working in the country, while con­
tinuing the ban on recruitment of new hires. Yet the flow of Filipino  labor to 
Af ghan i stan continued.
So how have Filipinos looking for military work evaded Philippine authori­
ties seeking to enforce the travel bans? For many the path still goes through local 
recruiters and recruiting agencies.  Because agencies in the Philippines who recruit 
for military contractors can have their licenses revoked if they are caught, recruit­
ing has gone under ground. To understand how this works I conducted inter­
views with both workers recruited  after the bans  were implemented and agencies 
that have provided  labor for three dif fer ent subcontractors in Iraq and Af ghan i­
stan during this period. In some ways under ground recruiting is similar to what 
took place before the bans. Agencies still work with contractors to determine  labor 
needs. They also continue to vet applicants for relevant skills, arrange necessary 
medical exams, and or ga nize transportation to the region.
Beyond this veneer of business as usual, however, the risks and costs— for both 
recruiting agencies and workers— can be substantial. One agency I talked with 
stated that the com pany they worked for continued to pay them a fee for each 
worker they successfully deployed, but also allowed the agency to charge appli­
cants a separate pro cessing fee, which amounted to roughly $200 per person. Ac­
cording to a 2006 investigative report by the Army, following the travel ban Serka 
began deducting $400 from Filipinos’ pay  after arriving in Iraq, ostensibly to cover 
travel costs even though the com pany was already compensated for  these expenses 
in its contract with KBR.25  These fees and deductions appear to be on the low end 
according to workers I interviewed, who recall paying up to $3,000 for jobs in 
Iraq or Af ghan i stan. Such costs are much higher than the Philippines allows for 
 legal recruiting, where laws stipulate that fees cannot exceed one month’s salary. 
Without question this indicates that supplying  labor during bans can be a lucra­
tive proposition, especially for the handful of recruiting agencies and po liti cally 
connected individuals willing to take the risks. More than one person I talked 
with, for instance, suggested that President Arroyo’s son, Mikey Arroyo, worked 
with PPI in the early years  after the ban to ensure that its workers destined for 
Iraq would not be detained by officials at Ninoy Aquino International Airport in 
Manila.
Ensuring the safe passage of workers during bans is an expensive proposition 
for military contractors and recruiting agencies without such po liti cal connec­
tions. The head of one agency, whom I  will call Edward, told me that “the most 
difficult one [stage of the under ground recruiting pro cess] that we are  doing is 
the airport . . .  immigration  people  really cost a lot of money.” For each batch of 
eight to twelve recruits that he sends he has to pay officials at the airport roughly 
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$500 to ensure that they are not interdicted. Edward counts himself as fortunate 
that none of his recruits have been  stopped, attributing this to the fact that his 
contact at the airport is an “honest person” who shares the bribes with cowork­
ers. The consequences for recruiters like Edward if their  people are detained at 
the airport for violating the travel bans are significant. He would lose not only 
his placement fee from the contractor, but also face the risk of losing his accredi­
tation if someone told authorities who was  behind the scheme.
While recruiting agencies have continued to play a role in facilitating  labor ac­
quisition  after the travel bans, my research suggests that the majority of  those 
who have found jobs during this period have done so without the help of agen­
cies. More commonly, companies with Filipino workers in Iraq or Af ghan i stan 
have asked them to spread the word to families and friends about job opportuni­
ties when they call home. John, who is from a village in Pampanga, explained to 
me how one of his cousins arranged work for him and nine other  family mem­
bers this way:
Me: How did you find jobs in Af ghan i stan?
John: Before we went we had a contract. . . .  Our cousin  there sent us 
papers to sign. Our cousin went to Af ghan i stan and found employ­
ers for all of us. . . .  As soon as she found employers it took a  couple 
of weeks for the papers and then I was gone.
Me: How did she find  these jobs?
John: She had American friends, and would hear [about opportunities] 
from other Filipinos at mealtime.
In other instances  those who have completed a contract with a firm, such as 
PPI, are contacted by former man ag ers asking if they want to work again. Al­
ternatively, former employees reach out to companies asking about work. One 
longtime PPI worker, Fidel, described this last scenario to me: “I sent an email 
[saying], ‘I’m a employee of PPI before in Iraq, so I’m looking if  there’s a va­
cancy for equipment operator.’ I’m lucky. In 2010, January,  they’re hiring on 
Af ghan i stan. They send me a ticket, [tourist] visa, just in one week, I go fly to 
Dubai.” Rowel, an electrician who began working for PPI in Baghdad in 2004, 
went home in 2006, and then returned to Iraq  later that year, also mentions 
PPI’s use of a tourist visa to get its workers out of the Philippines  after the ban 
was introduced:
Me: Did you have to buy a tourist visa to Dubai? Is that how you got 
back?
Rowel: I think that PPI, the main office in Dubai [arranged it]. They 
 were telling [officials in UAE] that we got [a] seminar in Dubai. We 
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got a tourist visa over  there so that PPI keeps pushing that, “Oh  these 
guys need to go in Dubai to take a seminar,” and then [they] send 
[us] another country.
Me: PPI was your sponsor for the visa to Dubai?
Rowel: Yeah.
While PPI provided tourist visas and plane tickets for Fidel and Rowel, they 
 were on their own when it came to clearing immigration at the airport in Manila. 
Dubai is the primary transportation hub for  those illegally working for military 
contractors, so  those with tourist visas to the emirate are given extra scrutiny. If 
an official believes that someone with a tourist visa is actually travelling to Iraq 
or Af ghan i stan they can detain them for questioning or prohibit them from leav­
ing the country. Luckily for Fidel he had a contact at the airport who helped him 
get through, telling him which line to go to and who to pay to ensure safe pas­
sage. When he arrived in Dubai he was greeted by a Filipino who said, “Are you 
PPI?” It turned out he was not the only one put on the plane by PPI. “ There was 
so many of us.  There was a list. I thought I was the only one.” Fidel and the other 
workers  were taken to PPI accommodations in Jebel Ali, a port complex in the 
southwest margins of the emirate. “The first days [ were] preparation. You sub­
mit your papers, passport, sign contracts, medical [exams]. . . .  After medical—
so a week [ later]—[you are] scheduled to fly to Af ghan i stan.  Every day we just 
check on the blackboard if  there’s a flight  going to Af ghan i stan.  Every day . . . 
maybe four  people, five  people, six  people, three  people.  There’s flights  going to 
Kandahar, to Bagram. PPI sent us to dif fer ent camps.”
What’s remarkable about Fidel’s account is that it illustrates PPI’s intimate in­
volvement in facilitating the evasion of the Philippine travel ban, from the pro­
curement of tourist visas  under false pretenses to purchase of airline tickets for 
Dubai. It also demonstrates the scale of the com pany’s under ground  labor acqui­
sition scheme, with the daily deployment of workers to bases across Af ghan i stan. 
PPI was not the only contractor that went to  great lengths to get workers past 
Philippine authorities. Christian, who was hired as a baker by Serka in 2008, was 
provided a tourist visa to Turkey and booked on a byzantine string of flights that 
avoided Manila’s international airport and departed first to Singapore to lessen 
suspicion of immigration authorities: “Manila to Cebu [a large city in the Visayas 
region of the Philippines]; Cebu to Singapore; Singapore to Dubai; Dubai to Tur­
key, Istanbul; Istanbul to Adana.” As a further precaution the com pany gave 
Christian and twenty­ four fellow passengers instructions concerning the line they 
should enter at Cebu’s airport to assure their safe passage out of the country. Upon 
arrival in Adana they  were put on a bus and transported overland to bases in 
northern Iraq.
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In addition to continuing its under ground recruiting efforts in the Philippines, 
PPI also targeted Filipinos and Indians already working in Dubai. One  woman, 
Grace, was working  under the  table while on a tourist visa at the City Centre Deira 
shopping mall in Dubai in 2005 when she was approached by a Filipino repre­
sentative from PPI who asked if she wanted to work in Iraq.
Grace: I said, “Iraq?  They’re having a prob lem  here. They say that it’s 
the worst  going  there.” “No, it’s not. I’ve been  here,” he told me. So I 
said, “OK, how much  will I be earning?” He said, “For a start,  they’re 
 going to give you $550 [a month].” Actually, at that time, $1 is equiv­
alent to 56 pesos, that’s why I grabbed it. I said, “OK.” “ After six 
months,  they’re  going to increase you $50, you  will be earning $600.” 
I said, “OK, I’ll get it.”
Me: How much more was that than you  were making in Dubai?
Grace: It was  triple. . . .  I’m a single mom. I’m thinking, I got three 
 daughters  going into college. How can I [be] able to send them 
money if I  don’t—if I  can’t find a good job in Dubai? That’s why 
instead of thinking, “Oh, Dubai is a nice place,” it was, “Why not try 
Iraq?”
Grace recalls that PPI was looking for Filipinos with older passports that did not 
have a travel ban stamp (Figure 7.2), as this would make it easier to get them past 
Dubai airport officials onto a flight to Baghdad.
 Whether through an agency or one’s own initiative, a noticeable difference be­
tween  legal and under ground recruiting concerns how job opportunities are 
made known to potential workers. Advertising in print or online is out as it at­
tracts government scrutiny. Chance encounters with crowds of applicants in front 
of recruiting agencies in Manila— which was how Carlos found out about PPI’s 
hiring binge in early 2004— also ceased. Therefore following the bans, military 
contractors and recruiting agencies have become more dependent on local agents 
to inform  people about hiring initiatives. Michelle, for example, facilitated the re­
cruitment of most of her neighbors for Serka  after the travel ban to Iraq was 
imposed. Also, as noted above, companies that have large Filipino contingents in 
Iraq or Af ghan i stan mobilize workers to spread the word about hiring opportu­
nities to families and friends when they call home, or reach out to former em­
ployees about returning for another contract. As a result, the travel bans have 
served to further concentrate the pool of potential workers by ratcheting up a spa­
tial path de pen dency when it comes to recruiting military  labor. As one recruit­
ing agency told me, “Once the ban is in place you  can’t cast your net that wide, 
you have to use the existing connections, which keeps it [recruiting] within the 
same communities that started out.”
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A second distinction involves risk. While some Filipinos recruited to work in 
Iraq prior to the travel bans endured substandard living conditions on military 
bases, or  were forced to work far more hours than stipulated in their contracts 
with no extra pay—as was the case with Serka’s employees— the state provided 
some modicum of oversight over the recruiting pro cess, which lessened risk. This 
is especially apparent when one compares the experience of Filipinos during the 
pre­ ban period with South Asian workers recruited by dodgy and un regu la ted 
agencies like Subhash Vijay and Moon Light.
Navigating the under ground recruiting pro cess is a much more precarious 
proposition. To begin, successfully obtaining a job is significantly more expen­
sive, from exorbitant fees charged by recruiting agencies to bribes paid to airport 
officials to smooth passage to Dubai. Moreover,  there is no guarantee that the fees 
and bribes  will result in employment. Job scams have become common. In 2012 
more than twenty Filipinos  were stranded in Af ghan i stan  after promised con­
struction jobs failed to materialize. They each lost the $1,400 dollars they had 
paid to a com pany called RMR Construction.26 For  those detained at the airport, 
any money paid to recruiters or contacts in Iraq and Af ghan i stan is lost, and 
they receive greater scrutiny from officials in the  future. Thus from the perspec­
tive of Filipino workers, finding military work  under the travel ban regime in 
FigUre 7.2. Philippine passport with travel ban stamp
120 ChApter 7
the Philippines more resembles the experiences of South Asian laborers when 
it comes to risk. Consequently, according to Edward,  those willing to take their 
chances are often more desperate: “During the ban you can only recruit who 
wants to go undocumented. Usually  these  people are  really desperate to have a 
job. . . .  You cannot hire workers with skill  really. A [skilled] worker  will not go 
undocumented, di ba [right]? You cannot get  people who are  really experienced. 
You can only get fast the tricycle [taxi] driver.” Yet despite increased risks, the 
Philippines has continued to be a major source of  labor for military contractors 
following the imposition of the travel bans. In 2010 recruiters in Manila esti­
mated that more than 5,000 Filipinos  were working in Af ghan i stan, with this 
number “growing”  every day as  people continued to sneak into the country.27
 Those who successfully obtain a job can still to be negatively affected by the 
travel bans. Several  people I talked with de cided not to go home between con­
tracts, fearful that they would not be able to leave the Philippines again. Fidel 
stayed for three years in Iraq even though he was suffering from lung prob lems 
that required major surgery when he came home in 2007.  Those who do return 
often face the prospect of losing their jobs, or coming up with money to bribe 
officials at the airport when they leave. Rick, a firefighter in Af ghan i stan who was 
at home on vacation when I met him in 2015, described his experience for me:
Rick:  After one year, 2008, that’s the time they banned Af ghan i stan for 
all the Filipinos. That’s why when we go on vacation  after one year of 
contract—we had to go on vacation—so  others cannot come back 
 because Af ghan i stan is banned already. We took the chance of pay­
ing money through escort in the airport so that we can exit.
Me: What do you mean an escort,  because other  people talk about this?
Rick: Some travel agency, they offer us, “If you want, I have an escort 
and helping you to go exit.”
Me: To get past immigration?
Rick: For immigration. But that’s on your own risk  because sometimes 
even though you pay already and you pass the immigration, in the 
boarding still they checking, “Where you  going?” “Af ghan i stan.” They 
 will pick you up and put you out again, so you spend a lot of money 
[for nothing].
Me: How much did you spend for an escort through?
Rick: The first year I go on vacation and then come back, I pay 14,000 
[pesos— roughly $300], and then second it became 18,000 [$350], 
then the third is 30,000 [$600].  Others they pay 40,000 [$800] or a 
$1,000 dollars. That money when we reach Af ghan i stan and we got 
the receipt that we pay escort, the com pany  will pay us.
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Me: Wait. The com pany reimbursed you for the escort?
Rick: Yes. First, it come from your pocket  because com pany they  don’t 
know if you passed the immigration. When you got  there  because they 
need you, they need workers, that’s the time they  will reimburse the 
money you spent in escort and every thing . . .  as long as you have re­
ceipt they  will pay.
Rick was the only person I talked with whose employer reimbursed him for the 
expense of evading the travel bans. His situation is unique due to the fact that as 
an airport firefighter he had specialized skills that  were in high demand, and 
 because his com pany is a prime contractor for the military. As I discuss more in 
chapters 8 and 9, this means that his status and privileges are much greater than 
 those working for subcontractors.
While the travel bans pushed recruiting and travel to and from bases under­
ground, thus increasing workers’ precarity, Filipinos I interviewed also dem­
onstrated remarkable initiative and agency in obtaining work with military 
contractors during this period. Take Anne, who was fired by Serka in 2006 for 
participating in protests against restrictive rules forbidding cell phones and the 
ability to move around her base unescorted. Two years  earlier she had joined a 
large  labor strike  after Serka promised workers $600/month (which was stipu­
lated in the contracts she and  others signed) but paid only $300/month for DFAC 
work. At that time she and other strikers  were supported by KBR and the mili­
tary. But her participation in protests two years  later— against rule changes that 
 were introduced by the military, not her employer— convinced Serka to termi­
nate her contract and send her home. Not content with staying in the Philippines, 
Anne procured a tourist visa to Dubai and “approached  every agency in Dubai” 
about work in Iraq.  After seven months searching, an Indian­ run agency offered 
her a job with Kulak. Another laborer, Andrew, returned home in 2008  after four 
years with PPI in Iraq. Then in 2009 he de cided to look for military work again. 
He contacted a Filipina fixer living in the UAE who was recommended by a 
former colleague in Iraq. The fixer helped him obtain a tourist visa and plane 
ticket to Dubai, put him up in a crowed apartment— “Just a two bedroom, [with] 
40 Filipinos”— and arranged interviews with military contractors. Three months 
and $2,000 in fees  later he obtained a job with a U.S. engineering firm, Arkel, in 
Af ghan i stan.
Another option involves smuggling oneself into Iraq or Af ghan i stan, with 
the hope of finding a job with a military contractor  after you arrive. Two ex­
amples suffice. The first comes from Mary, who smuggled herself into Victory 
Base Complex in Baghdad in 2005  after a promised job that she paid $1,400 for 
fell through.
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Mary: We got to Dubai [and] they told us that they  don’t hire to Iraq . . . 
I’m crying, always crying,  because I am thinking of my  mother’s land. 
It’s in the pawnshop [mortgaged]. Then someone told me, “You want 
to go to Iraq, one week, [by] cargo airplane?”
Me: With a contract or without?
Mary: We  don’t have a contract. Three girls. We go  there. We  don’t have 
a visa, we  don’t have a contract. . . .  We go to the [Baghdad] airport. 
We go into the back where somebody pick us up by bus.
Me: How did you find out about the bus?
Mary: My coworkers [friends] in PPI. They  were already  there.
Me: PPI  didn’t give you a contract but your friends said, “If you come 
with us we can find you a contract,  we’ll get you a job”?
Mary: Like that, yeah . . .  One month before we work, we go outside. 
[ Until then] we only stay in the [PPI] camp. If you  don’t have badge, 
you  don’t go outside the camp. It’s only in the lady’s camp we stay 
 there.
Like Mary, John’s cousin initially smuggled herself into Af ghan i stan without a 
job offer. John explained how this works for me.
John:  There is a camp right outside of KAF [Kandahar Airfield] that is 
an Afghan [army] camp, and Filipinos often stay  there to look for 
jobs.
Me: So you would fly into KAF, leave the base, and then look for a 
job?
John: You had to coordinate with relatives or friends to find a job, 
 because you  wouldn’t be able to get back on the base without papers 
[John is referring  here to a letter of authorization (LOA), which states 
that the person is an employee of a contracting firm and thus autho­
rized to be on the base].
Me: How long would  people stay  there?
John: A month. Five months. Sometimes  people would stay that long 
 because they  couldn’t find work. Sometimes they went by land from 
Dubai,  because the food comes from Dubai through Pakistan [and] 
they hitch a  ride.
Mary’s and John’s cousin’s stories are but two of many examples of Filipinos sneak­
ing into Iraq and Af ghan i stan for work that  were recounted for me. Given the 
widespread flouting of travel bans by the military and its contractors, it is under­
standable that individuals are willing to risk smuggling themselves into an active 
warzone in the hope of finding work.
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Nearly  every news account of the experiences of South and Southeast Asian 
laborers working for the U.S. military in Iraq and Af ghan i stan focuses on traf­
ficking and  labor abuses such as wage theft. That the military has done  little to 
combat  these  human rights violations by its contractors and subcontractors is dis­
graceful. But  there is a danger in this exclusive focus on exploitation, in that 
TCNs tend to be painted as passive and helpless victims. The above stories offer 
a necessary corrective to this view. Indeed, time and time again I was struck by 
the ingenuity and courage displayed by Filipinos who have labored in Iraq and 
Af ghan i stan. This is especially the case when it comes to  labor activism by work­
ers like Anne, which is the topic of the next chapter.
Evading Responsibility
In 2008 families of the Nepalese workers killed in Iraq filed a federal lawsuit in 
Texas alleging that the men  were victims of a trafficking scheme or ga nized by 
Daoud & Partners and KBR.  After initially allowing the case to go forward, the 
judge reversed course in 2014, declaring that congressional anti­ trafficking legis­
lation “was  silent with regards to extraterritoriality” prior to 2008, therefore 
the plaintiffs did not have standing as the alleged crimes did not take place on 
U.S. soil.28 In similar fashion, a 2006 DoD investigation into the incident de­
clared that “the U.S. government had no jurisdiction over the persons, offenses, 
or circumstances that resulted in the Nepalese deaths.”29 On its face this was a 
rather curious claim given that Daoud & Partners was one of the largest mili­
tary subcontractors in Iraq and the men  were kidnapped while in transit to work 
on U.S. bases in the country. Such comments, however, are consistent with the 
desire of the military to distance itself as much as pos si ble from responsibility 
for an oversight role when it comes to subcontractors’  labor practices.
Indeed, what stands out in the Najlaa and Nepalese cases—as well as many 
other incidents—is the inability or unwillingness of the military to provide effec­
tive oversight of subcontractors with regard to their treatment of workers, despite 
the fact that  these workers’ employment is entirely a consequence of military 
contracting. While acknowledging  legal complexities raised by overseas con­
tingency contracting, it is striking how often narrow, legalistic arguments are 
used to justify or explain lack of oversight responsibility when it comes to  labor 
exploitation by subcontractors. Following its initial investigation into the Najlaa 
affair, for instance, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) con­
cluded that “the USG [U.S. government] does not have jurisdiction over  these 
TCNs, as  these men are not being held on USG property, nor do they have USG 
contracts.”30 More farcically, a DoD Inspector General report argued that “while 
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certainly disconcerting, the facts and circumstances did not suggest that  Human 
Trafficking Violations had occurred”  because “TCN personnel  housed in the . . . 
complex  were  free to leave if they had de cided to do so.”31 Move along, nothing 
to see  here, in other words.
So how do military officials justify evasion of oversight responsibility? One way, 
as noted above, is by invoking the  legal princi ple of privity of contract. Accord­
ing to privity doctrine contracts establish a  legal relationship between parties, 
with attendant rights and obligations. This relationship does not apply to third 
parties. Thus in the case of defense contracts, the government and prime con­
tractors have privity, prime contractors and their first tier of subcontractors have 
privity, but the government, as a third party, does not have privity with subcon­
tractors. In other contexts the U.S. government has typically invoked privity 
of contract to shield itself from claims by subcontractors.32 In fact, it is against 
government policy to deal directly with subcontractors in order to maintain the 
 legal distance that privity provides.33 But privity can be permeable  going the 
other way as the government has a variety of tools available to monitor and en­
force subcontractors’ policies and be hav ior if it so desires.
The most power ful tool is the use of “flow down” clauses. This involves di­
recting prime contractors to insert clauses into contracts with subcontractors re­
quiring the latter to comply with certain provisions. For example, a standard 
“audit clause” requires a subcontractor to allow the government to examine rec­
ords of cost and pricing data.34 Federal regulations also now require a “combat­
ing trafficking in persons” clause for all contracts, including flow downs of this 
clause for subcontractors. The current version of this clause prohibits the use of 
forced  labor in the per for mance of contracts, confiscation of passports, use of re­
cruiters that do not comply with  labor laws of the country in which recruiting 
takes place, and the charging of recruiting fees. It also directs companies to “pro­
vide timely and complete responses to Government auditors’ and investigators’ 
requests for documents” and “reasonable access to facilities and staff . . .  to as­
certain compliance” with prohibitions against trafficking.35 So in theory, at least, 
privity should not be a significant stumbling block to effective oversight.
In practice, however, the military’s efforts to enforce prohibitions against traf­
ficking through contracts amount to  little more than legalistic formality. Black 
and Kamat describe the experience of one former worker in Iraq who recalled that 
upon arriving at the military base “his contractor required him and his colleagues 
to sign a Trafficking Awareness form, issued by the Department of Defense. ‘We 
all knew— and they knew— that we had paid,’ he said, referring to his supervi­
sors. ‘Oh, yeah, every body knows.’ ”36 As this example illustrates, the military does 
not assertively ascertain  whether or not trafficking has occurred, but effectively 
outsources this task to contractors, who are tasked with developing and imple­
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menting a “compliance plan.”37 The prob lem  here is that “contractors essentially 
have been asked to turn themselves in upon learning that an employee has  violated 
this policy— even at the risk of contract termination, suspension and debarment. 
Thus, while the FAR [Federal Acquisition Regulations] and DFARS [Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement] ban on  human trafficking is a warn­
ing to Contractors that such activities are expressly prohibited, it is doubtful that 
the regulations  will accomplish their laudable objectives, since Contractors are 
unlikely to self­ report.”38 Moreover, prime contractors, who are tasked with po­
licing the be hav ior of their subcontractors, are largely dependent on the latter’s 
cooperation, especially when it comes to conducting interview checks with 
workers. One Fluor employee from Bosnia who worked as a QA/QC supervisor 
in Af ghan i stan explained to me: “Usually they [subcontractors’ foreign employees] 
 don’t speak En glish at all. I had a language assistant which is from their com pany. 
That was against the contract . . .  in my documentation I’m not supposed to have 
any person next to me and especially from [the] same com pany.  There’s no other 
way, though. I had to have one. Your [the subcontractor’s] language assistant be­
tween me and him.” From the perspective of workers this pro forma pro cess pro­
vides no incentive to speak truthfully about their experiences. As an Indian 
worker for a subcontractor in Af ghan i stan told Black and Kamat, “We’ve already 
paid agents for the job. If we tell the U.S. military that we paid a fee,  they’ll just 
send us back, and  we’ll lose every thing.”39 Given all this, it is not surprising that a 
2011 report on war time contracting commissioned by Congress concluded, “The 
Commission uncovered tragic evidence of the recurrent prob lem of trafficking in 
persons by  labor brokers or subcontractors of contingency contractors. Existing 
prohibitions on such trafficking have failed to suppress it.”40
The second, and primary,  legal justification against more robust enforcement 
of anti­ trafficking prohibitions and other  labor standards centers on jurisdiction, 
or rather a supposed lack thereof. Westphalian sovereignty is based on the assump­
tion that po liti cal borders define jurisdiction, with each state possessing absolute 
authority to enforce the law within its territory. In real ity this territorial ideal has 
always been riddled with extraterritorial exceptions where domestic law extends 
beyond borders. This was particularly true during the age of empire in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. John Darwin goes as far as to claim that 
“extraterritorial ‘rights’ ” ensured by “bases, enclaves, garrisons, gunboats, treaty 
ports and unequal treaties”  were “as much the expression of . . .  Eu ro pean impe­
rialism as  were the colonies and protectorates.”41 Nor was extraterritoriality 
 limited to Eu ro pean powers. By 1900 the U.S. signed a number of treaties guar­
anteeing extraterritorial jurisdiction over its citizens living in North Africa (Mo­
rocco, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli), the  Middle East (Turkey, Muscat, Persia), Asia 
(Japan, China), and several other locales. The most extensive of  these was China, 
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where Americans, along with Eu ro pean foreign residents, “enjoyed virtual im­
munity from native law, and  were instead  under the extraterritorial authority of 
their own home governments.”42 By the turn of the  century  legal demands cre­
ated by the large American presence in China prompted the establishment of a 
“U.S. Court for China” based in Shanghai, which operated  until 1942. “In sum,” 
 legal scholar Kal Raustialia observes, “empires and extraterritoriality  were closely 
linked.”43
Echoes of  these imperial extraterritorial exceptions continue, most significantly 
SOFAs that provide for varying degrees of extraterritorial jurisdiction over U.S. 
personnel and dependents deployed to overseas bases. In 2000 Congress passed 
the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), which closed a jurisdictional 
“ legal Bermuda triangle” by extending extraterritorial authority for certain crimes 
over military contractors.44 Notably, MEJA applies to foreign nationals as well as 
U.S. citizens. Unfortunately, MEJA’s effect has been minimal. In the first ten years 
 after the law’s passage only fifteen attempted and successful prosecutions involved 
civilian contractors— and none of  these concerned trafficking or other  labor 
abuses.45 One reason for this is the difficulty U.S. prosecutors face in gathering 
evidence overseas, especially in war zones. More significant, though, is “a  simple 
lack of po liti cal  will to bring cases.”46
This lack of  will is often masked by specious references to jurisdictional gaps 
that no longer exist. The Najlaa case is emblematic  here. Nowhere in the MEJA, 
for instance, does it state that extraterritorial jurisdiction is  limited to crimes that 
occur on U.S. property or bases, as DCMA claimed. In fact, MEJA was successfully 
used to prosecute the four Blackwater contractors who killed fourteen civilians 
at Nisour Square in Baghdad in 2007. Najlaa, in contrast, was never prosecuted 
for its  labor abuses. It even continued to receive contracts from KBR and the 
military. This despite the conclusion of officials at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad 
that the incident was “essentially the trafficking of low­ skilled expat workers into 
forced  labor” due to the fact that “ these  people are only making $300 to $400 a 
month (for 12hrs/day 7day work weeks) and they are effectively working for 
 little or nothing for the 6–12 months it takes them to recoup the broker’s fee.”47
In addition to MEJA prosecutions the military has a number of other  legal and 
policy ave nues at its disposal if it wished to be more aggressive in curtailing  labor 
abuses by subcontractors. One pos si ble step, recommended by the Commission 
on War time Contracting in Iraq and Af ghan i stan (CWC), would be to “require 
that foreign prime contractors and subcontractors consent to U.S. jurisdiction 
as a condition of award of a contract or subcontract,” thereby eliminating any 
potential confusion as to the reach of U.S. law.48 Another approach would be to 
use the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which gives the military jurisdiction 
over civilian personnel working with troops in overseas operations, to prosecute 
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contractors for trafficking or other  labor abuses.49 Beyond prosecutions, the mil­
itary could also be more aggressive in pursuing debarment or suspension of con­
tractors in response to evidence of trafficking and other  labor abuses. That it does 
not pursue  these ave nues or MEJA prosecutions is telling. Especially when one 
considers the lengths to which the U.S. government and courts have expanded 
extraterritorial jurisdiction across a range of domains in recent decades— from 
the “war on drugs” to foreign sovereign debt disputes.50 Indeed, it is hard to 
disagree with the conclusion of one  legal analy sis of trafficking by military con­
tractors that “the main issue plaguing the U.S. Government in preventing and 
prohibiting  human trafficking is, predominately, the Government itself.”51
This prob lem, I believe, ultimately stems from the fact that officials are un­
willing to acknowledge that contracting out logistics support to an offshore army 
of workers means that the military is responsible for the conditions  under which 
this workforce is acquired and  labors on its behalf. In this the military is similar 
to large U.S. corporations with extended offshore supply chains that try to evade 
responsibility for substandard  labor conditions suffered by workers at the end of 
 these chains. In both cases offshoring  labor has transformed the workforce, from 
American to foreign. The consequence, as Maya Eichler observes, is that military 
contracting— like offshore manufacturing— depends on and reinforces global 
inequalities of citizenship that intersect with racial, class, and gendered in equality.52 
When this is combined with subcontracting and extended  labor supply chains 
that downsource risk and attenuate moral responsibility, it is not surprising that 
U.S. civilian and military officials’ response to cases of trafficking and other  labor 
abuses has been so tepid.
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BASE LIFE
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Third country nationals have a precarious and liminal status on U.S. military bases 
in the  Middle East and Af ghan i stan. In contrast to American contractors, they 
have  little recourse to remedies through the U.S.  legal system when subject to  labor 
abuses, especially when their employers are also foreign firms, as most military 
subcontractors are. And unlike local laborers who can appeal to host countries 
for help, they have few external po liti cal and social relationships that can be mo­
bilized to advocate for better wages or working conditions. Moreover, military 
bases are essentially closed com pany towns where all workers are at­ will employ­
ees that can be fired and deported by the military or contracting companies for 
any reason. In many cases being deported results in being “blacklisted” by the 
military from working again on its bases.
Given this context, U.S. bases in warzones are one of the last places one would 
expect to find a ferment of  labor activism. This impression is buttressed by the 
fact that few news stories discuss  labor strikes or protests on bases. In part this is 
a product of restrictions governing where reporters can go and who they can talk 
with. But it also reflects a widespread narrative that portrays TCNs— especially 
 those from South and Southeast Asia—as hapless victims with  little agency of 
their own. One notable exception to the lack of reporting on  labor activism is the 
work of Sarah Stillman, whose excellent 2011 New Yorker article, “The Invisible 
Army,” describes a massive 2010 riot by PPI workers at Victory Base Complex in 
Baghdad. Angered by a shortage of food at the com pany DFAC, more than 1,000 
workers, mainly from India and Nepal, ransacked their mancamp, “smashing 
8
ACTIVISM
We  were all thinking the same, so in the eve ning we talked and 
agreed that we would not go to work in the morning. . . .  We called a 
meeting. one or two men went room by room. the guy who led it was 
a former oFW, so he had lots of experience. so he went room by room 
and convinced  people. When he came in he said, “tomorrow we  will 
do something about the salary. please join us. it  won’t take long.”
— Manny
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win dows, hurling stones, destroying computers, raiding com pany files, and 
battering the entrance”  after supervisors refused to provide more rice. Eventu­
ally U.S. military police and Ugandan security guards  were called into the camp 
to quell the riot. Several weeks  later GCC employees in Baghdad staged their 
own protest, “pelting their bosses with stones and accusing the com pany of fail­
ing to pay them their proper wages.”1
As Stillman’s article hints at, protests and strikes have in fact not been uncom­
mon on bases in warzones. Nor are  these the only forms of  labor activism. More 
common, I am told, is a practice that workers refer to as “jumping,” which in­
volves surreptitiously transferring from one com pany to another in search of bet­
ter pay or working conditions. As I argue below, this is a strategy that is no less 
risky than mass protests or strikes.
Viewed in a broader context,  these  labor strug gles can be situated within a long 
history of such activities at the myriad of overseas U.S. military proj ects and bases. 
Julie Greene describes repeated strikes, riots, and attempts to or ga nize  unions on 
the part of the multinational workforce the military enrolled to construct the Pan­
ama Canal in the early 1900s—as well as vari ous coercive mea sures introduced 
to repress  these activities.2  Labor unrest also plagued contractors in Vietnam. In 
1966 roughly 16,000 RMK­ BRJ workers at multiple bases struck for better wages.3 
That same year 4,300 Korean, Filipino, and Viet nam ese laborers for RMK­ BRJ 
at Cam Ranh Bay military base went on strike in protest of onerous work rules.4 
And in late 1967 some 2,000 Koreans working for Vinnell Corporation at Cam 
Ranh Bay protested a shortage of rice and the quality of food they  were being fed. 
When a com pany man ag er shot three Koreans, the protests turned into a multi­
day riot, with workers smashing bulldozers and trucks into buildings.5 U.S. bases 
in the Philippines  were a regular target for  labor activists prior to their closure in 
the 1990s. In 1986 more than 22,000 Filipino workers struck at Clark Air Base, 
Subic Bay naval fa cil i ty, and six smaller bases. Seeking pay raises and increased 
severance benefits they blockaded entrances with logs, rocks, and scrap metal 
for nearly two weeks, preventing ser vice members from entering or leaving the 
bases.6 More recently, in 2013 hundreds of Djiboutian laborers conducted more 
than a month of protests and strikes against planned workforce cuts by KBR 
at Camp Lemonnier, forcing troops to “man the chow line” and perform other 
logistics duties.7
 There are several  factors that make  labor activism by foreign workers in war­
zones distinct from cases like the Panama Canal, Djibouti, and the Philippines. 
One is that in the latter local  labor laws govern—to greater and lesser degrees 
depending on SOFAs and other bilateral agreements— hiring and firing proce­
dures, wages, rights to  unionize or strike, and working conditions. Foreign work­
ers have no such  legal frameworks that they can effectively appeal to. Another is 
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that as transnational  labor mi grants TCNs are a captive  labor pool whose alter­
native in­ county work options are essentially non ex is tent. Being forced to return 
home is the most likely outcome if they leave, or are terminated from, employ­
ment on a base.
Perhaps the most significant difference involves the po liti cal and social dynam­
ics of protests and strikes. In countries that host large, long­ term U.S. bases the 
military is highly reliant on local  labor to provide logistics support. This de­
pendence, Amy Austin Holmes argues in her analy sis of domestic social unrest 
connected to military bases located in Germany and Turkey, means that local 
workers possess a degree of “structural power.” By this she means the ability to 
use strikes and other forms of  labor unrest to further vari ous economic and po­
liti cal goals, ranging from obtaining wage increases and greater job security for 
workers to pressuring the host government to end the U.S. military’s presence. 
Holmes’s research demonstrates that the ability to mobilize structural power is 
not just a  matter of  labor dependence; it is also  shaped by a triadic relationship 
between the military, local  labor, and the host nation. Thus in responding to 
strikes and protests the military by necessity has to take into account how its 
 actions  will be received by the host society and its po liti cal elites.8 Such consider­
ations are absent in the case of TCN  labor activism in the  Middle East and Af­
ghan i stan, greatly attenuating the structural power that  these workers possess. 
Put another way, the use of foreign workers in warzones produces a relatively 
high degree of “internal containment” of  labor relations. This, as noted in chap­
ter 7, is a desired feature of  labor offshoring, which facilitates the military’s goal 
of developing more flexible and modular logistical support regimes.
I do not wish to imply that  labor strug gles on  these bases unfold as if trapped 
in a hermetically sealed container. A certain amount of po liti cal leakage is inevi­
table. In May 2005, for instance, some 300 Filipino employees of PPI went on 
strike at Taji Air Base (also known as Camp Cooke at the time). They  were  later 
joined by 500 laborers from India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. The strikers accused PPI 
of violating contract language concerning working conditions and hours, falling 
three months late on pay, and refusing to provide cooks in the com pany man­
camp that would prepare national dishes such as adobo chicken. In response 
PPI threatened to immediately fire the agitators and send them back home on 
chartered flights. When word of the  labor dispute was picked up by Philippine 
diplomats in Iraq, the government dispatched its chargé d’affaires, Ricardo En­
daya, to mediate talks between PPI and the workers.  These talks ended in a quick 
settlement. Endaya also investigated allegations of systemic  labor abuses by 
First Kuwaiti in 2004 and 2005— there  were “simultaneous complaints at multi­
ple camps” he recollects— but the com pany refused to meet with him to discuss 
remedies. During his time in Iraq, Endaya continually prodded U.S. officials and 
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his superiors to more aggressively investigate First Kuwaiti’s  labor practices, 
though to  little effect.9
This chapter explores the hidden phenomenon of  labor activism on U.S. bases 
in Iraq and Af ghan i stan. Foreign workers on  these bases have three choices when 
it come to their situation. The first, and safest, is a “ don’t rock the boat” approach. 
That is, keep one’s head down and continue to work without complaining or try­
ing to change conditions. A second option is to return home. The prob lem is 
that this is a road to economic ruin if one paid exorbitant recruiting fees and still 
owes money to loan sharks, as many workers do. Fi nally, workers can decide to 
engage in  labor activism— either collective or individual— aware of the risks that 
this entails. In the rest of the chapter I examine when, why, and to what effect 
workers choose this latter option. I also discuss contracting companies’ strate­
gies to suppress workers’ efforts, and the military’s ambiguous position in relation 
to  these strug gles.
Protests and Strikes
In 2004 strikes unfolded across several major bases in northern Iraq, beginning 
at Diamondback and Marez in Mosul, and then spreading to Q­ West and Tal Afar. 
Instigated by Filipinos working for Serka, which held DFAC contracts for the bases, 
 these actions  were one of the earliest examples of large­ scale  labor activism in Iraq. 
They  were also successful, leading to significant pay increases for strikers at all 
four bases. I first heard of the strikes from Daniel, a gregarious former Serka em­
ployee who was one of the first  people I met in the Philippines. At the end of the 
interview I was left with several questions, the answers to which only started to 
come into focus as I talked with other participants in  these strikes. Why  were the 
majority of Serka’s Filipino workers motivated to take action despite the obvious 
risks? How did the pro cess unfold? And what  were the circumstances that con­
tributed to a favorable outcome for participants?
More than a de cade  after the strikes occurred Daniel still relished describing 
the events and displayed evident pride in what he and his fellow workers accom­
plished. Serka’s Filipino employees had two main complaints with their status. 
First, they  were angered by the gross discrepancy between contracts signed in the 
Philippines and pay and working conditions in Iraq. As mentioned in chapter 7, 
Serka’s contracts specified an eight­ hour a day work schedule, with one day off 
each week. When  people arrived in Iraq they  were told that standard shifts  were 
actually twelve hours, with no days off. And despite the extra thirty­ six hours a 
week they  were working, they would receive no additional pay. In addition to this 
blatant wage theft, many workers found themselves paid far less than promised. 
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Anne, for instance, was promised a salary of $600/month, but was paid only $300. 
Other Serka employees also mentioned working for salaries far less than prom­
ised. Their accounts are bolstered by a 2006 Army investigation into Serka that 
found evidence that this practice continued  after the travel ban drove recruiting 
under ground.10
What Filipinos  really resented, however, was the fact that Serka’s Turkish em­
ployees  were being paid much more for  doing the same work. Manny recalls, “A 
Turkish worker only go clean the toilet but his salary is $1,000 [a month]. A Fili­
pino that got the same [salary] work on the computer. For example, when I was 
a driver my salary was $1,000. My helper, Turkish, was $1,300 to $1,400 . . .  Turk­
ish workers in the kitchen would get twice as much [as Filipino kitchen work­
ers]. . . .  We felt insulted by the Turkish salaries compared to ours.” Moreover, 
Filipinos felt that the com pany’s Turkish employees treated them shabbily, even 
though they  were not as qualified. Daniel remembers, “We felt disrespected by 
the Turkish workers. [They]  didn’t go to school. They  didn’t know how to write, 
how to read. And they  didn’t know En glish . . .  But they  were very full of them­
selves.” Serka is a Turkish com pany with a history of providing logistics support 
for U.S. military bases in Turkey  going back to the 1960s. Therefore the fact that 
it treated its compatriot workforce better than its Filipino employees makes sense, 
to a degree. In this, in fact, its practices resembled Fluor’s and DynCorp’s tiered 
distinctions between American, Eu ro pean, and Asian workers in Af ghan i stan a 
few years  later. But Filipinos I talked with  didn’t see it this way. While the racial­
ized hierarchy between American workers and TCNs is generally internalized and 
accepted by Filipinos— especially if the latter work for a subcontracting com­
pany— they objected to the assumption that Serka’s Turkish employees should 
have a higher status.
Daniel suggests this perspective was fueled by discussions with Filipino­ 
American soldiers, who said to him and  others, “You guys are getting screwed.” 
In his telling  these conversations planted the seed for organ izing against the com­
pany. Rodrigo, one of his coworkers at Marez, says that the first step was drafting 
a petition that was delivered to Serka and KBR management. “They drafted a let­
ter that said, ‘ We’re asking for [an] increase. We know how dangerous the job is. 
You know how dangerous the situation is which makes our jobs dangerous as well. 
 Here are the list of the names who are demanding this and they signed them. If 
you cannot give this to us, send us home.’ ” According to Rodrigo, approximately 
half of Serka’s Filipino workforce on the base signed the petition. The following 
day they stayed in their barracks instead of reporting for work at the DFAC. Al­
most immediately the base mayor called a meeting with Serka, KBR, and strike 
leaders. According to Daniel, Rodrigo, and Anne, both KBR and the military 
backed their demands, with KBR telling Serka’s man ag ers, “ Don’t make this get 
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any worse, fix it.” Once  people heard this, they knew they had won. Three weeks 
 later Serka doubled the salary for all of its Filipino workers on the base, even  those 
who did not participate in the strike.
In short order strikes spread to other bases in northern Iraq. The last base to 
be or ga nized was Tal Afar. Manny, who worked  there, was originally reluctant to 
join the strike: “I was scared. On the one hand I wanted my salary to be increased. 
On the other I was scared I would be sent home. The one consolation I had was 
that if I got fired every one would get fired.” When I asked if  others felt this way 
he said: “Yeah, many. They  were scared too. But we  were [also] afraid we would 
be teased if we  didn’t [go along]. . . .  Also, we heard about strikes in other camps. 
We heard that other camps  were able to negotiate their salary, so we thought, ‘Why 
 don’t we try?’ Hearing about it [the other strikes] the leaders  were confident that 
it [a strike] would work.” In the end Manny and most of Serka’s non­ Turkish 
workforce at Tal Afar, which included some Indian and Egyptian workers, joined 
the strike.
Several  factors contributed to the success of  these strikes. As mentioned above, 
the perception of injustice concerning Serka’s differential treatment of Turkish 
and non­ Turkish employees created a shared set of grievances (“we  were all think­
ing the same”) that helped unite its Filipino workers against the com pany. In 
addition to this, it is clear that  those with previous experience working abroad, 
such as Daniel and the leaders of the strike at Tal Afar, played an impor tant role 
in mobilizing  people. Also relevant is the power of demonstration effects. Ac­
cording to Manny, success at the bases in Mosul emboldened both leaders and 
reluctant followers like himself to undertake their own strikes. Perhaps most 
impor tant was the fact that KBR and military officials sided with Serka’s Filipino 
workers, which foreclosed the possibility of punitive actions against participants 
by the com pany.
This support has to be understood in relation to the specific dynamics at play. 
It is not immaterial, for instance, that Filipinos constituted the vast majority of 
Serka’s food ser vice workers at the time. Without their  labor the com pany lacked 
the manpower to fulfill its contractual obligations. Moreover, the military places 
 great emphasis on dining operations in warzones, believing that plentiful and 
high­ quality food is critical for maintaining morale. Food ser vice is also much 
more time sensitive than other logistical support activities like construction, main­
tenance, and transportation. Truck convoys can be delayed for days with  little 
disruption to operations, but if troops miss a meal  because the DFAC is shut down 
all hell breaks loose. And due to strict sanitation rules and procedures, it is dif­
ficult for companies to rapidly replace striking food ser vice staff with untrained 
workers. Combined, the constant rhythm of food ser vice and the critical mass of 
Filipino DFAC workers who went along with the strike meant that strikers had a 
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significant degree of leverage. Therefore from the perspective of KBR and the mil­
itary the quickest way to resolve the prob lem of interrupted food ser vice was to 
order Serka to “fix” the issue by meeting its workers’ demands.
In response to the strikes, Serka made several  labor management changes. First, 
it appears to have phased out hiring Turkish workers, whose elevated status gen­
erated so much resentment from Filipinos. Second, the com pany became more 
aggressive in punishing employees who tried to or ga nize protests or strikes. As 
we saw in chapter 7, Anne was deported in 2006 for protesting new restrictions 
on the use of cell phones and freedom of movement around her base without es­
corts. A critical difference  here was that  these restrictions  were imposed by the 
military, so when Anne protested the changes she received no outside support. 
But rather than explain the situation for Anne and other protesters, Serka took 
this as an opportunity to remove unwanted agitators from its workforce. Another 
Serka employee, Angelo, recalls protests and strikes over low wages by Indian and 
Bangladeshi workers in 2006. Initially the com pany agreed to increase their $300/
month salaries by $50. But when dozens of workers continued to complain 
about this small increase in pay, Serka rounded up the leaders and sent them home.
The key change introduced by Serka was diversification of its workforce by na­
tionality. According to Daniel, “In the beginning it was mostly Filipinos and 
Turkish, but  after the strikes Indians and Nepali came in.”  These South Asian 
workers, he claims, cost less money and  were more docile. This shift in workforce 
composition, which I call the “Tower of Babel strategy,” was deliberate accord­
ing to  those I talked with. The logic  behind diversifying one’s workforce is that it 
is harder to or ga nize and mobilize support for mass action across national lines. 
Articulating shared goals or strategies, for example, is more difficult with a mul­
tinational workforce, especially given the fact that most South Asian workers have 
 little to no knowledge of En glish. Moreover, levels of solidarity and trust across 
national lines are much lower than within. For example, when I asked Angelo why 
he and other Filipinos refused to join the strike by Serka’s Indian and Bangladeshi 
employees he replied, “If you complained about salary you could get fired” and 
“it was their own strike.” Serka played up  these tensions by paying dif fer ent wages 
based on nationality. Filipinos on Angelo’s base  were paid double the com pany’s 
South Asian workers, for instance. More importantly, a heterogeneous workforce 
allowed Serka— and other companies that pursued this strategy—to more effec­
tively marginalize  labor activism, especially if it remained largely confined along 
national lines. When a DFAC workforce is constituted by a mix of Nepalese, In­
dians, Bangladeshis, Filipinos, and Turks, protests or work stoppages by one or 
two of  these groups can be more easily absorbed without dramatically affecting 
operations. According to Angelo, this was why the 2006 strikes met with  limited 
success. Even though a significant portion of both Indian and Bangladeshi 
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workers participated, they still represented a fraction of DFAC workers, which 
decreased their bargaining leverage. Another Serka employee, Christian, recalls a 
2009 strike by fifteen Bangladeshi DFAC employees. Rather than negotiate with 
this small contingent of disgruntled workers the com pany immediately sent 
them home, with  little vis i ble effect on food ser vice.
Filipinos who worked for other subcontractors, including the military’s larg­
est body shops in Iraq, PPI, GCC, and Kulak, suggest that this approach to work­
force composition, and aggressive moves to identify and deport  labor activists, 
quickly became widespread strategies for suppressing mass protests and strikes. 
Despite this, interviews reveal that  labor disruptions continued to occur at bases 
across the country. One PPI employee who was at Camp Bucca in 2006 and 2007 
recalls a large work stoppage where “the majority” of the com pany’s employees, 
“ people from India, Philippines, Nepal,” refused to work for two days in protest 
of small salaries and lack of overtime pay. Built in the desert wastes northwest of 
Iraq’s main port, Umm Qasr, Bucca was the U.S. military’s largest detention fa­
cil i ty in the country, holding 26,000 Iraqi prisoners at the peak of its operations.11 
 After promising a small salary bump, PPI man ag ers convinced every one to re­
turn to work. A week  later the com pany terminated eight employees— six of them 
Filipino— that it identified as the strike leaders.
Another person I talked with, Chris, remembers a  labor protest in early 
May 2005 staged by approximately 500 Filipino GCC employees at Victory Base 
Complex in Baghdad. Unlike the cases discussed above this one concerned food. 
Specifically, the fact that the com pany dining hall was staffed with Indian cooks 
who refused to accommodate their requests for noncurry dishes. “They fed us 
with curry that looked like shit.  There  were so many  people [that] got stressed 
 because of that.”  After complaints to com pany man ag ers went nowhere, Chris 
and the rest of GCC’s Filipino contingent turned to the military for help. “We 
went to the staging area, the military staging area and said, ‘We refuse to work.’ 
One officer came up and said, ‘What is the prob lem with your com pany? I  will 
call your com pany [man ag ers].’ ‘Sir, our prob lem is food, not work. Food, only 
food.’ The military gave us some MREs and  water and we went back to work. . . . 
What KBR did, [is] they talked to the [GCC] management to fix the prob lem. 
They provided us food accommodation, Filipino food.”
This is an instructive example of  labor activism for a  couple of reasons. One 
is that it illustrates another issue— the type, quantity, or quality of company­ 
provided food— that frequently motivated workers to protest or strike. Several 
 people discussed protests that centered on food occurring with other subcontrac­
tors during the first few years of operations in Iraq, an unintended consequence, 
perhaps, of hiring nationally heterogeneous workforces. Eventually, at most bases 
the largest subcontracting firms began providing a range of food options in their 
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mancamps to accommodate the tastes of workers from dif fer ent countries. How­
ever, as Sarah Stillman’s reporting discussed above indicates, food complaints 
remained a key precipitant of protests and strikes throughout the occupation of 
Iraq. Another common driver of  labor activism concerns salary arrears. PPI, for 
example, was notorious for its frequent delays, with  people I talked with  going 
up to four months in a row without pay. PPI’s salary arrears  was one issue, in 
par tic u lar, that had the power to unite all workers, no  matter their nationality, in 
protest.
The other significant detail about the GCC protest Chris recounted is that 
workers took their complaints directly to military officials  after receiving no re­
sponse from com pany man ag ers. This too was not uncommon. Enrolling the 
military in  labor disputes could take dif fer ent forms, from large protests like the 
one described by Chris to discussing prob lems with friends or acquaintances in 
the military, as was the case with Daniel, who credits Filipino­ American soldiers 
with convincing him and  others at Marez to or ga nize the first strike against Serka. 
Daniel was not alone in thinking that the military was more responsive than com­
pany man ag ers and KBR supervisors. In 2004 a number of PPI workers at Balad 
began agitating for better food and housing accommodations, eventually formulat­
ing a list of demands. When I asked Isko, who worked  there at the time,  whether 
they presented their demands to their PPI or KBR man ag ers he responded, “Not the 
mangers. They gave it to the MPs [military police].  Because the MPs had the power 
to change the rules or address the prob lem. Even if you complained to the man ag ers 
 there was nothing much that they would do. That’s why you went to the MPs.”
We should not place too much stock in  these accounts of military support for 
 labor activism. For one, most of the examples  people told me about involved in­
terventions by individual soldiers that had personal connections with workers, 
often developed through shared activities (church and basketball being two of the 
most common) or heritage in the case of Filipino­ American soldiers. Moreover, 
it would be inaccurate to say that the military as an institution has a pro­ labor 
disposition on its bases. Workers from Bosnia and the Philippines told me they 
could not recall a single case of military officials intervening to block the depor­
tation of  labor activists by  either prime contractors or subcontractors. Addition­
ally, the military’s reaction to  labor abuses on its bases over the past two de cades 
has consistently been reactive rather than proactive, demonstrating—as discussed 
in chapter 7— much reluctance in providing substantive, systemic oversight. 
Nonetheless, that workers often directed their complaints to the military, view­
ing this as the most promising ave nue for remedies, is revealing about the state of 
 labor relations on bases.
Interviews and news accounts suggest that large­ scale protests and strikes may 
be less prevalent in Af ghan i stan than Iraq. Why exactly this is the case is unclear, 
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though several pos si ble reasons come to mind. First, several  people who have 
worked in both countries suggest that subcontractor salaries in Af ghan i stan are 
typically higher than Iraq. In Af ghan i stan, PPI, for instance, paid monthly sala­
ries ranging from $1,200 to $1,400, approximately double what  people earned in 
Iraq. Additionally, LOGCAP prime contractors in Afghanistan— DynCorp in 
particular— appear to be directly employing a greater percentage of their logistics 
workforce, hiring Filipinos,  Kenyans, Indians, and Bosnians on “Asian” contracts. 
Not only do workers with  these contracts usually earn more than  those employed 
by subcontractors, their food and accommodation also tends to be of a higher 
standard. It is also pos si ble that subcontractors have become more effective in 
surveilling and disciplining workers that engage in  labor activism.
Though less prevalent, protests and strikes still take place in Af ghan i stan. One 
of the more remarkable examples was relayed to me by Rick, who works as a fire­
fighter at KAF. One of the two main logistics hubs in the country (Bagram is the 
other), KAF’s massive airfield plays a critical role in ferrying equipment and 
personnel into and within Af ghan i stan. In 2007 a Canadian com pany, ATCO 
Frontec, was awarded several contracts to provide support ser vices at KAF, in­
cluding fire and crash rescue. One of the countries it turned to for its  labor needs 
was the Philippines. The com pany paid Rick and other Filipino firefighters 
$1,000 month, more than he previously earned working at Clark International 
Airport in the Philippines, but a pittance for such highly skilled and impor tant 
work in a warzone. In 2009 ATCO Frontec’s entire Filipino contingent began 
demanding salary raises. “We de cided if they  don’t increase our salary we  will 
go home,” recalls Rick. “We  were eigh teen  people at that time. We wrote a let­
ter to the com pany that  every year we want a raise to our salary . . .  They  don’t 
answer our letter. Four letters we sent to them, nobody answered us. . . .  We 
talked to our fire chief, ‘How about the letters we sent to the com pany?’ ‘No­
body answered,’ he said.”  After months of being ignored, they de cided to esca­
late  matters when the proj ect man ag er returned from a visit to com pany head­
quarters in Calgary.
Rick: We packed all of our  things, packed our bags . . .  We told the fire 
chief that at 5:00 we  will stop working. So the fire chief called the proj­
ect man ag er, “We got a prob lem  here.  People  don’t want to work. 
It’s 5:00 so you have to come  here and make a decision about  these 
 people.  There are eigh teen Filipinos  going home if you  don’t answer 
and attend [to] their grievances.” The proj ect man ag er came. “This 
is your new contract,” he told us. We read it. It was the same con­
tract. We told him, “We  will never sign this. We  will leave.” We went 
out and the proj ect man ag er called us back. “What do you want?” “A 
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salary increase.” “How much do you want?” “Double our salary.” 
“OK,” he said,  because he saw that we  were ready to leave and then 
the category of the airport  will go down. This  will be a big prob lem 
for the com pany.
Me: What do you mean by “category of the airport”?
Rick: That’s civil aviation policy. It’s [KAF’s] supposed to be a 9, it  will 
go to 7 [if we walk out]. The com pany  will be fined a million dollars 
an hour.  Because this  will be reported to the tower, the Base Opera­
tion Center.
Rick is referring  here to the International Civil Aviation Organ ization (ICAO)’s 
Rescue and Fire Fighting Ser vice (RFFS) requirements. Based on a 10­ point scale 
 these categories represent assessments of an airport’s firefighting and rescue ca­
pabilities. They also determine the size and type of aircraft that an airport is per­
mitted to  handle. Category 9 airports, for instance, are allowed to receive planes 
up to 250 feet in length, while category 7 airports are  limited to planes that are 
less than 161 feet long.12 The largest military transport and refueling planes, such 
as the C­17 Globemaster III, C­5 Galaxy, and KC­10 Extender, require category 
9­ or 8­ rated airports. So too do the most popu lar civilian transport planes like 
Boeing’s 747/767/777 variants, and Airbus’s A330/340/350 series. A drop in KAF’s 
ICAO rating from 9 to 7— which Rick claims would have been the result of a de­
crease in the airfield’s firefighting contingent by eigh teen workers— would have 
crippled logistical operations for southern Af ghan i stan. And ATCO Frontec would 
have borne responsibility for this ratings drop, a breach of contract that in turn 
would have resulted in large fines from the military.
Eigh teen firefighters banding together and instigating a dramatic work stop­
page showdown with their proj ect man ag er on the tarmac in Kandahar: it was a 
remarkable event, one that won Rick and his colleagues a significant pay raise 
from their employer. Their actions demonstrated a sophisticated understanding 
of logistics operations, military contracts, airport regulations, and bargaining le­
verage. More significantly, in my view, this threatened strike—as with all the 
other strikes and protests that Filipinos recounted to me— vividly illustrates the 
unwillingness of foreign workers to simply acquiesce to U.S. military contrac­
tors’ exploitative working conditions and pay. Despite the risks that this entails, 
they have often chosen instead to fight.
Jumping
More common than protests and strikes is another type of  labor activism that 
workers refer to as jumping. Jumping, as mentioned above, is the practice of 
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covertly changing one’s employer on a military base. The most common reason 
that workers jump is the promise of a larger salary at the new com pany.
Before  going into the details of this phenomenon, it may be useful to explain 
why I consider jumping to be a form of  labor activism. On the surface it may ap­
pear incongruous to lump it in with protests and strikes. The latter are vis i ble (at 
least on military bases), mass actions aimed at subcontractors, prime contrac­
tors, and/or military officials. Their goal is to make known grievances concern­
ing pay, food, working conditions,  etc., and prod relevant authorities to remedy 
the situation. Jumping, in contrast, is done in secret. It is also an individual 
action— though one that usually requires the assistance of multiple  people on a 
base to succeed. And it is not done with the collective aim of bettering workers’ 
status. Put in terms of Albert Hirschman’s famous Exit, Voice, and Loyalty trea­
tise, protests and strikes represent “voice”— attempts by workers to repair or im­
prove their relationship with employers through communication of grievances 
and desired redress— while jumping represents “exit”—an abandonment of the 
relationship.13
Why then should jumping be viewed through the lens of  labor activism? The 
primary reason is that it represents a challenge to military contractors’ power over 
their workforces, one perhaps even more fundamental than protests or strikes. 
This power derives from the fact that foreign workers on bases in warzones are a 
doubly captive  labor pool. First, as noted above, they do not have alternative in­ 
country work options if they are fired, rendering them more vulnerable than lo­
cal laborers. Second, and more significantly, foreign laborers’ right to live and 
work on a military base is determined by their employer. This is  because they are 
required to have a LOA that identifies them as “contractors authorized to accom­
pany the Force.”14 Military contractors are responsible for registering their em­
ployees with a base’s “contracting officer,” who then issues a LOA for each worker. 
In addition to specifying one’s employer, LOAs also define rights and privileges 
on a base, such as  whether or not someone is allowed to use MWR facilities, pos­
sess cell phones or computers, or move around a base without escorts. At any point 
in time, and for any reason, a com pany can inform the contracting officer that 
they are ending their relationship with an employee. This leads to the immediate 
revocation of one’s LOA, followed by deportation from the base as soon as can 
be arranged. Right to work, in short, is entirely dependent on the whims of one’s 
employer.
This de pen dency bears a striking resemblance to the kafala, or sponsorship, 
system utilized by most countries in the  Middle East. As with TCNs on military 
bases, mi grant workers’ right to live and work in countries with kafala  labor laws, 
including massive  labor importing states like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and 
Kuwait, is controlled by their employer, or “sponsor.”15 Given this similarity, as 
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well as the Gulf provenance of many military subcontractors,  labor abuses— such 
as confiscation of passports, wage theft, trafficking and excessive recruiting fees, 
substandard living quarters, and unsafe working conditions—on U.S. bases have 
tended to parallel  those experienced by workers in Gulf states.
Foreign workers successfully leaving their employers for better pay or work­
ing conditions with another com pany on a military base constitute a threat to 
this second aspect of  labor captivity. This is especially the case when jumping be­
comes a widespread practice, which threatens companies’ ironfisted control 
over their employees. That military contractors— especially subcontractors, whose 
workers have the greatest motivation to jump— recognize this threat is evident 
by the fact that their contracts often explic itly forbid employees from jumping to 
another com pany, language that is sometimes accompanied by threats of large 
fines or penalties. Najlaa’s contracts, for example, stated that employees would 
be charged a $2,500 fee if they left to work for another com pany “before comple­
tion of one year of ser vice.” The contract Kulak has its employees sign includes a 
“resignation” section that stipulates, “You are not allowed to leave Kulak Cons. 
Co. and work on any other com pany.” In response to an epidemic of jumping 
in 2003 and 2004, Serka revised its contracts with Filipino workers to include 
the following language forbidding workers from leaving the com pany: “You are 
not allowed to leave Serka Com pany and work for any other com pany part time 
or full time. If you wish to be released by Serka to another com pany you have to 
pay Serka Com pany the sum of $5,000 as the transfer fee” (bold and underline 
in original).16
A second, corollary, reason that jumping should be considered an act of  labor 
activism is that it is a strategy employed by workers to get out from  under the 
thumb of employers, to improve their lot. Moreover, jumping carries similar risks 
as striking or protesting. In fact, jumping is arguably riskier as getting caught be­
fore successfully switching to another com pany almost always leads to termina­
tion and deportation, while not all participants in strikes and protests suffer  these 
consequences.
Despite the risks, jumping is widespread, at least according to Filipinos I in­
terviewed. Isko claims that other PPI employees he flew into Iraq with tried to 
arrange work with a new com pany before they even settled in. “Even though they 
 didn’t have their [ID] badges yet they  were already looking to jump!” Danilo 
echoes this, claiming, “Most of us who could jump from PPI did.” When I asked 
him what type of work  people looked for, he replied, “Administrative work, 
 because it pays better. And also technical work like mechanic, [on] trucks or heavy 
equipment.” The most desirable companies to jump to, I was repeatedly told, are 
U.S.­ based prime contractors, who pay more that subcontracting companies and 
offer better accommodations and base privileges. Not every one follows this path, 
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though. During his second “tour” of Iraq— after working for PPI for nearly three 
years and then heading home for six months— Sam jumped from Kulak to Jama­
her Contracting Com pany, a Saudi firm with multiple military construction con­
tracts. He eventually  rose to the position of proj ect man ag er. Sam views Kulak as 
“a  really bad com pany,” but one that was ultimately useful. “It was, let me just 
say, my stepping stone. Just my access to get back in Iraq.  Because when you ar­
rive in Iraq you have a lot of companies that  will hire you.”
So how does one successfully jump from one com pany to another? The fol­
lowing example is provided by Rowel.  After more than two years with PPI, he 
de cided to jump. The com pany he transferred to, Card Industries, provides “man­
power solutions” to prime contractors in Iraq and Af ghan i stan, primarily in the 
electrical and instrumentation fields.17 What this means is that Card does not di­
rectly hold military contracts, but recruits and “rents out” (in Rowel’s words) 
skilled workers to prime contractors that do, such as Parsons, Louis Berger, and 
Bechtel.  Here is Rowel’s account:
Me: Can you walk me through the pro cess? How did you find the job? 
How did you negotiate [this] when  you’re already employed by PPI?
Rowel: By that time I heard [about opportunity] from some Filipino 
 people,  because we are friendly. We can walk outside the com pany 
[camp].
Me: You’d ask around?
Rowel: Yeah, ask about other companies. They [Card] said, “Oh yeah, 
 we’re hiring some  people.” PPI at that time the salary is only $700 [a 
month]. Then if  there are some rumors— actually not rumors, that’s 
truth [about hiring]— some Filipinos start moving to the com pany. 
They got a salary like, give them like $2  grand, $3  grand [a month].
Me: When you heard that [did] every one start to think about jumping 
and asking [questions]?
Rowel: Yeah.  Because we are  here to make money. I heard the com pany 
[Card] hiring  people . . .  rental to another com pany, Parsons. [So] I 
applied.
Me: How did you apply?
Rowel:  After work,  because my work is seven to five,  after work I go 
outside, just walking around the base,  because we got an ID [badge], 
we got access, [so] you can walk.
Me: You had a green badge?
Rowel: Yes, green. Privileges. We  don’t need an escort [to move around 
the base]. We can walk in secret. Walk over to the [Card] office. Bring 
my ID and my passport.
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Me: You  didn’t need a CV?
Rowel: [I] needed a CV. But [ there  were] some Filipino  people work­
ing in KBR office. I walked to the office, secretly talked to guys, a 
friend working in the office, “Can you make my CV like this?” They 
print it and give it to me  after duty, 5:30. Bring CV, then if the boss, 
the man ag er is available he can start interview, asking something 
about your job and experience. If you agree about the salary they give 
you, that’s it. Come back [in] three days and sign your contract.
Jumping may be a strategy taken by individuals, but as Rowel’s story illus­
trates it is also a social and collaborative endeavor, especially if one wishes to 
succeed. Critical information circulates among friends and colleagues on 
bases. Which com pany is hiring? Who is the man ag er to talk to? What applica­
tion materials are needed? Rowel was convinced to jump to Card  after working 
for PPI for more than two years in part  because he knew  people who had already 
done this and  were willing to explain the pro cess to him. Additionally, when he 
needed help with an impor tant part of the application— writing up and printing 
out a CV—he had friends  doing administrative work with KBR who he could 
turn to.
In some cases supervisors or man ag ers with prime contractors facilitate 
jumping for  those working in the skilled trades like electricians, mechanics, and 
engineers, in effect poaching workers from their subcontractors. This was the 
experience of Susi, a power mechanic. Though employed by PPI he worked with 
KBR personnel in the Green Zone in Baghdad, installing and repairing electric­
ity generators.  After a  couple of months he was approached by his boss.
The boss asked me, “Let me see your payment” [PPI’s pay stub]. I gave 
him the stub, and he said, “What? Is this all?” “Yes, sir. That’s my sal­
ary.” “It’s not a salary, it’s just an allowance. Do you accept this?” I said, 
“Yes,  there is nothing  else.” “No! You have no  future . . .  That’s why we 
are  here, to have money, but this kind of salary is not good for you.” “You 
can do something about this?” He said, “Yes, I can. Wait for me. I’ll just 
go to the PX and talk to my friend.”  After a while he came back. “OK. 
Tomorrow morning, first  thing in the morning, 8  o’clock,  we’ll go to the 
PX, meet my best friend.” Next day in the morning, I saw the man. “Are 
you ready for an interview?” “No, no, no,” I said. “No need, we  will go 
to the workshop, I’ll show you what we do” . . .  Around 15 minutes 
[ later] he said, “Sign this contract for me. Right now.  Don’t think twice, 
just sign it. How much do you want?” “Just give me $2,000 [a month], 
sir.” “What about $1,500 starting salary and then, in a few months  we’ll 
give you $2,000?” “OK, I’ll sign it then.”
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Susi’s and Rowel’s narratives may give the impression that jumping is fairly 
easy. But this is not the case. A variety of  factors shape one’s chances of pulling 
off a switch from one com pany to another. Jumping is most prevalent at large 
bases like KAF and Victory Base Complex in Baghdad that have thousands of 
workers and dozens of contracting firms, especially if such bases also have less 
restrictive regulations on foreign workers’ freedom of movement during off hours. 
At small bases with fewer companies  there are fewer options for jumping.  These 
bases also facilitate closer surveillance over workers, making it more difficult to 
successfully arrange a transfer. As the most desirable companies to jump to are 
prime contractors— especially U.S. firms— English fluency or competence is an­
other key consideration. Filipinos I talked with who jumped in Iraq and Af ghan­
i stan, such as Susi and Rowel, are generally more comfortable with En glish than 
 those who did not. In this Filipinos tend to have an advantage over other TCNs 
from Asia. Therefore it is pos si ble jumping may be less common overall than my 
discussions with Filipinos suggest.
The main reason that jumping is difficult and risky is that subcontracting com­
panies have worked diligently to thwart the practice, often with successful re­
sults. Rene, who worked for PPI from 2004 to 2011 as an electrician, told to me 
he received multiple offers to jump to a new com pany during this time. But he 
never did, in part  because he saw several cases where PPI convinced the military 
to rescind  these new contracts. Confused, I asked him to explain this to me.
Me: Let’s say you successfully jumped. I offer you a job. “Come work 
with our com pany. I’ll double your salary.” You say, “OK.” You sneak 
out, you come to me. Then PPI gets upset and goes to—
Rene: The military.  Because you [already] have a contract. [The military 
says to new com pany], “Send him back to PPI.”
Me: Then you get sent back to PPI?
Rene: Within twenty­ four hours they [PPI]  will get your LOA [re­
scinded]. [You] go to Dubai, back to the Philippines.
Rene’s account is supported by Domingo, who worked at Balad Air Base. Originally 
recruited by PPI, Domingo jumped to a FedEx subcontractor in 2006, increasing 
his monthly salary from $500 to $1,500. A year  later he arranged for a friend to 
join him, but the move was sabotaged by PPI. “One of our friends, I helped 
him also. He was already hired at the FedEx [subcontractor] and then they no­
ticed in the office in PPI. They picked him up, then they sent him back home.” 
Workers are most vulnerable to this strategy in the two to three days it takes be­
tween signing a contract and having all the necessary paperwork— such as a new 
LOA and badge— processed by the contracting officer on a base. To avoid get­
ting caught and sent home, some workers would hide  until all the paperwork was 
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complete, according to Domingo. “ There was a lot of PPI workers [that] jumped 
but  will hide first. They wait for [new] ID. If you have it [new ID and LOA] they 
[your old com pany]  will not do nothing to you.” Rather than retaining employ­
ees who attempt to jump, PPI and other companies pursue the punitive mea sure 
of deportation to discourage  others who are looking to do the same. This is a 
power ful deterrent, as most  people who de cided against jumping cited fear of los­
ing their job as the primary reason they made this decision.
Rescinding one’s new contract is not the only strategy at companies’ disposal. 
One of the most effective ways to prevent employees from jumping is to confis­
cate their passports, a widespread practice not officially banned by the military 
 until 2006.18 An alternative, as Mary recalls her com pany  doing in the mid­2000s, 
is to impose a stricter curfew on employees. When  people asked why, they  were 
told that too many  people  were jumping. The curfew was accompanied by in­
creased surveillance of workers, including bunk checks (to identify anyone hid­
ing while waiting for paperwork to be finalized) and searching bags when  people 
left their camp in the morning. The reason for this latter check, according to Mary, 
was that workers wanted to get their clothes and possessions outside the camp 
before jumping and so would “bring their clothes  little by  little in a bag. Then 
they  don’t have to come back anymore if they already got their clothes.” If caught 
with clothes you could try to fool the guards by claiming you worked in laundry 
operations and saying, “I’m not jumping. I’m just  doing my laundry . . .  you know 
[at] the big American laundry”  because  people who worked  there often did this 
due to the higher quality of washing machines compared to  those provided in 
com pany camps. Fi nally, several  people who worked in Balad told me that some­
time in 2007 or 2008 the main military contractors on the base reached an agree­
ment not to steal each other’s employees, an action not dissimilar to the informal 
anti­ poaching accord reached by Apple, Google, Intel, and other firms during the 
same point in time in Silicon Valley. But unlike the plight of Silicon Valley engi­
neers, this instance of anti­ labor collusion was never covered by the media, or the 
subject of a federal, class­ action, anti­ trust lawsuit resulting in a multimillion dol­
lar settlement.19
The lengths to which companies have been willing to go to stem the tide of 
jumping extends beyond military bases where it takes place.  After a rash of work­
ers quit the com pany in 2004 and 2005, Serka began putting pressure on its 
recruiting network in the Philippines. Michelle, the local agent responsible 
for recruiting dozens of Serka food ser vice workers, recalls that Serka “called the 
[recruiting] agency” and then the “the agency called  people  here to inform 
the wives that their husbands jumped,” which they  were reminded is a violation 
of their contracts. Another recruiting agency remembers the subcontractor 
they worked with threatening to withhold payments if they did not do a better 
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job of screening potential applicants and dissuading them from jumping. The 
agency’s man ag er replied, “Why do you put all the fault on me? Every one says ‘Yes, 
 ma’am.’ The prob lem is that when they get  there [Iraq] they hear that the salary 
that  you’re giving is not enough.” PPI went even further, instructing its Philip­
pine recruiting agency, AES, to file a “complaint for disciplinary action for breach 
of contract” with POEA against at least nineteen former employees in 2005 and 
2006.  These complaints argued that by jumping  these individuals caused “sus­
tained damages” for PPI and AES, and “tarnished” and “besmirched” the reputa­
tion of the country’s recruiting industry. In two cases POEA ruled in  favor of the 
companies, temporarily suspending the rights of the former employees to work 
abroad for a period of two to four months.20
 These  legal proceedings demonstrate again the argument I made at the begin­
ning of the book that one of the main effects of military logistics contracting is 
the generation of vari ous entanglements— economic, social, po liti cal, and, in this 
case,  legal— which extend well beyond the battlefields in Af ghan i stan and the 
 Middle East. We  will return to this point  later in chapter 10, which examines the 
themes of  family, community, and returning home. But first I want to explore fur­
ther life, work, and social relations on bases.
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It is difficult to decide where to start, or how to or ga nize, a chapter that aims to 
describe social relations on military bases in the  Middle East, Af ghan i stan, and 
Africa, given the diversity of experiences and settings. Any account, as noted in 
the introduction,  will be partial and incomplete. That said,  there are certain themes 
that stand out based on interviews. This chapter examines two social fields that 
significantly influence the experiences of the military’s TCN workforce, which in 
their most basic form can be referred to as com pany and identity, respectively. 
To be certain,  these are inextricably entangled. Thus this is a somewhat artificial 
distinction that I am making, as  will be clear in the analy sis below, which also 
emphasizes intersections and connections among them.
Perhaps the most impor tant influence on life on a military base in a warzone 
concerns the type of com pany that one works for. The key distinction is that be­
tween prime contractors— especially U.S. firms— and their subcontractors. It is 
hard to overstate just how impor tant employment with a prime contractor or 
subcontractor is in determining pay and privileges, as well as relations among 
workers, and between workers and ser vice members. Bosnians employed by 
prime contractors, for instance, have typically lived in housing with American 
workers, enjoying similar base privileges and competing for jobs and promo­
tions. Their lives are a world apart from other TCNs working for subcontractors. 
Another way to illustrate the prime contractor­ subcontractor distinction is to ex­
amine accounts of individuals from the Philippines who have managed to jump 
from a subcontractor like PPI to a prime contracting com pany. I also discuss in 
further detail below the introduction of tiered contracts by Fluor and DynCorp 
9
RELATIONS
i saw it as a caste system. it was Americans on top, then the 
eu ro pe ans under neath, then Filipinos, then indians. . . .  but that kind 
of dividing of  people is just wrong for every body. What’s the differ-
ence between me and the black American guy, or me and that tCn? 
What’s the difference? We all did the same jobs. We  were all in the 
same base.
— Lena
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in Af ghan i stan, which has blurred the distinction between prime contractors 
and subcontractors in recent years.
The second sphere, identity, is multifaceted. For instance, patterns of recruit­
ment by prime contractors and subcontractors— with the former primarily 
hiring workers from the U.S. or Southeast Eu ro pean countries and the latter 
sourcing  labor predominately from South and Southeast Asia— highlight the 
role that differential pay and privileges play in contributing to racial disparities 
within the military’s workforce. Indeed, several researchers have argued that the 
extensive recruitment of workers from countries in the Global South reinforces 
racialized hierarchies in warzones. The above observation from Lena, who worked 
for multiple companies in Kuwait, Iraq, and Af ghan i stan, points to another sig­
nificant aspect of relations on bases: one’s citizenship or nationality. As her 
quote indicates, this also intersects with race, both within— such as American— 
and across national categories. Possibly the least explored aspect of base life con­
cerns the experiences of female workers like Lena, as with few exceptions news 
accounts and academic articles overlook the fact that a not insignificant number 
of contractors are  women. Race, citizenship, and gender often intersect in com­
plex and unexpected ways, which I discuss in the second section of this chapter, 
following an examination of the divergent experiences of prime contractor and 
subcontractor employees.
Com pany
Most accounts of foreign  labor on bases in the  Middle East and Af ghan i stan high­
light the exploitation of this workforce by military contractors, from low pay 
and poor living conditions to trafficking. In nearly  every instance the offending 
companies have been subcontractors, predominately from the Gulf states and Tur­
key. Often unseen in  these accounts is the experience of  those who work for 
prime contractors. The differences are stark. Consider the following exchange 
with Fedja, who was employed as a  labor foreman by KBR at Tallil Air Base in 
Iraq in 2007:
Fedja: You know in Iraq I had a CAC card from the U.S. government— a 
white CAC card— I had  every rights of an American citizen [on the 
base].
Me: Is that  because you had previous experience working with Ameri­
can forces  here [in Bosnia]?
Fedja: No. It was the KBR contract in 2007. And in  those days we had 
the white CAC cards.
Me: What is a white CAC card?
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Fedja: It is like this. You had a  couple of cards. CAC card is your chip 
card, you had every thing in it— with the CAC card you go on R & R 
[vacation], you sign in to your outpost— every thing is on your CAC 
card. And we had a white CAC card like American citizens [contrac­
tors].
Me: So  these are electronic?
Fedja: And visual.  Because in  every base you have inside security. It was 
visual security for inside the post  because you had limitations. For 
my base, for example, you had  people from Turkey, from India, from 
all around the world. And they could go to work, and then back into 
their outpost [mancamp].  Because inside a base you had ten other 
bases [company­ run mancamps]. I, with a white CAC card, I could 
go to PX, to a gym. I could shop and buy every thing I want. I could go 
to pizzeria. But  people who  didn’t have a white card  couldn’t go. 
They could only go to their base [mancamp]. They had their own 
mess hall and every thing.
Me: So you had a segregated mess hall then? What dif fer ent cards  were 
 there? Or what dif fer ent levels— let’s say for dif fer ent workers— were 
 there?
Fedja: It was like two types of levels. Minor jobs like cleaning the toi­
lets,  those  really,  really low jobs  were being done by  people from 
India, and they had major restrictions. They could only go super­
vised to work their job. I picked them up from their base [man­
camp], inside this base they are quarantined, a small base for them 
only.
Me: And they  couldn’t leave it  unless you came and supervised them?
Fedja: I would come and pick them up, do my eight hour shift, drive 
them back and that’s it. They  can’t go to mess hall with U.S. troops. 
They  can’t go anywhere without supervision.
Me: And your job was?
Fedja: I was a  labor foreman. I supervised  people who worked for me.
Me: How many  people would you have, then, as a foreman?
Fedja: From three to eight guys.
Me: And they would be Indian or Pakistani?
Fedja: Yeah.
Me: And what  were they  doing?
Fedja: Most of the time they  were  doing the cleaning jobs. Latrines, 
showers, and stuff like that. That’s all the jobs they could do  because 
the contract— KBR had a lot of jobs— and all the impor tant jobs  were 
you needed experienced  people, like air conditioners, electricity, 
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power generators, stuff like that, they  were hiring Bosnians for an 
excellent salary. And third country nationals they  were  doing the 
lowest jobs, cleaning, nothing  else.
Fedja’s comments highlight several of the most impor tant contrasts created by 
the prime contractor­ subcontractor system. First, as a KBR employee he had many 
of the same privileges accorded to U.S. contractors and soldiers at Tallil. He could 
eat in military DFACs, use MWR facilities, buy sundries at PX stores, and move 
around the base with few restrictions. This status was exemplified by his white 
CAC card.  These identification cards are issued to all active duty uniformed per­
sonnel, DoD civilian employees, and select military contractors. At Tallil KBR em­
ployees like Fedja received CAC cards, which provided visual indication of their 
privileged status. In contrast, employees of subcontracting companies at the base, 
the largest of which in 2007  were Kulak, GCC, and Iraq Proj ects Business Devel­
opment, received color­ coded “badges.” Though  these badges have varied across 
bases and the period when they are issued, they typically provide an employee’s 
name, com pany, and an identification or passport number. Badge colors indi­
cate degrees of mobility and access to facilities at a base. The Indian and Paki­
stani workers that Fedja escorted wore red badges, which meant that they  were 
forbidden from moving anywhere on the base— except inside their company­ run 
mancamp— without an authorized escort. In Iraq badges usually ranged from red, 
orange, and yellow to green or blue, with the latter colors indicating that the wearer 
was allowed to move around a base without escorts, and even had access to cer­
tain facilities like PX stores.
A second difference between prime contractor and subcontractor employ­
ees that this conversation raises revolves around work, pay, and contracts. The 
men Fedja oversaw  were tasked with “minor jobs”— cleaning latrines and 
showers—in his view. For the most part subcontracted  labor at bases in the 
 Middle East, Af ghan i stan, and Africa is used to perform similar low­ skilled or 
poorly paid work such as DFAC operations, laundry ser vices, cleaning, con­
struction, and basic ware house tasks. Most Bosnians who have worked for 
KBR, Fluor, or DynCorp, in contrast, have been hired for skilled  labor posi­
tions such as electricians, mechanics, or heating, ventilation, and air condition­
ing installers, have performed administrative tasks like property management 
or payroll, or have held supervisory positions like QA/QC inspectors and  labor 
foremen.  These jobs tend to pay extremely well, especially compared to salaries 
earned by subcontractor employees. As a  labor foreman, for example, Fedja 
earned $5,300 a month, more than ten times the salary of his Indian and Pakistani 
charges. This despite the fact that his job actually had few par tic u lar skill 
 requirements.
 relAtions 153
Typically, even for similar jobs  there are considerable differences in pay de­
pending on  whether one works for a prime contractor or subcontractor. Several 
Bosnians I interviewed had worked in material management and supply opera­
tions, which involves moving, sorting, and tracking military and contractor ma­
terials in ware houses.  These are well­ paid jobs, ranging from the high $30,000s 
to $70,000 a year for  those who worked for KBR in Iraq or on Eu ro pean con­
tracts with Fluor and DynCorp in Af ghan i stan. Filipinos who perform similar 
tasks at bases in  those countries but are employed by subcontractors like PPI are 
paid but a fraction of this amount. In addition to the pay differential, as a KBR 
employee Fedja was given three paid leaves (“R & R”) a year, while the men he 
supervised received no leave during their two­ year contracts.
A third point concerns differential relations between American employees and 
foreign  labor depending on  whether one works for a prime contractor or not. In 
the above passage Fedja refers twice to the fact that his “white CAC card” was the 
same as  those issued to Americans, and carried with it the same privileges. In con­
trast, the subcontractor employees he supervised  were confined to their camps 
when not performing the menial jobs that  were reserved for them. Moreover, his 
characterization of them as a category apart (“third country nationals”) is remark­
able  because, as a Bosnian national, Fedja was of course himself classified as a 
TCN by the military. Yet, as discussed in chapter 4, he and other Bosnians who 
worked for KBR  under the LOGCAP III contract did not see themselves as such, 
in large part  because the com pany treated all of its employees (American and for­
eign citizens alike) as part of a “KBR  family” that stood apart from and above 
 those working for its subcontractors. The following exchange about base hous­
ing arrangements is illustrative.
Me:  Were you mixed in with soldiers?
Fedja: No. We had dif fer ent [housing]. We called them hooches. The 
Army was separated. KBR was separated. Third country nationals 
 were separated.
Me: So you  weren’t called a third country national?
Fedja: That’s the line that I picked up from the Americans [KBR employ­
ees], third country nationals.  Because they  were looking at them [Asian 
workers employed by subcontractors] as third country nationals.
Me: But they  weren’t looking at you as one?
Fedja: No,  because they worked with me and we had the same CAC card 
and the same paycheck.
As I discuss below, this does not mean that  there  were no tensions between KBR’s 
Bosnian and American workers, just that for the former, such as Fedja, the relevant 
“comparables” or “comps”—to borrow a term from the real estate industry— 
154 ChApter 9
were American contractors, not other foreign workers on the bases. I should also 
note  here that KBR is somewhat of an outlier in the efforts to which it goes to 
inculcate a distinct corporate identity with its employees. This said, when it comes 
to the chasm separating its employees and other prime contractor workers from 
subcontracted  labor concerning pay, privileges, and status, the difference is a 
 matter of degree not kind.
This is perhaps best illustrated by describing the experiences of Filipinos 
who successfully jumped from subcontracting companies to jobs with prime 
contractors. Take Rowel, whom we met in chapter 8, who worked as electrician 
for PPI for two years in Iraq before jumping to Card Industries, which “rented” 
him to the  giant U.S. engineering firm Parsons.  After this contract ended in 
2009, he worked for another U.S. engineering com pany, Louis Berger, in Af­
ghan i stan. Like all Filipinos I talked with who jumped, his primary motivation 
was money, in his case an increase in salary from $700/month with PPI to 
$2,300/month with Card. But in our conversation he also emphasized the dif­
ference in privileges, such as use of cell phones and computers to keep in touch 
with his  family: 
In PPI you  don’t have computer. You  don’t have cell phone. You got 
only like five minutes a week. In a week only five minutes privilege on a 
[com pany] cell phone. Sometimes they are busy.  There’s always [a] low 
bat[tery]. Your five­ minute  free time [you] keep calling them, they are 
busy. The phone is busy.  After that one you cannot talk to them. You have 
to wait a week again to talk to them. Not like in Card and Louis Berger, 
[where] you got access.  Every day you got phone. . . .  Every day we talk 
 because I got [my] own computer on my job  because I work in a power 
plant. We got [our] own office . . .  After [work], I go to the computer. If 
they are online, [I] talk to them. 
A second difference Rowel stressed was living conditions. At the PPI man­
camp in Victory Base Complex  there  were ten men living in a forty­ foot ship­
ping container. The com pany’s camp also had only ten showers for hundreds of 
 people, so you had to get up early in the morning,  because “if  you’re getting up 
late, no hot  water.” In contrast, at Card he shared a twenty­ foot container, which 
had its own bathroom, with one coworker. While with Card he also received a 
$300/month cash allowance— nearly half his previous salary— which could 
 either be saved, or “if you  don’t want to eat in military DFAC, go to Popeyes 
[Chicken], go to the coffee shop [Green Bean], drink coffee with  those muffins.”
I then asked Rowel if his American man ag ers or coworkers at Parsons or Louis 
Berger used the term TCN when referring to his status. He said, “Yes,” which was 
followed by this exchange:
 relAtions 155
Me: What does that mean? What do you think about that?
Rowel: I’m not thinking hard about that one  because we are Filipino. 
The meaning of TCN for me is third country nations. It’s OK for me. 
 Because when I work in Louis Berger, like I said they gave me full of 
access that’s why I’m not thinking about I am a TCN. The military 
guy go to MWR,  doing gym, I can go  there also, same what they did. 
See what  they’re  doing, I can go [on] R & R. I can watch [TV] on the 
MWR. What ever they eat, I can eat also.
Like Fedja, this term had  little meaning for Rowel as a prime contractor employee 
 because it did not reflect the privileges, pay, and status he was afforded compared 
to his previous experience with PPI.
Rowel’s perspective is echoed by  others who jumped.  After years with PPI in 
Iraq and Af ghan i stan, Fidel landed a position with KBR in Africa, along with sev­
eral other workers from the Philippines. He described the difference this way: 
“In Iraq and Af ghan i stan we [he and his fellow Filipinos] are TCN. In Africa we 
are expats. They treat us as expat. Our accommodation is good. We have one [an 
individual] room, air conditioning, one bed. We have cable TV. . . .  Every morn­
ing  there’s a local [that] pick[s] up our laundry. Then in after noon return[s] it.” 
Susi, who jumped to Arkel in Iraq, worked on DoD­ funded civil power genera­
tion reconstruction proj ects. As this job required travel to vari ous sites across the 
country he was given a CAC card granting him access to amenities on all bases 
in Iraq, and permission to carry a ser vice pistol, radio, and telephone. Compared 
to PPI, with its “ limited” privileges, as an Arkel employee he was afforded, in his 
words, “full access.” When asked if this meant he was considered a TCN when 
working for Arkel he replied, “No,” and then, “That’s why I’m telling you we are 
not all the same experience.”
“I’m telling you we are not all the same experience.” Susi’s admonition is worth 
keeping in mind when discussing the military’s foreign workforce. It even applies 
to the prime contractor­ subcontractor divide, perhaps the single most deter­
minative  factor shaping work and life on overseas bases in warzones. The best 
example of this is the introduction of tiered contracts by Fluor and DynCorp 
in Af ghan i stan in 2010, which has led to a relative blurring of lines. As discussed 
in chapter 4,  these contracts divide the companies’ employees into multiple tiers 
based on nationality and geography. DynCorp’s categories are Expats (Ameri­
cans), Foreign National United Kingdom (FNUK), Foreign National Eu ro pean 
(FNE), and Foreign National Asian (FNA). Fluor has set up a five­ level classifica­
tion system that distinguishes between com pany staff, Americans hired on con­
tract, West Eu ro pean employees, East Eu ro pe ans, and workers from Asia. The 
primary impetus for the introduction of  these tiers appears to have come from 
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the Pentagon, which directed LOGCAP IV prime contractors to bring salaries for 
foreign direct hires more in line with prevailing wages in their home countries. 
Thus, starting in late 2008, KBR also lowered its pay scale for new Bosnian re­
cruits to Iraq and Kuwait. But due to the drawdown of forces in  those countries, 
this change has primarily affected  those recruited by Fluor and DynCorp, who 
took over LOGCAP operations in Af ghan i stan. At the peak of operations in 2011 
the two companies and their subcontractors provided support for 133 bases and 
nearly 100,000 U.S. troops in the country.1
Fluor’s and DynCorp’s foreign employees— particularly  those from the 
Balkans— experienced a reduction in both pay and status  under this tiered sys­
tem. Bosnians hired by Fluor, for example, are paid 45  percent of what Americans 
and West Eu ro pe ans earn for the same jobs, with a similar gap in pay between 
DynCorp’s workers from the Balkans hired on a Eu ro pean contract and Ameri­
can  labor.  Those who have an Asian contract with DynCorp are paid even 
less, typically earning $12,000 to $18,000 a year— roughly one­ third the amount 
paid to  those  doing similar jobs  under a Eu ro pean contract. A commensurate 
shift has occurred when it comes to status. Whereas KBR developed a culture 
that treated its employees (both American and TCNs) as a com pany  family posi­
tioned above its subcontractor workforce— and continued to do so  under LOG­
CAP IV according to Bosnians who have worked for the com pany during this 
period— those working for Fluor and DynCorp report that they are frequently 
reminded of their lower status. This ranges from the common use of terms like 
TCN or OCN in conversations with American coworkers to  little details like 
Damir’s example in chapter 4 of the use of separate buses for American and for­
eign workers upon arrival in Bagram.
Interviews in Bosnia and the Philippines suggest that the introduction of tiers 
has had the greatest impact on  those who work for DynCorp, due to the fact that 
the com pany has direct hired significantly more workers  under Asian contracts 
than Fluor, which has followed KBR’s practice of relying primarily on subcon­
tractors for low­ skilled and low­ paid  labor. One reason for this difference is that 
DynCorp found itself shorthanded in late 2009 when one of its two primary 
first­ tier subcontractors, Agility (formerly known as PWC), was barred from re­
ceiving government contracting money following a lawsuit accusing it of over­
charging the military billions of dollars  under its DLA contract to provide 
food for troops in Iraq and Kuwait.2 Short subcontracting support, and  behind 
on several proj ects, which invited criticism from the military and government au­
ditors, it appears DynCorp executives in Af ghan i stan de cided to turn the com pany 
into its own body shop by direct hiring thousands of workers from Asia, Southeast 
Eu rope, and Africa (primarily  Kenya)  under “Asian” contracts that offered pay 
and benefits similar to its subcontractors. According to Diana— who states she 
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“ didn’t speak no En glish at all” at the time— DynCorp’s recruiting pro cess for 
Asian contracts in late 2010 more resembled PPI’s early scramble to hire workers 
from the Philippines than KBR’s and Fluor’s more exacting standards: “We went 
over  there in  Hotel Tuzla and they did some kind of interview but . . .  they  didn’t 
ask us a lot of questions. Of course we already know what they  will ask us, let’s 
say, ‘What is your first name, last name?’  Because we  will work in laundry. We 
 don’t need that much En glish. We  will wash, clean and that’s it. . . .  After five, ten 
days, they call us that they  will hire us and next month that we  will have a flight to 
Dubai.” Her salary was a $1,000 a month. Sead, a young bartender from Tuzla who 
was hired as ware house man  under an Asian contract around the same time as Di­
ana, recalls that his group had “guys from  Kenya, from India, most of them. And 
you had Filipino guys, and Bosnian guys.” Grace, a Filipina who worked for Dyn­
Corp for two years in Af ghan i stan on an Asian contract that paid $1,400 a month, 
remembers sharing a large Alaska tent with other female DynCorp direct hires at 
Camp Dwyer: “We had Americans  there.  Kenyans, Macedonians, Bosnians.”
Identity
Fluor’s and DynCorp’s introduction of a tiered pay scale highlights the degree to 
which the military’s logistics workforce is stratified along racial and national lines. 
Though the number of tiers and labels differs across the two companies, they both 
essentially divide their workers into four hierarchically ordered categories: Amer­
icans, West Eu ro pe ans/UK citizens, Southeast Eu ro pe ans, and Asians. The great­
est difference in pay is that between  those with Asian contracts and the rest. In 
this the companies’ internal tiers mirror a broader racial hierarchy on military 
bases in warzones. Painting with a broad brush— and stressing that this is an over­
simplification with numerous exceptions— the primary distinction is between 
relatively high status and well­ paid American and Eu ro pean workers, and a poor, 
often exploited, Asian workforce.
Nearly  every journalist and scholar who writes about foreign  labor in the wars 
in Iraq and Af ghan i stan has highlighted  these disparities, both in the fields of logis­
tics and security. Indeed, the racialization of  labor may be even more prevalent in 
the private security industry, where discourses extolling former colonized  peoples 
from the Global South as “martial races”— such as Gurkhas and Fijians— abound.3 
None of this is new. Indeed, when it comes to the experiences of logistics workers 
 there exists a remarkable parallel from a  century  earlier: the “silver and gold” sys­
tem set up by the U.S. during the construction of the Panama Canal.
The Panama Canal is an engineering marvel, celebrated as the “eighth won­
der of the world” upon its completion in 1914. But it is also as much a feat of 
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 labor as it is engineering. In fact, in 1906 the proj ect’s chief engineer, John Ste­
vens, claimed that “the greatest prob lem in building a canal of any type on the 
isthmus . . .  is the one of  labor. The engineering and constructional difficulties 
melt into insignificance compared to  labor.”4 To surmount  labor challenges U.S. 
administrators recruited widely, bringing in tens of thousands of workers from 
across the Ca rib bean, Central Amer i ca, the U.S., and Eu rope. They even proposed 
recruiting Chinese laborers, but this scheme was rejected by then­ U.S. attorney 
general William Moody, who argued that the importing of “Oriental aliens”  under 
contracts to perform  labor “is not necessarily one of involuntary servitude, but 
it may be and, in fact, usually is a condition of involuntary servitude.”5 A  century 
 later the U.S. now looks the other way as tens of thousands of South Asians on its 
bases in the  Middle East often work  under contracts and conditions of debt bond­
age that also constitute involuntary servitude.
To manage its massive and diverse workforce in the Canal Zone, U.S. admin­
istrators established a segregated silver and gold system.  Under this system, “the 
government paid silver employees far less, fed them unappetizing food, and  housed 
them in substandard shacks. Gold workers earned very high wages and terrific 
benefits, including six weeks of paid vacation leave  every year, one month of paid 
sick leave  every year, and a  free pass for travel within the [Canal] Zone once each 
month.”6 Like the prime contractor­ subcontractor system  today, the silver and 
gold system was largely, but not exclusively, or ga nized around racial distinctions, 
though it began as a more fluid way to reward productive employees regardless 
of race or nationality. In 1906 Stevens issued an order requiring “colored employ­
ees” from places such as the West Indies to be placed on silver rolls while white 
Americans  were placed on gold. All but a handful of African American workers 
who had been explic itly hired on gold roll contracts  were also shifted to the silver 
roll. Somewhat paradoxically, the silver and gold system also revolved around citi­
zenship, especially following an executive order by President Theodore Roo se velt 
in 1908 that stated that gold roll employment should be  limited to U.S. citizens. 
This resulted in the shift of a number of Eu ro pean laborers from gold to silver 
rolls. At the same time the U.S. de cided that Puerto Rican and Panamanian 
workers should be eligible for gold roll employment due to the former’s status as 
colonized “wards of the nation” and the latter’s position as citizens of the coun­
try in which the canal was being built.7
 There are other parallels between the silver and gold system and present­ day 
military  labor practices produced by the prime contractor­ subcontractor system. 
In addition to pay, both formed the basis of the distinction between supervisory 
and supervised work. For example, in Panama “one gold carpenter (typically a 
white U.S. citizen) might oversee eight to twelve silver carpenters (West Indians); 
one gold plumber might manage an area with a few silver plumbers  under him.”8 
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And in both contexts a divide and conquer strategy was used as a means of fa­
cilitating a more docile workforce. In 1906 the chairman of the Isthmian Canal 
Commission, the body originally charged with overseeing construction of the ca­
nal, claimed that “a  labor force composed of dif fer ent races and nationalities 
would minimize, if it did not positively prevent, any pos si ble combination of the 
entire  labor force.”9 Despite this, strikes over food and wages in Panama  were not 
uncommon. So too was the strategy of moving from lower­ to higher­ paying jobs 
by silver roll workers, though the more rigid delineation of  these categories along 
racial and national lines  limited the ability to substantially improve one’s station 
through this strategy compared to Filipinos and other subcontractor employees 
who jump to positions with prime contractors.
One difference between the two systems, as detailed in the previous two parts 
of the book, is that the racialized hierarchy of  labor at bases in the  Middle East 
and Af ghan i stan is less a product of intentional policy by the U.S. government—
as it was in Panama— than the intersection of historical circumstances with 
contrasting recruiting patterns and  labor practices by prime contractors and 
subcontractors. That KBR’s direct hire TCN workforce in Iraq was overwhelm­
ingly from Southeast Eu rope was directly related, for instance, to the fact that in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s it hired tens of thousands of  people from Bosnia, 
Kosovo, and Macedonia as LN  labor when it provided LOGCAP support for the 
peacebuilding missions in the Balkans. At the same time that  these missions  were 
beginning to wind down in the mid­2000s, U.S. military activities in the  Middle 
East  were ramping up, thus many  were subsequently employed by KBR when it 
found itself shorthanded in the early years of the occupation of Iraq. Once this 
recruiting pattern was established, it was logical for Fluor and DynCorp to also 
turn to the region to fulfill direct hire  labor needs, especially considering that they 
took on much of KBR’s workforce in Af ghan i stan following the transfer of LOG­
CAP support for that country to their hands in 2009. Similarly, the prevalence of 
workers from South and Southeast Asian countries is connected to the provenance 
of military subcontractors in CENTCOM, most of whom hail from the Persian 
Gulf or Turkey. When  these firms utilize recruiting agencies in countries like In­
dia, the Philippines, Nepal, and Sri Lanka to amass the pool of  labor needed to 
fulfill their contractual obligations in Iraq, Af ghan i stan, and other countries in 
the  Middle East, they are drawing on well­ worn pathways that constitute a mas­
sive  labor import­ export regime between wealthy Gulf petro­ states and poor Asian 
labor­ exporting countries. At the same time they have brought with them exploit­
ative  labor practices that characterize operations in home countries.
The racial disparities that exist on U.S. bases in CENTCOM, in other words, 
are more a product of contingency than intentional design by military officials. 
Nonetheless, through its actions the military has been complicit in perpetuating 
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and even deepening inequalities, from its refusal to substantively combat traffick­
ing by subcontractors to instructions to prime contractors to introduce steeper 
pay differentials for direct hires from Asia and Southeast Eu rope compared to 
American and West Eu ro pean employees  under LOGCAP IV.
Compared to race, relatively less attention has been given to the role that citi­
zenship and nationality play in structuring experiences on military bases in war­
zones, and the ways that the latter intersect with the former. Yet as with the silver 
and gold system in Panama a  century ago, present­ day disparities in pay, privi­
leges, and risk cannot simply be reduced to race. When it comes to categorizing 
its workforce, for instance, the fundamental distinction made by the military is 
the line dividing American citizens on one hand, and foreign workers, both TCNs 
and LNs, on the other. As discussed above, on a daily basis this distinction car­
ries greater weight for subcontractor employees than  those who work for prime 
contractors and thus have privileges that are more comparable to Americans. But 
the distinction is still ever pre sent— and it can crystallize at a moment’s notice, 
to significant effect.
One example that illustrates this point was the military’s response to the Chel­
sea Manning leaks in 2010. Srdjan, who was working as a logistics coordinator 
for KBR at Balad at the time, remembers that following the leaks  every non­ 
American worker on the base was immediately viewed as a security threat, de­
spite the fact that the information had been leaked by an American soldier.
Srdjan:  After the Bradley Manning case and shit we started to be treated 
like fucking spies. I still have all  those emails. No electronic devices 
whatsoever. No laptops. No freaking cell phones. Nothing.
Me: Did they do that with soldiers as well?
Srdjan: No, no, no, just foreigners. We  were so pissed off. It came to 
the point that we had a meeting, an all hands meeting [of KBR em­
ployees]. “Guys, your Motorolas? Go back to your rooms and turn 
them in.” How the fuck are we supposed to work without a radio? It 
was so fucked up. I had to literally—my only lifeline back home was 
Skype. I had bought a laptop, external antenna, got Wi­ Fi from local 
provider that was an arm and a leg per month.
Me: From an Iraqi provider?
Srdjan: Yes. And if you  don’t get rid of that stuff yesterday you can lose 
your job, get prosecuted, blah, blah, blah. I literally had to say, “ Here’s 
my laptop” [give it up]. I was pissed! Right  after that meeting expats 
[American KBR employees] had their [own] meeting and they  were 
told not to help us,  because they could lose their jobs. So I  couldn’t 
go to my buddy, Alan and say, “Alan, please help me and hold onto 
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my laptop  until I’m on R & R and can take it home.” No. if he’s found 
with two laptops in his quarters he would get in trou ble. Our friends 
 were pissed about it, U.S. guys and the military too. So  there was an 
officer who said, “Srdjan, use my computer.” It was fucked up.
Me: So was it all foreign nationals or TCNs?
Srdjan: Every body. British— non­ U.S. citizens. Period. Ridicu lous. And 
then you figure out that’s the world of the military, you know? This 
might sound ugly, but  there is no military intelligence . . .  it was hard 
at that time. I know a guy from my hometown got fired  because of a 
memory stick in his cargo pants. It was used for training new em­
ployees on how to load up cargo planes, it had pictures on it. Our 
[KBR] man ag ers, U.S. guys, confirmed to the military, “Yes this our 
employee, he is an instructor. He needs this for training.”
It is necessary to note that any contract laborer— American and foreign alike— 
can be immediately fired and removed from a base for breaking military rules. 
But as this example shows, citizenship is central to the military’s calculations of 
security risk, and thus when it comes to surveillance, job security, and the exten­
sion and removal of privileges such as possession of computers and cell phones, 
non­ Americans’ positions are always more precarious and contingent.
Another issue raised by several Bosnians who have worked for KBR, Fluor, or 
DynCorp concerns slights by American coworkers, especially African Americans. 
This is alluded to in Lena’s comment that begins this chapter, when she asks, 
“What’s the difference between me and the black American guy, or me and that 
TCN?” Asim provides an example from his time working for Fluor in Af ghan i­
stan, involving his supervisor, Alonzo:
One day [he] approached us . . .  and he said, “Hey guys I  don’t want to 
hear Bosnian any more over  here.” I told him. “It’s my right, my  human 
right, to speak my language with my  people. Do you understand how 
stupid it is to speak En glish with this guy? Of course you do not speak 
my language, so I  will speak En glish with you. But that man is Bosnian, 
I cannot express myself with En glish as well as I can with Bosnian.” And 
he was reported to the site man ag er [who] said, “Stop  doing that shit to 
 people. You  don’t have the right to do that. I  will report you next time 
to HR [ human resources, which deals with discrimination claims].” And 
from that date he [Alonzo] hated every one that come from Bosnia. 
Small, big, he hated Bosnians.
When I asked Goran about tensions between American and Bosnian workers at 
KBR, he admitted they existed but suggested this was to be expected, and that in 
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some cases the prob lem lay with his Bosnian compatriots, especially when it came 
to interactions with African Americans.
That’s normal. It’s not just Americans . . .  First,  we’re dif fer ent cultures. 
We see  things differently, 10,000 kilo meters between [the] two of us. We 
are Westernized, but  we’re dif fer ent cultures. . . .  I had my share of is­
sues with some of the  people, but nothing  really much. I mean, that’s a 
normal  thing.  Because  after all, we  were the outsiders. We  were outsid­
ers, and if you cannot deal with that, I mean, what the fuck? Most of the 
 people from  here, they  didn’t see a black guy before. This is a country 
where black  people, they  don’t live  here. And it was cultural shock for 
some of our guys to go over  there and interact with dif fer ent races if they 
 didn’t work  here [in Bosnia] for Brown & Root.10
Most Bosnians, however, suggested that tensions with American coworkers 
 were rooted in their subordinate status as TCNs. Faruk, for instance, explic itly 
linked what he saw as mistreatment by African Americans to racial in equality in 
Amer i ca. “It’s a power trip. It’s the only time in their life when they are being above 
somebody  else. Just  because of the nationality. And so they  were abusing it in the 
worst pos si ble way.” While this claim is impossible to substantiate, given the broad 
pattern of racialized  labor in equality on military bases in Af ghan i stan and the 
 Middle East, it is understandable that African American contractors might be es­
pecially concerned with policing status hierarchies based on citizenship.
It would be a  mistake, however, to suggest that tensions between American 
and non­ American employees working for prime contractors revolve primarily 
along racial lines, even if in interviews several Bosnians highlighted such cases. 
For example, if one peruses English­ language internet job boards where LOG­
CAP opportunities are discussed (such as indeed . com), along with other promi­
nent online fora for military contracting information and conversations like blogs 
and Facebook groups, it is not difficult to discern a per sis tent line of Trumpian 
“Amer i ca First” resentment among American workers that prime contractor jobs 
are being given to non­ Americans, especially  people from the Balkans. One site 
where this viewpoint was often expressed was mssparky . com, a blog run by for­
mer KBR electrician Debbie Crawford (a white  woman from Oregon) from 2008 
to 2013. Crawford’s posts about financial malfeasance and shoddy construction 
work by contractors like KBR— peppered with leaked documents from a network 
of sympathizers working for contractors in the  Middle East and Afghanistan—as 
well as discussions about job opportunities quickly made her blog a must­ read 
for  those concerned with military contracting. By early 2010 her site was receiv­
ing nearly 2 million page hits a month.11
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Comments on an October 2009 post discussing Fluor’s plans for transition­
ing over KBR employees in Northern Af ghan i stan  under the new LOGCAP IV 
contract give a sense of the anger and resentment directed  toward Bosnians and 
other TCNs. I highlight  here just two comment threads from that post— which 
received more than 300 comments in total (all posts have been copied as in orig­
inal thread).12 The first, raised by someone that went by the moniker “Speicher 
Dude” (suggesting he worked at Camp Speicher in Iraq), highlighted recruiting 
efforts by Fluor in the Balkans, prompting a critique by Crawford of the U.S. gov­
ernment’s refusal to prioritize hiring Americans for  these jobs, and a response by 
another U.S. commenter who went by the name “Gijane,” who suggested that 
maybe he should pretend to be from the Balkans.
Speicher Dude says: February 13th 2010 at 6:07 a.m.
Fluor is currently holding job fairs in the Balkans for  future Afghaniland 
employees . . .  Soooo, if  you’re thinking about how many TCN’s are 
currently on LCIII [LOGCAP III]; wait till you see whats in store for 
LCIV [LOGCAP IV].
gijane says: February 27th 2010 at 7:18 p.m.
I understand that it is cost efficient for Fluor to hire Balkan personnel 
(no offense) but what about the  people who have more credentials 
and experience than  those  people?
Ms Sparky says: February 27th 2010 at 7:21 p.m.
That is a valid point. But regardless of  whether they are more or less qual­
ified. The DoD should hire the  people who  will be filling their bud­
gets with US tax dollars. The Bosnians or any other TCN  won’t! HIRE 
AMERICANS FIRST!
gijane says: February 27th 2010 at 7:34 p.m.
MsSparky, I know me and among hundreds of other Americans are try­
ing to wait for “the call” while recruiters goes to other country and 
give away positions like candies. I think it is far double standards. So 
what does it takes for  people like me, other than a  great resume with 
not just “bullets” of duties performed but with “achievements” to get 
noticed by recruiters? Perhaps, changing my name into Balkan would 
kick it up a notch.
 Later that year  there was a much more vitriolic exchange between a commenter 
who went by the name “FN” (for “foreign national”), Crawford, and “Eric,” 
another reader from the U.S. It began when FN defended the hiring of foreign 
workers and asked  people to “keep politics out” of the discussion. The following 
comments ensued:
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Eric says: November 19th 2010 at 6:08 p.m.
FN
The only good FN’s are the Brits other then that they are trash taking 
are taxpayer dollars. You do not see any Philipino soldiers fighting this 
war, you do not see any Bosnians fighting this war, You do not see any 
Indian soldiers fighting this war, I  will come out very clearly they are 
worthless bloodsucking leaches living off the American tax system and 
 these com panys along with the US governement should be ashamed of 
themselves.
FN says: November 21st 2010 at 5:43 a.m.
Eric
Well man, I’m sorry you feel that way  because just the same as you every­
body  else is trying to make a living.
And I’m not talking about who is fighting the war, look hats off to the 
soldiers  doing their job man, they are heroes. I’m talking about the 
 people who is actually working for companies as a contractor such 
as KBR, FLUOR, DYNCORP. And just to notify you, mostly all of 
the FN’s does have taxes to pay when they get back home it’s just not 
as much as the American tax system. Maybe some of the FN’s  you’ve 
met or came accross are trash well let me tell you not all of them are 
the same and believe me I’ve met some of  those FN’s even from my 
own country. I’ve been givin more recommendation letters by the US 
companies than I have certificates so never judge  people in quantity 
 because you  don’t know all of them.
Eric says: November 21st 2010 at 6:41 a.m.
You must be from the Balkans Im guessing FN, some of  these guys are 
 great  people but I am still paying for  there salarys with my taxes. Your 
taxes do not go back to the United States the country who is paying 
for this war. Your taxes go back to your country that has not sent a 
dime over  here. Besides I have not found one Balkan who can bend a 
piece of Conduit or even make job look half way presentable. YOU 
ARE NOT A QUALIFIED ELECTRICIAN IF YOU DO NOT KNOW 
HOW TO USE A FREAKING PIPE BENDER.
Ms Sparky says: November 21st 2010 at 3:29 p.m.
I agree. Americans are paying for this war and should have the first shot 
at the jobs. I  don’t even want to hear about how much cheaper FN’s 
are to hire. The DoD has proven time and time again they could care 
less about cost savings. Allowing the contractors to hire FN’s espe­
cially when they use  labor brokers ehuman trafficking and abuses. 
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And . . .  from an electricians point of view,  unless you have been 
trained to the National Electrical Code and certified or licensed in the 
States then you are not equal to an American electrician to work on 
a US military fa cil i ty that requires work to be done to the National 
Electrical Code.
 These exchanges pre sent remarkably ugly and resentful comments directed 
 toward a foreign worker for taking an “American” job— following the dubious 
logic that as taxpayers Americans should have priority for this type of overseas 
military work. Bosnians and other workers from Southeast Eu rope bore the brunt 
of  these remarks, which makes sense since unlike South and Southeast Asians 
working for subcontractors they  were frequently in direct competition for jobs 
and promotions with American coworkers at prime contractors. It is also not in­
consequential that the  Great Recession in Amer i ca hit industries like construc­
tion and manufacturing especially hard, thus for some blue collar Americans 
military work in Af ghan i stan and the  Middle East represented—as it did for 
 people from the Tuzla region—an answer to economic precarity. Undoubtedly, 
similar sentiments to  those expressed by Crawford, “Eric,” and “Gijane”  were 
held by Americans working on bases across CENTCOM, though they likely would 
not have been expressed as openly due to the fact that this could lead to warnings 
and even sanctions from supervisors and  human resources administrators.
The experiences of Filipino workers also illustrate the ways in which national­
ity complicates narratives that emphasize a rigid racialized hierarchy of military 
 labor in overseas warzones. Most Filipinos I talked with argued that they occupied 
a relatively privileged place on bases—at least compared to other subcontractor 
employees. One reason for this is the presence of Filipino­ American personnel 
in the armed forces. Several workers brought up their connection with Filipino­ 
American “ brothers” in the military during interviews. For some this was primar­
ily a social relationship, such as attending church together on Sunday, or playing 
pickup basketball at the MWR during off hours. But Filipino­ American soldiers 
also served as sounding boards and even conduits for addressing  peoples’ con­
cerns about working conditions and pay. Recall Daniel’s claim in chapter 8 that 
discussions with Filipino­ American troops— who told him and other Filipinos 
that they  were “getting screwed” by Serka— were the catalyst for the successful 
series of strikes against the com pany in 2004. Another example cited by former 
PPI employees at Balad is Brigadier General Oscar Hilman, who was in charge of 
base security from April 2004 to March 2005. Domingo, for instance, told me 
that Hilman would regularly come to PPI’s mancamp, asking to eat adobo with 
workers, and speaking with them in Tagalog. He also played a central role in 
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convincing Filipinos at Balad to continue working  after a 2004 mortar attack 
on PPI’s mancamp killed Raymond Natividad and wounded four other Filipino 
laborers.
A second  factor  behind Filipinos’ relatively high status on bases, at least in the 
first year of the occupation of Iraq, was the Philippines’ initial membership in 
the troop contributing “co ali tion of the willing.” Manny remembers that Filipi­
nos had badges with more privileges, such as the ability to shop at PX stores, than 
Indian and Bangladeshi coworkers due to the Philippines’ co ali tion status. This 
is echoed by Angel and Domingo, who  were part of the first batch of PPI em­
ployees to arrive in Iraq in October 2003. Angel, who worked in Baghdad, recalls, 
“We  were not TCN . . .  we  were part of the co ali tion” and therefore “entitled to 
every thing that the military was entitled to: DFAC, MWR, PX.” According to An­
gel, Filipino workers in Baghdad lost  these privileges “right  after Arroyo left [the 
co ali tion].” When I asked if he knew why this happened he replied, “Yes,”— they 
 were told that it was Arroyo’s fault. Domingo remembers that the word “co ali­
tion” was written on his first badge, consequently he and other Filipinos on the 
base  were given “full access,  because we are allowed to go to DFAC, MWR.” Gen­
eral Hilman even sustained  these privileges  after Arroyo’s withdrawal of troops 
in 2004, making him a “hero of Filipino contract workers” at Balad.13 According 
to Domingo,  these privileges  were only rescinded when Hilman left in spring 2005 
and his successor forced PPI to rebadge all of its Filipino workers. Carlos, who 
jumped to a job with the private security firm Special Operations Consulting­ 
Security Management Group (SOC­ SMG) almost immediately  after arriving in 
Iraq in early 2004, told me: “When I went to work for SOC they told me you can get 
your own CAC card  because you are co ali tion. Then I got it and all the privileges . . . 
see, it says valid 2004 to 2006.  After that we  were not allowed to get a CAC card. 
With this  there was much privilege. They treated you like a soldier when you wore 
that. Like an American.” When the CAC card expired in 2006 he had to be rebadged 
and in the pro cess experienced a loss of privileges, which in his humorous recount­
ing was the first time he felt like a TCN with similar status to workers from South 
Asian counties. “I heard the term TCN when I renewed . . .  Not before that. Then 
I asked, ‘We are third country national? We belong like Indians, Pakistanis, Sri 
Lankans? Oh shit, we belong with  those guys!?’ [laughs] Damn!”
Hidden  behind Carlos’s joking concern that he “belonged” with “ those guys” 
are nationally essentialist ste reo types circulating among Filipinos that discur­
sively construct them as better workers than their South Asian counter parts. 
Moreover, as was frequently claimed in interviews, this superiority is recognized 
by both U.S. personnel and military contractors. Several  factors make Filipinos 
ideal workers, I was told, the most impor tant being the ability to speak En glish. 
Christian, for instance, claimed that soldiers preferred working with Filipinos in 
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Serka due to the language barrier with other nationalities, including their Turk­
ish supervisors.
Christian: Filipinos are much dif fer ent from Turkish [workers]. They 
 can’t speak En glish and understand. Only, “Yes/no. Yes/no.”
Me: So your Turkish supervisors would have to turn to Filipinos to trans­
late?
Christian: Yeah, yeah! He would need help to translate from us. That’s 
why Filipinos on U.S. bases are a priority. They [the military] want 
Filipinos.
Me: And you  were aware of this?
Christian: Yeah. They know that when speaking we can understand 
them. Not [like] other nationals, like Indians that [he pantomimes an 
Indian yes/no head shake].
In addition to language, several  people cited Filipinos’ supposed natu ral in­
dustriousness and flexibility. Gina, who spent nearly a de cade in Af ghan i stan 
working in administrative positions for several dif fer ent contractors, told me, “If 
you talk to some Americans . . .  they like a Filipino,  because [a] Filipino is hard­
working, [a] Filipino, when you give instructions, only one time, they get it, they 
do [it]. What you want them to do, they  will do it perfectly.” Manny also discussed 
the superiority of Filipino workers in U.S. soldiers’ eyes.
Manny: They [U.S. soldiers] would tell us about other job openings. And 
usually [it] would be [an] increase in pay. But it was up to you if you 
accepted or not. And if you  don’t accept no prob lem. They always 
offered the first opportunity to Filipinos. If no Filipinos then Ban­
gladesh, Indians.
Me: Why in your view did they offer to Filipinos first?
Manny: Filipinos are good workers. They take their jobs seriously. You 
do it your best. But other countries . . .
Most remarked upon was Filipinos’ supposed cleanliness compared to South 
Asians. One recruiting agency owner, Gloria, focused on this quality when ex­
plaining to me why her com pany preferred Filipinos as workers. “They can com­
municate. Then, no smell. Very clean, take a bath . . .  When  they’re in the dining 
fa cil i ty, Americans want it clean. The KBR guys, they  will check the dining fa cil­
i ty. Our workers  there, they say they  will do like this [wipes top of her desk with 
fin ger] on the  table and if it’s dirty, they  will  really get mad. How can  these Nep­
alese, Indian, Fiji guys do that?” Dif fer ent standards of cleanliness also extended 
to conversations about life in company­ run mancamps. This is especially the case 
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for  those who work in Af ghan i stan, where housing often consists of large Alaska 
tents filled with  people from around the world, rather than segregated container 
units as was more common in Iraq. Consider the following exchange with Isko, 
who worked in both countries.
Me: How many  people [ were] sleeping in a tent?
Isko: Fifty persons. All [from] around the world.
Me: Did that cause prob lems?
Isko: It depends on how sloppy your roommates are.
Me: Who  were the sloppiest?
Isko: Indians. If you are tidy we  will be fine.  Kenyans are tidy.  Kenyans 
are nice, and very industrious.
Following Anna Guevarra, I think it is useful to situate  these comments— 
especially concerning Filipinos’ supposedly inherent industry and cleanliness— 
within broader culturally essentialist and racialized discourses that “promote the 
Philippines as a natu ral source of ideal  labor.”14 Such discourses are pushed by 
the Philippine state as part of its strategy of marketing  labor for export. But their 
apparent resonance, among workers, troops, and contractors, also reflects more 
than a  century of entanglement between Filipino  labor mi grants and U.S. military 
proj ects around the world.15
In contrast to the attention given to racial— and to a lesser extent, national— 
relations within the military’s contractor workforce, when one reads news sto­
ries or academic analyses about  those who support U.S. overseas wars it is hard 
not to notice the striking absence of female laborers. Indeed, one could be ex­
cused for thinking that no  women work for military contractors in warzones as, 
with the notable exceptions of Sarah Stillman’s 2011 long­ form article “The Invis­
ible Army” in the New Yorker and Lee Wang’s 2006 documentary film Someone 
Else’s War,  women’s experiences— especially  those from other countries— are al­
most non ex is tent. Yet a considerable number of  women have also worked on 
military bases in the  Middle East and Af ghan i stan. The military’s contracting cen­
suses do not provide information on the gender breakdown of its workforce in 
CENTCOM so it is not pos si ble to calculate their presence with any precision. 
But my research suggests that it is more significant than has been acknowledged 
to date. For instance, nearly 20  percent of the workers I interviewed  were 
 women— and this with no attempt at oversampling along gender lines on my part. 
Moreover, when queried about the presence of female workers on bases, Bosnian 
and Filipino interviewees provided estimates ranging from 10  percent to 
25  percent of the TCN workforce. My sense is that the lower bound is prob ably 
more accurate as interviews and news accounts suggest that it is much less com­
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mon for  women from South Asian countries like India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Pak­
istan to work for military contractors than  those from labor­ exporting countries 
in other regions of the world like Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, the Philippines, 
Fiji, and  Kenya.16
Irrespective of the  actual numbers  there is an evident disconnect between for­
eign female workers’ not insubstantial participation in the military  labor market 
and their near total erasure in reporting on the subject. This is perhaps not sur­
prising as  there is ample research demonstrating that  women’s perspectives and 
voices are consistently marginalized in news reporting,  whether traditional print 
journalism, social media, or online news sites.17 My interviews suggest that this 
disconnect is also fueled by relative differences in the type of work that  women 
and men perform on bases, with the former more likely to be found  doing ad­
ministrative tasks (such as payroll, property management, and  human resources), 
working in laundry or billeting, or occupying ser vice positions in MWRs, PX 
stores, and other shops. Most of  these jobs— with the exception of ser vice 
positions— are less vis i ble to journalists than male­ dominated work like construc­
tion and DFAC operations— the latter perhaps the iconic symbol of TCN  labor 
on military bases.
So how does the absence of  women from accounts of military contracting 
 matter? One way is through the framing of research agendas, especially when it 
comes to gender and the military.  There is a rich body of feminist scholarship, 
for example, that examines topics such as how contractors perform masculinity, 
the intersection of masculinity and race in discourses about private military se­
curity contractors, the masculinization of military markets and the state, and the 
role that contracting plays in reinforcing “male dominance in the military and 
security sphere.”18 As this list of topics suggests, most scholars who focus on ques­
tions of gender, contracting, and the military do so through the lens of mascu­
linity. To a certain degree the predominance of masculinity as a conceptual frame 
reflects the fact that the vast majority of this research deals with private security 
contracting, which is more obviously gendered than support work.19
Another way in which female military workers’ absence  matters concerns the 
lack of attention paid to intimate relations on bases. This lack of attention is no­
table  because over the past two de cades scholars have increasingly turned their 
attention to the intimate ties that have  shaped U.S and Eu ro pean imperial proj­
ects, from sex to domestic work to child rearing. Focusing on relations between 
colonizer and colonized, this research has examined the ways in which “intimate 
domains . . .  figure in the making of racial categories and in the management of 
imperial rule.”20 The context of intimate encounters on military bases is dif fer­
ent, both in its relative narrowness (primarily sexual relations) and isolation from 
occupied populations. Nonetheless,  these encounters are also revealing in their 
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own ways when it comes to relations between and among American ser vice mem­
bers, contractors, and TCNs.
Nearly  every person I talked with, for instance, indicated that relationships 
between American troops and foreign contractors are extremely rare. This bound­
ary is policed by military brass, prime contractors, and subcontractors, with 
punishment for  those working with the latter being dismissal. In contrast, two 
 women who spent time on Eu ro pean bases in Iraq and Afghanistan— such as 
Camp Bastion, which was located adjacent to Marine Corps­ run Camp Leather­
neck in Helmand Province— recalled that it was common for coworkers to date 
Eu ro pean soldiers. When it comes to relationships among contractors the rules 
appear to be more varied, depending on the base one works at or the com pany 
one works for. Gina, who worked with Supreme and Arkel, among other firms, 
recalls that  there  were no rules against dating at  these companies “as long as the 
work  wasn’t affected.” In contrast, at Victory Base Complex KBR and PPI  were 
stricter about policing relationships, especially between the companies’ employ­
ees. Mary, who worked four years at the base with PPI told me that “they [would] 
terminate you” if they caught you dating someone from KBR, and that the same 
punishment also applied to KBR employees. Consequently most  people she knew 
dated other Filipinos working for PPI.
KBR’s rules against relationships with subcontractor employees appear to have 
been put in place in part to discourage exploitative solicitations for sex by Amer­
ican contractors. If so, their effectiveness was  limited according to Filipina work­
ers in Iraq, who recall that such relationships  were not uncommon, especially 
among  those that worked in billeting. The following story told to me by Iris, a 
single  mother who worked for PPI at Balad, is instructive. According to Iris, she 
and several other  women at the base had a profitable “extra business” cleaning 
rooms outside of regular work time. “If some KBR [worker] wanted you to clean 
their room they would pay us $20. Once a week, cleaning.” When word got around 
 people began offering them money for sex.
Iris: You know how many American guys approached me and said, “Be 
my girlfriend and I  will give you money each month?” And I said, “Sir, 
I came  here to work, not to sell myself. You offer me this big amount 
of money, but I  don’t need to.” And they said, “Why  don’t you ac­
cept this offer rather than cleaning rooms?”
Me: Americans would just approach you like that?
Iris: [nods]. Say you are my man ag er. So one day you come to me, “Iris 
do you need something extra?” This is their approach. Some ladies 
they want to flirt so they use it, “OK, sir, I want this, can you buy it 
and I  will pay you  later?”. . . .  I am talking from my own experience. 
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My boss came to me one day and said, “Iris, do you need anything 
from the PX?” “No sir.” So then next day he approached me, “Iris, 
do you have something that you need to send to the Philippines?” “No 
sir.” Third time, he said “Iris, why always when I approach you, you 
are telling me you  don’t need [anything], you  don’t like [anything]?” 
“Sir, I re spect you as my boss. But re spect me as your admin. I  don’t 
intend to work with you just to get involved with you. If I like you, I 
love you, I  will give myself for  free. But no negotiation.” This is the 
only way that you can take care of yourself, by not letting other  people 
use you.
Iris recalls that some of her friends whose “wish was to find money” did have “boy­
friends.” Likewise, Flora, who was employed in billeting for PPI at Victory Base 
Complex, told me, “Sometimes other  women had three or four [boyfriends] . . . 
 doing it for money. They would get into a relationship with a person that would 
support them financially.”
The most common reason  people develop relationships on military bases, I 
was told, is to satisfy a need for companionship and connection. Joshua, who was 
with PPI in Iraq, poignantly explained that “loneliness” was the primary moti­
vation  because individuals “just want to have somebody to be loved.” A number 
of  people from Bosnia recall friends or colleagues dating and even marrying men 
from the U.S. While such relationships  were often dismissed as transactional, Di­
ana insisted that in her experience this was rarely the case: “It’s just love. It’s just 
destiny. Every body is searching for love, for happiness.” Iris’s experience illustrates 
Diana’s argument. Eventually she began dating an American working for KBR, 
the two getting close enough that they began to discuss marriage. But he returned 
to the U.S. and  after a year the long­ distance relationship fell apart. “For three 
weeks,” she tells me, “I was crying.”
This need for  human connection is heightened by the nature of life— isolated, 
regimented, and dangerous—on military bases in warzones. Several  people al­
luded to prison when trying to describe their experience on bases. Representa­
tive is Goran, who told me, “It’s a work camp. It’s like a big prison camp. No one’s 
 going to hit you and shit, but your life is programmed. You eat at this time. You 
go and see that, that, and that guy at the same time  every day. And it’s shitty.” 
Daniel, who worked for Serka in Iraq, stated, “We  were like prisoners . . .  just eat, 
sleep, and work.” Likewise, Adnan, who was employed by KBR in Iraq and by 
Fluor in Af ghan i stan, called bases a “voluntary prison” where “you are like a ma­
chine. Wake up. Work. Eat. Sleep. That’s it.” In such a context many,  whether mar­
ried or not, desperately sought out companionship on bases. As Mary remarked, 
“Once you get  there, it  doesn’t  matter if  you’re married or not.  You’re both single.”
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Alen, who worked for KBR and Fluor in Af ghan i stan, provided an example of 
this for me. “Something happened that started to shake our  family at that time. I 
got involved with another girl [on the base]. I got madly in love . . .  When I came 
back our marriage was a disaster, I wanted to go away, I wanted to leave and marry 
that girl.” Eventually he reconsidered, realizing that this relationship was a prod­
uct of his lonely, pressure­ cooker life on the base. “I started to think about what 
I’m  doing. Is this the right choice? Is that  really, [the] real girl? What about my 
wife? What about kids? How would they do growing up without me? I left my 
son. I left my  daughter. I left my wife. OK. I left what we created together. At that 
time, I recognized the truth. The truth was it  wasn’t the right choice. The truth 
was that all that I created in my head about that girl was just my creation. . . .  I 
 really was crazy at that time.”
Several  people I interviewed met their current partner while working on a base, 
or knew  others who had done so. Sam and Anne met while working for Kulak in 
Balad. Despite com pany rules against relationships, they began dating.  After sev­
eral months she got pregnant— “That one, he’s Iraq­ made,” she joked, pointing 
to their oldest child— and returned to the Philippines. Their situation was not 
unique, according to Sam. “A lot of  people had a  really good opportunity to find 
a good relationship—it  doesn’t  really  matter [ whether] with a Filipino or a for­
eign national. Most of the  people that we know ended up in a relationship.” Tati­
jana’s  brother, Luka, who oversaw property management at several bases in Iraq, 
met his wife, Katrina, on a short visit to Fallujah. “I just met her [briefly]. I mean 
with some other friends. We drank coffee. That’s it. . . .  Then the questions, ‘Where 
you work at?’ This and that. We started to email each other and then plan the va­
cation together and then another one and that’s it. I met her on a camp where I 
was just two days.” Adrijan, who is from Macedonia, also met his wife, Danica, 
who is from Tuzla, in Iraq. They  were both in unhappy marriages, he remem­
bers: “I was already having prob lems back home, she was also having prob lems 
back home, so it’s prob ably just . . .  it just happened.”
Intimate relationships on military bases are not without consequences. One 
is the strain it places on relationships back home, as Alen’s, Adrijan’s, and Dani­
ca’s stories illustrate. Another is that some subcontractors instituted changes in 
hiring practices, limiting opportunities for  women. For instance, in response to 
a number of pregnancies among its workforce, Serka instructed its recruiting 
agency in the Philippines to quit hiring  women.21 PPI, I was told, took a dif fer­
ent tack and started to prioritize hiring older  women, like Iris, Mary, and Flora, 
 under the assumption that they would be less likely to get pregnant. According 
to Mary, “They hired old, old. They  didn’t want young  women  because they  didn’t 
want [pregnancies].” In addition to placing the blame for pregnancies on  women, 
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Serka and PPI also refused to provide access to contraceptives. KBR, in contrast, 
provided condoms at its camp in Balad, according to Domingo.
Fi nally, a darker side to this story concerns sexual harassment and assault on 
bases. Few I talked with  were willing to discuss this topic openly like Iris did, but 
it was alluded to several times.  Here, for example, is how Tatijana responded to a 
question about sexual harassment and assault during her time at Victory Base 
Complex:
Tatijana: It’s not easy when you think about it.  You’re in military base 
with all  those soldiers around and sometimes you have to go back [to 
your housing] . . .  eventually they installed this buddy system [so] that 
you  couldn’t walk by yourself. Initially  women had to get escorts. If 
you  were leaving, I  don’t know if it was  after dark or  after hours, or 
was it all the time. They changed it. It eventually became you  can’t 
walk by yourself pretty much at all. You had to think about that too.
Me: Was this [sexual assault] fairly common?
Tatijana: I  didn’t have issues like that but yeah,  there  were cases and 
complaints. I guess it’s all about being careful. Being aware of your 
surroundings. Nothing dif fer ent than being around  here.
Me: Yeah. Except for  you’re on a base, so  there should be some more 
sense of security, you would think.
Tatijana: Yeah, but when you think about it, the majority is guys, both 
contractors and military. Then you consider the heat, and  people go 
crazy when it’s hot. Yeah, it’s a  little bit maybe more intense when it 
comes to work [ there].
As Tatijana points out, severe gender imbalances and a heavi ly masculinized 
working environment are two  factors that contribute to the cases of sexual ha­
rassment and assault on bases.22 Another is the battlefield environment itself, 
as military­ funded research indicates that rates of sexual assault against female 
military personnel increase in warzones compared to stateside bases.23 Due to a 
lack of comparable research it is difficult to tell just how pervasive a prob lem this 
is for female contractors (foreign or U.S. citizens), but Sarah Stillman’s investi­
gative reporting suggests this is a significantly underreported phenomenon that 
is also exacerbated by the military’s unwillingness to police the be hav ior of its 
contractor workforce— whether the  matter concerns trafficking,  labor abuses, or 
sexual assault.24
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The comforts of home and  family loomed large in almost  every interview I con­
ducted with Bosnian and Filipino military laborers. This makes sense, as amidst 
divergent experiences working and living on bases, absence from home consti­
tutes one of the few commonalities shared by TCNs. The communities they come 
from are also impor tant—if overlooked— sites in which the effects of the wars in 
the  Middle East and Af ghan i stan are felt, with the primary conduits being work­
ers themselves.  These effects are multiple, from the trauma of returning dead and 
wounded bodies to the injection of money that alters the lives and trajectories of 
 house holds and towns, to the toll that this work has on personal relationships. In 
this book and elsewhere I argue that such space­ spanning entanglements are re­
shaping the geography of war. Due to military  labor contracting on a scale and 
scope unpre ce dented in U.S. history, numerous communities and states around 
the world seemingly unconnected to the country’s wars are nonetheless profoundly 
impacted by them as the effects of vio lence radiate far beyond the immediate bat­
tlefields. I refer to this condition as the “everywhere of war.”1 Perhaps nowhere 
 else is the everywhere of war so deeply felt and intimate as places where recruit­
ing for this type of work is highly concentrated, such the Tuzla valley in Bosnia 
and the Pampanga region in the Philippines.
I orient this chapter on home around three themes. The first concerns specific 
effects of the U.S.’s overseas wars on communities and families in Bosnia and the 
Philippines, especially  those with high concentrations of military laborers. The 
second focuses on workers’ longing for  family and friends while living a secluded 
life on bases halfway across the world, and how they communicate with  those back 
10
HOME
 there is a social and economic impact on every body. you know, it’s 
like both sides of a coin. it’s good but you pay [for it] in other ways.
— Enis
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home. The final section takes a dif fer ent tack. In it I explore the question of how 
po liti cal, social, and economic contexts at home shape individuals’ ability to ad­
just to life  after military work, including retrospective perceptions of the upsides 
and downsides of such work.
Entanglements
Few events illustrate more directly the connection between military contracting 
and the everywhere of war than deaths of foreign workers and the reverberations 
they cause back home. This tragedy has struck the small Bosnian town of Luka­
vac twice. The first time occurred in June 2008 when Nedim Nuhanović, an elec­
trical mechanic for KBR, was killed by a mortar attack on a small base along the 
Afghanistan­ Pakistan border. Nuhanović had been in Af ghan i stan for just six 
months. Nearly two years  later, in March 2010, Fluor employee Almir Biković, 
who had spent three years as a firefighter at Bagram Air Base outside Kabul, was 
killed in a rocket attack on the base. Prior to this he had worked for several years 
for U.S. peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. Both deaths dominated local and national 
news for several days and left distraught  family and friends in their wake. Biković 
was an only child, while Nuhanović, who worked as a video technician and DJ 
prior to heading to Af ghan i stan, had planned to marry his long­ term girlfriend 
while on R & R in July. On the day that Biković died the Bosnian portal bliski­ 
istok.ba temporarily crashed as thousands of  people flocked to the site to read the 
breaking news. Days  later hundreds lined the cold, wet streets of Lukavac as his 
funeral pro cession passed by, just as much of the town had gathered to bury 
Nuhanović two years before.2 Years  after, their deaths still resonated in Lukavac 
and nearby Tuzla, with several  people mentioning them in interviews. One day 
an individual I  will call Ado, who was chatting with me about my research in Lu­
kavac, informed me that he had also applied to work in Af ghan i stan for Dyn­
Corp, and in fact had been offered an Asian contract. In the end Ado, who worked 
as an interpreter for U.S. peacekeeping forces in Bosnia in the 1990s, declined. 
When I asked why, he replied, “Two guys from this city died, Almir and Nedim. 
One of them was engaged to a girl from my neighborhood. And then my  sister 
and  brother told me, ‘Ado, this is not Bosnia, it is not Eu rope. Af ghan i stan is a 
dif fer ent story.’ ”
Despite the risk exemplified by the fate of Nuhanović and Biković, thousands 
from Lukavac and Tuzla have worked in Iraq and Af ghan i stan over the past fif­
teen years, lured by the chance to earn some “bread.” Such lucrative opportuni­
ties are few and far between in the local job market, especially for young  people 
given the heavi ly industrialized region’s postwar economic decline. Shortly 
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before his death, for instance, Biković was able to buy his own apartment, which 
is rare for someone in their early thirties in Bosnia. He was not alone. Indeed, Amer­
i ca’s wars since 9/11 have had a noticeable impact on Lukavac’s urban fabric. 
Driving into the town is like passing through a massive industrial gateway, as the 
road is flanked by Bosnia’s largest cement plant on the right, and the sprawling 
Soda Lukavac soda ash production fa cil i ty on the left. The town itself has a 
rundown feel to it, with the center dominated by drab, Yugoslav­ era apartment 
complexes. The notable exceptions are several recently built, modern­ looking 
apartment towers surrounded by parking lots at the southeastern edge of the 
town, which locals colloquially refer to as “Iraq” and “Af ghan i stan” due to the 
large number of units purchased by  people who have worked for military con­
tractors in  those countries. Similar, newly built, apartment towers have also 
sprouted up around the outskirts of Tuzla.
Though not as visually arresting, neighborhoods and towns in the Philippines 
have been no less significantly transformed by military contracting. For instance, 
a handful of former PPI workers I talked with came from a rural barangay in the 
town of Lubao, in Pampanga. All had relatively new concrete homes with metal 
or tile roofs, which they  were  eager to show off. The following exchange with Angel 
is representative.
Angel: It was a happy but scary time. I was happy  because I was able to 
build this  house and send my kids to school. Most Iraq workers built 
new  houses. This one  here [points to  house across the road] is my 
 brother’s. He was working in the gasoline pumps, with the Turkish 
 drivers.
Me: So many [ people] from Lubao worked over  there. How has it 
changed the community?
Angel: Before the  houses  were just small  houses on stilts and wood. Now 
they are concrete.  These are our peace of mind. And now  there are 
 water wells. A lot of  children  were able to go to school.  People bought 
vehicles.
Me: This looks like a prosperous village.
Angel: That is  because most went to Iraq. When we  were in Saudi Ara­
bia it was a small salary. It does not compare to Iraq. You cannot build 
a  house like this if you are working in Saudi [Arabia]. You cannot send 
your  children to private school. But we in Iraq sent our  daughters and 
sons to private schooling.
Echoing Angel, Christian, who worked for Serka in Iraq, told me: “The earnings 
from Iraq  were so huge. This was not our  house, it was just a shanty before.  Every 
time I sent money home so that when the rain comes we  will have shelter. And 
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when I come home I am so happy even though I have no money. All the money 
went right  here to our  house [a beautiful three­ story  house]. And some educa­
tion assistance for my  children. So when I go home I had nothing other than my 
last salary.”
In several cases  people insisted I take pictures of them in front of their new 
homes. Andrew, one of Angel’s neighbors in Lubao, had me take the picture re­
produced in figure 10.1. Wearing a Marine Corps T­ shirt, he informed me that 
his  house was katas ng Iraq (“fruit of Iraq”), a phrase I heard from  others in his 
barangay.
As Angel’s and Christian’s comments indicate, another significant area that 
money from military work has been directed to— especially in the Philippines—
is education. Specifically, this entails paying to send one’s  children to private 
schools, which are perceived as superior to poorly funded public education op­
tions in the county. Even more than housing, Filipinos I talked with stressed the 
importance of education opportunities afforded by their military  labor. For Fred, 
who worked for four years with Serka in Iraq, education was his primary moti­
vation for applying.
Me: What was the discussion like with your  family when you made the 
decision to go?
Fred: I wanted to go  because the twins  were  going to college. I knew 
 there was a war  there. But I wanted to sacrifice for the girls.
Me: Had you worked abroad before?
Fred: No, my first time. My  family agreed with me.  Because we needed 
money for college. I am only a high school gradu ate. That’s why I 
want my kids to go to college.
Like Fred, Angel contrasted his education status— “I was only in high school”— 
with his three  children who  will be able to get “good jobs” due to their private 
college education. “My  daughter is a nurse at a hospital. My second finished [her] 
foreign ser vice degree. My youn gest  will gradu ate as a civil engineer.” Angel spent 
six years without a break working for PPI in Iraq, prompting me to inquire if  there 
was a point during this time that he wanted to go home. He replied, “Oh yeah. 
But if you go home early you cannot go back [ because of the travel ban]. My 
 daughter at the time was in college. And I was worried that she might not be 
able to gradu ate.” Similarly, when I asked Flora if she is still happy with her deci­
sion to go to Iraq in 2004 she replied, “Yes,”  because “I was able to send my 
 children to [private] school, even though I am a single parent.”
The economic and social effects of military work on communities in Bosnia 
and the Philippines extend beyond workers’ deaths and investments in housing 
and education. Michelle, the local recruiter for Serka who was responsible for 
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helping dozens of  people from her barangay obtain jobs with the com pany, high­
lighted several more subtle effects this has had on her poor community. She 
claimed, for instance, that “for the first time families  were able to celebrate birth­
days for their kids [by  going out for a meal at Jollibee’s— a popu lar Filipino fast 
food chain—or McDonald’s] and invite their friends to the cele brations.” More­
FigUre 10.1. Andrew in front of his katas ng Iraq (“fruit of Iraq”)
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over, “With so many families building or expanding their  houses with the money 
they  were earning, many construction workers  didn’t have to go live in Manila 
or even farther away in the Philippines to find work. They could work where they 
lived, in the barangay.” Fi nally, she told me, many former Serka workers have sub­
sequently found good­ paying jobs as chefs, bakers, or kitchen assistants with 
companies in the Philippines and beyond. When I asked why this was the case 
she said: “ Because they have experience working for a U.S. com pany [showing 
me KBR certificates of appreciation and food safety given to her husband]. This 
is like their passport to the jobs,  because the certificates for food safety are 
valuable,  because the U.S. Army is very strict about food safety and prepara­
tion.” Michelle’s claims about the value of Filipinos’ experience working for 
U.S. military contractors and their subcontractors stands in contrast to Bos­
nians’ complaints about the devaluation of their work experience at home. But 
her point about remittances having effects that extend beyond immediate fami­
lies does apply. Indeed, as I argued in chapter 4, for roughly a de cade the influx 
of money from the war economy in Iraq and Af ghan i stan was able to counter­
act—to an extent— general economic decline in the Tuzla region by bolstering 
industries as diverse as real estate, construction, restaurants, auto sales, tourism, 
and retail.
Another entanglement is the impact that military work has on families, espe­
cially  those with  children. While money earned from this work can transform 
families’ material and educational situation,  those who stay  behind have to bear 
the load of raising  children and managing  house holds on their own. Consider the 
following exchange with Michelle.
Me: What was the hardest  thing about this work?
Michelle: He could not come home. He was not with us during vaca­
tion times, during Christmas, New Year’s. For me, my  children are 
growing up. And I am raising them as a solitary parent. That was 
hardest.
Me: Did you ever ask him to come home?
Michelle: Yes. When  there was the explosion at the DFAC [in Mosul, 
in 2004]. Most of us  here [in the barangay] told them to come home 
 after that bombing.
Me: How did that conversation go?
Michelle: They first said, “Yeah, we might come home.” And then  later 
on they said, “No, we are staying.”
Rosamie— whose husband worked for Supreme for four years in Afghanistan— 
told me that she barely had time to be lonely  because “I was busy  every day,  going 
to the school, the market [and] carry[ing] on by myself with the kids.”
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In addition to increasing the burden of reproductive  labor on  those at home, 
being apart also  causes strains on relationships. Zlatan, who got divorced shortly 
 after returning home, told me this was a common occurrence among other for­
mer military contractors he knows, especially  those who  were gone for years. In 
his case, he recalls: “We  didn’t fight. We  didn’t argue. We  were just sitting and 
talking just like you and me now. ‘OK. This is not  going anywhere. This is not it. 
We lost too much time.’ I know lots of  people that got divorced in this area  here 
[Lukavac]. I  don’t know. I’m looking at it like why? Sometimes you win. Some­
times you lose. Pretty much, you  can’t have it both, it looks like. You  can’t be on 
the other side of the world and you have a  family  here.  You’re just losing time.” 
Rena also blamed her time working in Iraq and Af ghan i stan for the collapse of 
her marriage: “It was a phantom distance. It just made us know that we can live 
without each other. In one moment he told me, ‘We live good without you,’ and 
that made me so pissed. I  didn’t live good. I  didn’t live good at all! ‘You live good 
 because I send you [money] and you live exactly how you want  because I provide 
[for] you. You  don’t appreciate that’. . . .  Those  couple of words made me— well, 
of course to re spect myself [she left him]. If nobody  else  will I am  going to.” To 
add insult to injury, she told me, “When I came back from Afghanistan— I was 
two years over  there— I came back and found $1,200 in my bank. That’s it. He 
wasted the money . . .  like I was  going to stay [in Af ghan i stan] forever.” Echoing 
Rena, Manny summed up for me the consequences of working with Serka in 
Iraq in the following way: “I built my  house when I was in Iraq. But my  family 
was broken as well . . .  Too much trou ble. That is my experience. I lost money. I 
lost  family.”
“Your Life’s Not Complete”
Losing connection with  family back home was a concern for most  people I inter­
viewed. This was especially the case for  those with  children. Representative in this 
regard is Kenan, who worked for five years with Fluor in Af ghan i stan. When I 
asked him what he found to be the biggest challenge related to his work, he im­
mediately replied, “Reconciliation with  family . . .  especially if you have small kids. 
I went to Af ghan i stan when my older boy was three. I came back when my younger 
boy is three, so basically nobody knows me.” For Rena, being apart from her 
 daughter was an ever­ present sorrow that made it difficult to work and sleep.
If I call her—we do shifts over  there, first and second shift. When I do 
first shift, if I call her  after the job, I could not sleep over night. I would 
stay awake all night long and crying. Then if I call her before [the] shift, 
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I  will be looking bad when I’m working. I could call her on my days off 
to be able to cry all day long as much I want. We are  really close. When 
she’s sitting next to me, I always need to touch her. Touch her hands so 
I always play like this [caresses one hand with the other]. When I do this, 
it’s so nice. She’s sitting next to me and all, always touching each other 
and I always play with that part of the hand. In Af ghan i stan during the 
night, it happened that I dream I do that. That wake me up and that’s it. 
It’s no sleeping anymore. You  can’t sleep. You[’re] just thinking about 
sad  things.
In the end, Rena, told me, “It was actually her only that [was] pulling me back 
home,” not the relationship with her husband, which had slowly dissolved  under 
the strain of years of being apart.
In the Philippines several  people I talked with had parents who had also mi­
grated abroad for work when they  were young. Rowel brought this up unprompted 
while discussing the increase in privileges— particularly R & R  every six months 
and the use of personal cell phones and computers— that occurred when he 
jumped from PPI to Parsons.
Me: What would you do during your R & R’s?
Rowel: We just keep, stay home, and then like Sunday go church.  After 
that one, take a rest a  little bit and then go to the mall. Spend my time 
with my kids. Some relatives is coming  because they know you came 
from abroad, they got start coming, visiting you, then drink, cook­
ing, barbeque, always  doing get together. Not like my  father,  because 
my  father was abroad also. During his time you can contact your fam­
ilies only by writing [letters], and then . . .  sending in the post office. 
But not like now [where] we got computer, we got cell phone. Our 
communication is easy.
Me: When you grew up, you  didn’t see your  father much  because he was 
abroad?
Rowel: Yeah . . .  Since I was like, prob ably like four years old, [when he] 
start working in Saudi [Arabia].
Me: For most of your childhood? What was that like growing up with­
out your  father?
Rowel: You feel like it’s not complete. Your life’s not complete  because 
your  father is not  here. By the time that you need your  father, you 
need some advice. Not like other  people walking on the street, you 
see they are complete. They are working together with their families, 
 father and  mother. Then you saw them.  You’re  going to miss your dad. 
You feel incomplete in your life. It’s too hard.
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When I asked Rowel if he was worried that his  children would also feel “incom­
plete” due to his long­ term absence, he replied: “I think it’s better than my  father 
 because at that time you cannot talk to your  father on phone, on a computer. You 
only talk to your  father when in person. Now it’s easy to communicate with your 
 family on a computer, on a cell phone  because cell phone they got camera, com­
puter also. When you talk to them it’s like it’s with you, you get together. You feel 
like they are with you.” As I discuss in the next section, Rowel also justified his 
choice by asserting that it would lead to a better  future for his  children, one which 
would not require the same kind of sacrifices made by him and his  father.
Many  people I talked with suggested that one of their central concerns was hid­
ing details of work and life on bases from  family. Specifically, this involved mini­
mizing information about attacks, casualties, or dangerous working conditions so 
their families would not worry about their safety. For instance, when I asked Sead 
what he would talk about when chatting with his parents over Skype he replied:
Sead: Most of the time about what’s happening  here, that is Bosnia. You 
know, you cannot tell your mom  there was a rocket [attack], you 
know. And when they hear the siren [signaling an attack] . . .
Me: When  you’re calling?
Sead: Yes and they say, “Hey, what is that?” And you say, “They have 
practice for something. We need to go.” So you just say, “Bye, see you 
tomorrow.” But sometimes they watch the TV and see in Af ghan i­
stan is killed twenty  people and they call tomorrow and ask, “What 
was that?” and you say, “Oh, nothing happened, it’s not  here, it’s far 
from  here.” But I remember [one time] . . .  the Taliban guys shot our 
container and  there was [a guy] on Skype with  family. I remember 
that. I mean, I mean some pictures are never  going to go from your 
head like that, and he died in that place. . . .  So in that time I want to 
go home, so I go in the office and say, “Hey, please, I want to go home. 
What do I need to do?” But, you know,  there was nothing that hap­
pened to you so you think, “Oh, maybe nothing  will happen again.” 
So when you go sleep in your tent, tomorrow morning  you’re a dif­
fer ent man. Just put that  behind you and go forward. So I stayed. And 
 after that I stayed two years.
 Later in the interview Sead explained that he hid the details of this attack from 
his parents  until he returned home,  because he knew that they would have begged 
him to come home if they found out.
The most extreme example of hiding information I was told came from Grace, 
the single mom who was working illegally in Dubai in 2005 when a PPI recruiter 
convinced her to go to Iraq.
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Me: What did your  family say when you told them?
Grace: They  didn’t know. Actually, they  don’t know that I’m  going in 
Iraq a long time. I  didn’t tell [anyone]  until one of my cousins, it was 
two years [ later], yeah, that we spoke in Messenger. He said, “Hey, I 
went to your place, your address [in Dubai] that you gave and  you’re 
no longer living  there.”
Me: Wait, you  were working in Balad for two years without telling your 
 family?
Grace: Yes, they  don’t know I was in Balad. I was pretending [to be] in 
Dubai. I get a lot of pictures [of Dubai] to show them. “Oh, this is 
my picture from that time.” I just made basically . . .  I just basically 
edit [pictures] in a computer and said, “Oh, this is the day that I . . .”
Even  after her  family found out about her move to Iraq she deflected concerns, 
responding to questions about life on the bases by saying “It’s OK, it’s easy. All is 
 free . . . [you]  don’t have to worry.”
Deflecting concerns from  family and friends about the dangers of military work 
in warzones is understandable. But it is not without consequences. In fact, the 
emotional distance that Zlatan and Rena spoke of in the previous section is fu­
eled in part by such silences. As Srdjan put it to me, “ There’s a big gap of say six 
or seven years” of life separating him and his wife. In an attempt to bridge this 
gap she eventually bought a copy of The Kite Runner, by Khaled Hosseini, which 
helped him open up about his time in Af ghan i stan. “I was living in that neigh­
borhood in Kabul. And then she reads the book and comes to me and then I tell 
her what I saw with my eyes! Stuff like that,  simple  things . . .  we’ll discuss it from 
time to time.”3 Srdjan’s case appears to be the exception as most I talked with 
found it difficult to discuss with  family their experiences on military bases, even 
 after returning home.
Afterlives
What is left  after the money is gone? I posed this question to a group of former 
PPI employees one after noon in Lubao. “Kids who have [a] better education,” 
replied Angel. “Yeah, and they get a good job,” followed up Chris.  Others pointed 
to the many new  houses and improved infrastructure in the community. With few 
exceptions, in fact,  people I talked with in the Philippines felt that military work 
elevated their families into a better situation than before they left. This perspec­
tive is noticeably divergent from the more equivocal assessments of Bosnians. 
On its face this constitutes a puzzle. While working for military contractors 
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offers Filipinos relatively better pay than similar jobs with civilian firms in the 
Gulf region, the differential is not enormous. And this work is arguably more 
precarious and dangerous, especially following the imposition of travel bans. In 
contrast, Bosnians working for prime contractors have been able to earn wages 
that are not just substantially greater than Filipino military laborers, but ex­
travagant compared to the few job opportunities available at home. They have 
also experienced more opportunities to gain promotions and raises. So how 
are we to understand this discrepancy? The answer, I argue, lies in the dif fer ent 
po liti cal, social, and economic contexts Filipinos and Bosnians experience 
upon returning home, which shape their adjustment to life  after military work 
and retrospective perceptions of the upsides and downsides of such work. In 
this final section I examine  these differences by comparing the afterlives of mili­
tary work in the Philippines and Bosnia.
One significant difference concerns social expectations and perspectives on 
transnational  labor migration. As discussed in chapter 3, since the 1970s the Phil­
ippine state has promoted  labor export as a development strategy. In the inter­
vening de cades millions of Filipinos have headed overseas for work. According 
to the POEA  there  were 2.4 million OFWs in 2015. But registered OFWs are just 
a fraction of the overall number of Filipino citizens living and working abroad, 
which the government estimates to be as many as 10 million  people—or roughly 
10  percent of the country’s population.4 What this means is that  labor migration 
is a relatively common experience for Filipino families. Indeed, several  people I 
spoke with indicated that  going abroad to pursue military work represents a con­
tinuation of previous  labor migration to the region for individuals (as was the 
case with Angel) or across generations (as was the case with Rowel). Consequently, 
challenges associated with  labor migration— from the burden on  those who stay 
 behind to strains on familial relationships— tend not to be suffered in isolation 
as more often than not relatives and  family friends are experiencing similar is­
sues. Michelle, for instance, highlighted one time that she and other spouses in 
her barangay intervened when the wife of a Serka worker was being profligate with 
money sent home by her husband. To provide another example, Gina left to work 
in Af ghan i stan when her  daughter was six months old. When I replied that this 
must have been difficult she disagreed, replying that her  mother was happy to look 
 after her  daughter. And shortly before I interviewed her in 2015, her  daughter, 
who is now a teenager, encouraged her to apply for military work again if she 
wanted, saying, “You want to work again, mama, overseas? It’s OK for me  because 
I can manage . . .  my grandma and I can manage.”
Transnational  labor migration is not just a common choice for Filipinos look­
ing to improve the lives of their families, it is also socially and po liti cally valo­
rized. This is perhaps best exemplified by the government’s promotion of mi grant 
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workers as bagong bayani (modern­ day heroes), a phrase first used by President 
Corazon Aquino in 1988. In the thirty years since Aquino’s invocation of bagong 
bayani, the Philippine state has diligently labored to “manufacture heroes” out 
of mi grant  labor.5 Beginning in 1989, for instance, the POEA began sponsoring 
an annual Bagong Bayani Award that “seeks to recognize and pay tribute to our 
OFWs for their significant efforts in fostering goodwill among  peoples of the 
world, enhancing and promoting the image of the Filipino as a competent, re­
sponsible and dignified worker, and for greatly contributing to the socioeconomic 
development of their communities and our country as a  whole.”6 Central to bagong 
bayani discourse is the notion of mi grants’ experience of hardship and suffering, 
which sanctifies them as heroes of their communities and the Philippine nation. 
As Anna Guevarra observes, this aspect of the bagong bayani discourse is rooted 
in “Catholic ideals of sacrifice, suffering and martyrdom.” Since  these are cultur­
ally familiar and impor tant values, “when the state invokes them, Filipinos un­
derstand and respond accordingly.”7
While working abroad is both common and celebrated in the Philippines, the 
social context of  labor migration in Bosnia is rather dif fer ent. To begin, Bosnians’ 
choice to work as military mi grants is not valorized by  either society or their gov­
ernment. The state does not track  labor migration, and provides  little support to 
workers or their families when crises arise, leading to a sense of social isolation. 
According to Srdjan, this isolation is amplified by the effects of working in a 
warzone— especially  after surviving the war in the early 1990s—as illustrated by 
the following exchange.
Srdjan: Believe me, it took a  couple of months to wind down,  settle. And 
figure out,  there is someone sleeping next to me. My wife. First  couple 
of months I kept continuously waking up at 5:20 in the morning. 
Where am I? OK, I’m home, nice. Just to get your organism back [to] 
civilian life, and how should I say it? Socializing. I got together with 
my boys in this bar, [called] Oscar. We grew up together, went through 
the war together, every thing. So they  were so glad I am back, and 
happy for me. But it was a month  after working and one time, “Srd­
jan, why are you so quiet?” “Guys you just talk your talk, I need time 
to take in every thing.” You know what I am saying? It was just like I 
was in my world trying to figure out shit. And it took some time, be­
lieve me.  People changed.
Me: This seems to be  little difference [psychologically] with soldiers.
Srdjan: I would say it is like a 85  percent match.  Because practically you 
 were wrung through the same shit. Except for shooting. You  were not 
in direct combat, but for every thing  else you  were like a U.S. soldier. 
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You  were in the same convoy, on the same chopper. In the same shit 
day in, day out.
Me: Is  there anything in Tuzla, Lukavac, [other] local communities, sup­
port networks that have been developed?
Srdjan: No. None that I know of. But I remember we  were joking, just 
for  those PTSD [post­ traumatic stress disorder] guys, or  those who 
miss it, we should build ourselves a camp outside town somewhere.
Me: So you can pretend to be locked up [on a military base] again?
Srdjan: Exactly! [laughs] Just to have a feeling how it is. And simulate 
the same situation!
Me: That’s some typical Bosnian black humor!
Srdjan: So another price for that [work] is being without your  family, 
totally separated, with strangers who come from dif fer ent place. War 
 going on. And I still  don’t know what damage has been done to my 
brain or my soul, but I am trying to keep my mind straight. And I 
think I am pretty good with it so far [knocks on wood]. But some 
 people  can’t.
Srdjan was not the only person I talked with who suggested that the cumula­
tive effect of living through the war in Bosnia and then working in a warzone ex­
acted a psychological toll. Fedja worked as a  labor foreman for KBR at Tallil Air 
Base for only four months before resigning. When I asked why, he replied: “For 
a lot of reasons. It was the third war in my  really short period of life. I had the 
 whole war  here, had shit­ tons of bad situations in Bosnia. And then I worked 
for almost six years in something like a SWAT team [a special police force]. And 
then I went to Iraq and  there was a lot of shelling and stuff . . .  The day before I 
went home  there was eight guys in my camp [Tallil] killed. We had incoming 
shells and one of them hit a jeep and killed three MPs instantly on the spot, and 
five guys from India.” Fedja then told me that when he arrived back home on 
his first vacation and saw his  family he said to himself, “The money is not worth 
it . . .  It’s [working in Iraq is] too much for me,” and de cided that he would not 
return to Iraq.
A second  factor concerns the history of  labor migration in Bosnia and the 
broader “Yugosphere.” While  there is a tradition of temporarily migrating abroad 
in search of better pay and opportunities dating back to the Yugo slav period, the 
most common pathway for Bosnians has involved traveling to Western Eu rope, 
 whether as a formal gastarbeiter (guest worker) or finding work in the informal 
economy, usually through personal connections with  earlier mi grants who have 
permanently settled in another country. Compared to  these options, working 
for military contractors is a rare and relatively incommensurable form of  labor 
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migration. Moreover, while the skills and experience that  people accumulate 
working in Eu rope often lead to new opportunities upon return,  those who 
have been employed by military contractors report that the opposite is true in 
their case.
The primary reason that Bosnians are equivocal about military work, however, 
has to do with the general condition of precarity in Bosnia, from high unem­
ployment and economic insecurity to corruption and divisive ethno­ nationalist 
politics, and strug gles to regain a sense normalcy in the aftermath of war and 
displacement. As we saw in chapter 4, for many this is encapsulated in the expres­
sion, “facing the real ity of this life  here.” This “real ity” profoundly colors  people’s 
perspective on the  future, fueling pessimism that money, experience, or skills 
gained through military work  will translate into a better life  going forward, and 
placing emphasis on what has been sacrificed in a futile attempt to better one’s 
life.  Here is how Enis articulated this pessimism:
When U.S. troops pulled out of Bosnia, Bosnians went with U.S. troops 
[laughs]. So still they  were supporting their families back home— buying 
apartments, resolving existential needs, buying cars, getting a guy to 
paint my  house, what ever. You help the local economy. And now that’s 
 going out too. And now what? You got a bunch of  people that got back 
home and are now scratching their balls and what the fuck are they  going 
to do? Do I invest in the local economy which is ruined, and with a ques­
tionable outcome of my investments? Do I try to go back again to some 
warzone? And for how long can you take it? Especially if you got kids. I 
know guys who  haven’t seen their  daughters— just Skype and R & R— 
and then you lose them,  there’s a gap right  there. It’s like, “Yeah, my 
 daddy is on a TV, and that’s it.”  There is a social and economic impact 
on every body. You know, it’s like both sides of a coin. Its good, but you 
pay [for it] in other ways. You pay for it by being separated from your 
loved ones, or PTSD.  There is a huge impact on the local population  here. 
And meanwhile, unfortunately,  things got worse in Bosnia, or our home­
town [Tuzla].
When asked to assess her decision to work in Af ghan i stan with DynCorp, Rena 
offered an even more blunt and negative assessment: “You know how I describe 
my two years in Af ghan i stan? I wasted two years of my life  because I  didn’t make 
it while I’m  going over  there. OK, I get some experience. What am I  going to do 
with it? Nothing. I went to provide [a] better life for my  family and I  didn’t.” The 
primary long­ term consequence of this work, she concluded, was the tension it 
placed on the relationship with her  daughter’s  father, which eventually led to their 
separation.
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Relations with  family and friends,  others told me, become even more strained 
as money drains away  after  people come back home and strug gle to find work. 
Ivan explained this to me in the following way: “Money gets spent. Money,  every 
day it’s less and less and then you start fight[ing] with your wife on money a lot. 
 Those are the downsides. Lot of marriages getting divorced. When you have a  little 
more money, you start feeling beautiful.  People like you all the time if you have 
money. Then  after that,  you’re  going to feel the real life. Over the night,  people 
are  going to start turning their head away like they  don’t know you anymore. Like 
you  don’t have money, they  don’t need you.” Likewise, Sead argued that adjust­
ing to straightened financial circumstances is the biggest challenge most military 
workers face when returning to Bosnia: “You know in our country they say na-
jgorije nemate pa imate (it is the worst to not have  after you have had). You know, 
 because, you  don’t have money and you live with that. But when you live and you 
 don’t have money, you get some money, and then lose that again— don’t have 
money— it’s very bad. It’s killing you in your head.” Due to the depressed econ­
omy and difficulty in finding work— even work that pays Bosnian wages— nearly 
every one who returns home, he claimed, wrestles with this decline in status.
Not all in Bosnia are so pessimistic. Kenan told me that he spent the first three 
months back “just watching TV” but then “one day you wake up in the morning 
and say to yourself, ‘Yeah, well this is a dif fer ent real ity, let me swim in this real­
ity now.’ ” He then de cided to invest in a construction com pany— “two excava­
tors and two trucks”— attributing his optimism to experience working with Fluor.
Well, I have more confidence in myself. You have to understand I  wasn’t 
in Bosnia for five years, so I kind of forgot how the system works  here 
and how much  people are suffering  because [of the] economic situa­
tion . . .  I was in my dream world like Alice in Wonderland. I’m coming 
from Af ghan i stan to spend twenty­ one days  here [ every R & R], so my 
only aim is to have fun with my  family and I have money to support that, 
so I  don’t give a heck about the po liti cal situation, I  don’t give a heck 
about economic [situation].  Those  people, they  don’t exist for me 
 because I’m stuck in my world. Now, when you come back, you start to 
awake. You can see how the real life actually is, but  because every thing I 
went through to put myself in this life position and not in some other, I 
have a choice . . .  I  don’t see prob lems where most  people see them. I’m 
above the lethargy, which is in  every sphere of living in this country. It’s 
in  people’s heads. It’s on [the] street. It’s everywhere. That’s my benefit 
from [Af ghan i stan].
Like other long­ term workers, Kenan is suggesting  here that he picked up dif fer­
ent habits and ways of thinking  after interacting with American contractors and 
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uniformed personnel for years. But unlike most— who emphasize the challenge 
this imposes on readjusting to life back home—he insisted that this has enabled 
him to stay “above,” mentally, the precarious real ity of life in Bosnia. That said, 
 later in the interview he acknowledged that since he had only been home for six 
months when we talked, his optimism might fade over time.
Whereas Bosnians are generally pessimistic, Filipinos I spoke with tend to be 
optimistic that military work  will lead to a better life for their families. This is 
reflected in the ubiquity of references to the  future during interviews. Rowel, for 
instance, explained to me: “You can live [ here], but it’s not like— I mean every­
day life you can survive over  here but the  future of your  family you cannot reach 
over  here especially if you  don’t have a business. Our choice is  going out of the 
country, travel abroad. . . .  The only  thing I think is if I got to stay home the  future 
of my  family and my kids is, I cannot give them a good  future. That’s the feeling— 
that I’m  going to be strong, stay outside [working on the base]. Just keep putting 
in my mind the  future of my kids.” When I asked Mary about the conversation 
she had with her  daughters before leaving for Iraq she replied, “I told them that 
[it’s] for their  future. That’s right. ‘If I  don’t go  there, how you can finish your 
study?’ I told them, explained to them.” One person I talked with, named 
 Edwin, worked abroad for more than thirty years, twenty with construction 
companies in Saudi Arabia and eleven with military contractors in Iraq and 
 Af ghan i stan. He admitted that he felt homesick many times over the years, “But 
if you think about your  family it  will pass”  because “this is their  future. I am 
 doing this for them.”
Rowel’s comment about being able to “survive” in the Philippines, but a bet­
ter  future being out of reach for his  family if he did not decide to work abroad, 
reflects two widely held assumptions among Filipino military laborers I inter­
viewed. First, most  people who have pursued this line of work come from rela­
tively poor and underprivileged families and communities. Like Rowel, they view 
working abroad as the most realistic chance to escape life at the economic and 
social margins. This squares with Amanda Chisholm’s research on Nepalese se­
curity contractors who also see military work as a short­ term sacrifice that  will 
provide a better  future for their families.8 Second, education— specifically their 
 children’s education—is seen as the primary mechanism that  will allow families 
to move from the margins. The “good  future” that Rowel believes he has secured 
for his  children is based on their ability to go to a private school. As noted above, 
private schools are perceived as superior to public ones in the Philippines, both 
in terms of the education they provide and the opportunity for social advance­
ment that they afford. One useful way to think of this is a pro cess of converting 
economic capital to cultural capital, as suggested by the following analy sis of the 
link between remittances and private education in the Philippines:
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When economic capital is circulated back to the Philippines, it becomes 
convertible to other forms of capital. A common use of remitted funds 
is the education of siblings,  children or other relatives. In this way, eco­
nomic capital is converted into cultural capital, which forms an invest­
ment in the sense that such cultural capital  will, in the  future, itself yield 
economic capital. The ability to keep  children in school and, in par tic­
u lar, the ability to send them to prestigious schools or colleges, also con­
stitutes an impor tant conversion of economic capital into social capital 
as parents develop new networks among a higher status section of soci­
ety, and  children develop friendships, social ties, and alumni networks 
with a similarly elevated cohort.9
To return to the question that I began this section with, then, for Filipino mil­
itary laborers the money earned working on bases in Iraq and Af ghan i stan is not 
gone. Instead it has— ideally— been transformed into other forms of capital that 
 will benefit their families for generations to come. This optimism is based upon 
an understanding of life in the Philippines as socially stratified but also relatively 
fluid if one can acquire the educational and cultural capital necessary to achieve 
a middle­ class life. No such optimism exists for Bosnians, who have  little hope 
for a better  future due to pessimism about the suffocating “real ity of this life” in 
their country.
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On October 4, 2017, four SOF personnel  were killed in an ambush near Tongo 
Tongo, a remote village in western Niger. That the U.S. was carry ing out military 
operations  there— and subsequent revelations that roughly 800 personnel  were 
located in the country at the time— came as a shock to most Americans, includ­
ing members of Congress. In an interview with the NBC news show Meet the Press 
days  after the attack, South Carolina senator Lindsey Graham, one of the more 
knowledgeable members of Congress concerning foreign policy, admitted, “We 
 don’t know exactly where  we’re at in the world, militarily, and what  we’re  doing.”1
For  those who follow military contracting trends on the continent the large 
U.S. presence in Niger was less surprising. As noted in chapter 5, in early 2013 
the Air Force established a drone base in the capital, Niamey. Three years  later, 
according to contracting documents, the base had “a steady state of 200 to 250 
personnel a day.”2 In 2014 the Pentagon moved its airlift contract for casualty 
evacuation, personnel recovery, and search and rescue support from Burkina Faso 
to Niamey, indicating a significant shift of SOF forces to Niger.3 That same year 
the military announced that it planned to establish a second drone fa cil i ty in Ag­
adez, a desert city more than 700 kilo meters northeast of Niamey. Satellite imag­
ery indicates that the still­ under­ construction base  will have a footprint that is 
larger than Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti by area. Fi nally, in 2015 (or possibly 
 earlier) the U.S. established a secret SOF base next to the massive uranium mines 
in Arlit, near the Algerian border.4 As the designated contractor for AFRICOM 
 under the LOGCAP IV contract, Fluor has provided logistical support for each 
of  these bases. In fact, one can roughly track the inexorable increase in the U.S. 
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empire involves more than pushpins on a map. it is made up of  human 
activities— a network of situated practices that . . .  sculpt geogra-
phies in their own image.
— Josh Begley
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military’s presence in the country by monitoring the steady flow of positions ad­
vertised at the com pany’s LOGCAP job opportunities website.5 Less than two 
weeks  after the deadly ambush, for instance, Fluor advertised several new posi­
tions at the SOF base in Arlit, including a plumber, a vector control specialist, 
and a food ser vice supervisor.
This conclusion addresses the following question: How has the revolution in 
military logistics and contracting impacted the “American way of war”? Shortly 
 after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, military historian Max Boot wrote an influen­
tial article in the journal Foreign Affairs arguing that technological advances  were 
ushering in a “new American way of war.” Whereas before the U.S. relied on nu­
merical superiority in weapons and men to wear down opponents, Iraq— and 
the war in Afghanistan— demonstrated a new paradigm of warfare, one in which 
“quick victory with minimal casualties” and minimal cost is achieved through 
“speed, maneuver, mobility, and surprise.”6 Fifteen years on, with trillions of dol­
lars spent, thousands of U.S. personnel killed, tens of thousands more wounded, 
and hundreds of thousands of civilians dead, this prediction reads like a cruel joke. 
Instead of quick and painless victory, the “war on terror” grinds on, with  little 
change in policy other than an expanding roster of countries in which the U.S. 
now carries out operations.
Indeed, if  there is any defining characteristic to the American way of war in 
the pre sent day it is the unboundedness of its spatial and temporal registers.7 Spa­
tially, this “everywhere war” is nearly unlimited in its ambition, extending even 
to space and cyberspace. One of the more striking aspects of this spatial unbound­
edness is the ubiquity of “war in countries we are not at war with.”8 The growing 
U.S. military presence in Niger, and deadly vio lence that has accompanied it, is 
an excellent example of this ele ment of the everywhere war. The temporal coun­
terpart to everywhere war has received even more attention over the past two 
de cades, with Amer i ca’s continuous military operations since 9/11 variously 
characterized as “endless war,” “infinite war,” the “long war,” and the “forever war.”9 
Again, the dramatic increase in U.S. military presence in Niger in recent years, 
and Africa more generally, suggests that  there is no end in sight to Amer i ca’s spa­
tially and temporally unbounded wars. This too was acknowledged by Senator 
Graham in his interview with Meet the Press when he stated, “This is an endless 
war without bound aries and no limitation on time or geography.”
If U.S. military ambition— and hence its imperial foreign policy—is now de­
fined in large part by this peculiar combination of everywhere and forever war, 
what enables this state of affairs? Like Boot, most observers stress technological 
innovations. Technology is impor tant, and undoubtedly part of the story. But 
technological wizardry alone is an insufficient basis for prosecuting boundless 
war. As I have argued in this book, the ability of the U.S. to proj ect force, con­
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tinuously and on a planet­ wide scale, depends as well upon the im mense logisti­
cal resources it can bring to bear. This includes both logistics spaces, including 
its global network of bases, and logistics  labor, which is now drawn from around 
the world. Indeed, it is scarcely an exaggeration to argue that logistics “holds em­
pire together across time and space.”10
Moreover, technological changes— such as the ongoing “robotic revolution”— 
and increased reliance on foreign  labor (and foreign military surrogates) over 
the past de cade and a half, represent two sides of the same coin, which Martin 
Shaw has identified as “risk transfer war.”11 According to Shaw, this “new Western 
way of war” is centrally concerned with “managing relationships between po liti­
cal risks (to politicians) and life­ risks (to combatants and civilians)” by transfer­
ring them onto foreign socie ties and bodies.12 Above all this entails minimizing 
casualties to Western soldiers. The utility of drones and other robotic systems, 
such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal machines, in facilitating the transfer of risk 
by minimizing casualties on the battlefield is recognized.13 Less so is the concom­
itant risk transfer role played by contracting, though as noted in the introduc­
tion contractors constitute roughly one­ third of the casualties suffered by U.S. 
forces and its associated civilian workforce in CENTCOM since 9/11. In both 
cases the transfer of risk and casualties onto foreign bodies serves to dampen 
domestic opposition to the pursuit of boundless war.  Here, Cynthia Enloe’s 
observation that “the wheels of militarization” are “greased . . .  by popu lar in­
attention” is instructive, as few  things disrupt inattention to the U.S. military’s 
boundless wars more than the deaths of American soldiers.14 Put another way, 
the new American way of war is a product of changes in both technology and 
military contracting.15
It is necessary, then, to push back against accounts that argue that technologi­
cal innovations are heralding a new form of warfare in which machines reduce 
the need for military bodies and  labor.16 Emblematic of this view is Ian Shaw’s 
“predator empire” thesis. According to Shaw the spread of drone operations sig­
nals that “American empire is transforming from a labor­ intensive to a machine­
 or capital­ intensive system.” Consequently, “the new face of the U.S. military’s 
empire has far fewer  human  faces.”17 On the surface drones appear emblematic 
of innovations  toward small­ footprint, technologically sophisticated and machine­ 
intensive military operations that enable the U.S. to extend its reach across the 
globe. However, as my discussion in chapter 4 concerning the extensive logistics 
sites and  labors that supported a tiny drone outpost in Ethiopia from 2011 to 2015 
suggests, it is a  mistake to succumb to this machinic seduction. Instead, a more 
accurate observation is that “distributed and  labor intensive” drone operations 
“do not so much do away with the  human but rather obscure the ways in which 
 human  labor and social relations are configured.”18
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 There are further prob lems with the argument that technological advances are 
lessening the importance of military  labor. First, the drawdown of troops in Iraq 
and Af ghan i stan that Shaw highlights reflected, in large part, a strategic shift by 
the Obama administration away from war in the pursuit of regime change, oc­
cupation, and counterinsurgency to a focus on counterterrorism. This shift was 
clearly articulated in the 2015 National Security Strategy report which states: “We 
shifted away from a model of fighting costly, large­ scale ground wars in Iraq and 
Af ghan i stan in which the United States— particularly our military— bore an enor­
mous burden. Instead, we are now pursuing a more sustainable approach that 
prioritizes targeted counterterrorism operations, collective action with respon­
sible partners. . . .  Working with the Congress, we  will train and equip local part­
ners and provide operational support to gain ground against terrorist groups.”19 
Counterterrorism lends itself much better to smaller military footprints, especially 
when combined—as noted in the report— with a liberal reliance on military  labor 
contributed by local allies and proxies, such as the thousands of Chadian, Ma­
lian, Cameroonian, and Nigerien forces that are providing the bulk of troops for 
counterterrorism campaigns in the Sahel region of Africa. This point is echoed 
by Brigadier General Donald Bolduc, the former commander of SOCAFRICA, 
who observed in 2016 that effective counterterrorism operations on the continent 
are not pos si ble “without enablers, robust logistics, intelligence and airlift, host 
nation forces and international partners” (italics mine).20 The primary mission for 
many U.S. SOF operators in Africa, in fact, is training host country military forces. 
 These foreign “ human  faces” should not be discounted when accounting for the 
military  labor of U.S. empire. Moreover, strategic priorities change. If the U.S. 
initiates another war in the name of regime change—as has been advocated by 
some foreign policy hawks with regard to Iran or North  Korea—it  will once again 
be accompanied by large­ scale military deployments.21
Second, the U.S. military remains highly dependent on  labor, but this depen­
dence is obscured by reliance on foreign workers, whose presence, as this book 
argues, is typically overlooked. Shaw, for instance, cites the reduction of U.S. 
troops in Af ghan i stan to a “skeletal force” of nearly 11,000 by the end of 2014 as 
representative of the reduction in  labor accompanying counterterrorism opera­
tions.22  These troops, however,  were accompanied by more than 39,000 military 
contractors in the country at that time. The vast majority of  these  were TCN and 
Afghani laborers providing logistics support.23 Moreover, the nearly 4:1 ratio of 
contractors to troops in Af ghan i stan at the end of 2014 was substantially greater 
than any previous period in U.S. history. Nor was this a temporary anomaly. A 
year  later more than 30,000 contractors  were still supporting a U.S. force just short 
of 9,000 uniformed personnel.24 Furthermore,  these numbers do not represent a 
full accounting of the  labor involved in continuing military operations in Af ghan­
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i stan. Missing from the data are thousands of truck  drivers, stevedores, and 
ware house employees in Pakistan and vari ous Central Asian countries that move 
supplies to bases in Af ghan i stan, contracted airlift transporting workers and 
troops in and out of the country, and back office staff of military contractors and 
subcontractors working in office parks in Dubai. Indeed, what is most striking 
with regard to military operations since 9/11 is not a reduction in  labor that sus­
tains them, but its changing composition, from uniformed and American to ci­
vilian and foreign. In short, military  labor still animates U.S. empire, but where 
it comes from, and how it is obtained, has changed significantly over the past two 
de cades.
The parallel  here with  earlier Eu ro pean empires’ dependence on military  labor 
performed by colonial subjects to sustain their imperial proj ects is evident. Con­
sider the following observation: “A durable imperial system can afford to make 
only moderate military demands on the ‘home’ population. The British empire 
would never have been so popu lar for so long with the British public if  every sin­
gle soldier who policed that empire had to be recruited in Britain. Thus the In­
dian army helped to make the empire po liti cally palatable in Britain by reducing 
the demand for British soldiers and taxes.”25 This point holds true  today. Con­
tracting reduces the demands of Amer i ca’s pursuit of boundless war with regard 
to deployed personnel and casualties, thus reducing po liti cal risk. But whereas Eu­
ro pean empires primarily relied upon the  labor of colonized  peoples, the sources 
of the U.S. military’s present­ day workforce are more diverse. In addition to en­
rolling former colonial subjects like Filipinos, workers are drawn from sites of 
previous interventions, including the peacebuilding missions in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, and transnational cap i tal ist  labor mobility cir cuits, such as the massive 
 labor import regime established by Gulf petro­ states.
Tracing  these heterogeneous military  labor pathways, the histories that have 
produced them, and the vari ous po liti cal, economic, and social entanglements that 
radiate back out along them, reveals critical— but less­ known— contours of the 
U.S. military empire. It also bears witness to the fact that this empire is inextri­
cably linked with the lives of the global army of  labor whose thankless toil it 
depends on.
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1. MILITARY CONTRACTING, FOREIGN WORKERS, AND WAR
Epigraph: Julie Greene, “Builders of Empire: Rewriting the  Labor and Working­ Class His­
tory of Anglo­ American Global Power,” 3.
1. Embassy Kathmandu 2004.
2. Cam Simpson (2018) has chronicled—in beautiful and evocative detail— the lives 
and deaths of the Nepalese men, as well as repercussions on families back home and the 
subsequent de cade of lawsuits in U.S. courts. For more contemporaneous reporting on 
 these events, see Dhruba and Rohde 2004; Bell 2004; T. Miller 2006.
3. Schwartz 2010. A copy of the November 2008 report, as well as all of the other quar­
terly censuses, can be downloaded at http:// www . acq . osd . mil / log / ps / centcom _ reports 
. html. For a map of CENTCOM’s AOR, see http:// www . centcom . mil / images / stories / unified 
­ command _ world ­ map . jpg.
4. Roberts 2014. For a detailed analy sis of one USAID contractor proj ect in Af ghan i­
stan, see Attewell 2017.
5. Raw contracting census data from Iraq (see chapter 2), for example, indicates that 
the number of contractors in that country increased from nearly 137,000 in 3rd quarter 
2007 to more than 149,000 in 2nd quarter 2008, and reached its peak at the end of 2008. 
This corresponds with the peak in the average monthly number of U.S. military person­
nel in Iraq, which also occurred in 2008. For more on this, see Belasco 2009.
6. This graph is based on data from all published quarterly censuses beginning in 2008. 
Reports can be found at http:// www . acq . osd . mil / log / ps / centcom _ reports . html.
7. See, for example, Scahill 2008.
8. On sovereignty and the mono poly of vio lence, see Avant 2005; Verkuil 2007; Krah­
mann 2013; McFate 2015. On state control and accountability, see Singer 2008; Isenberg 
2008; Bruneau 2011. On effectiveness, see Dunigan 2011. On ethical and moral implica­
tions, see Pattison 2014; Eckert 2016. One significant exception to this policy­ centric 
focus is an emerging lit er a ture that examines the intersection of gender, race, and mascu­
linity with private security contractors. See, for example, Joachim and Schneiker 2012; 
Higate 2012a; Eichler 2013, 2014, 2015; Stachowitsch 2014; Chisholm 2014a; Chisholm 
and Stachowitsch 2017.
9. Runstrom 2010, slides 29–30.
10. Fontaine and Nagl 2010, 9. Fontaine and Nagl derived  these figures from an analy­
sis conducted by the U.S. Army’s Center for Military History on behalf of the Commis­
sion on War time Contracting for Iraq and Af ghan i stan (CWC), which is the most widely 
cited analy sis of war time contracting ratios.
11. This book focuses on logistics contracting by the U.S. military. Relatively less re­
search has been devoted to logistics contracting by its Western allies, though they too 
increasingly rely upon contractors to support overseas operations, such as the NATO­ led 
International Security Assistance Force mission in Af ghan i stan. This reliance on contrac­
tors is especially true of the United Kingdom, which has moved  toward the U.S. model for 
logistics contracting in recent years, as evidenced by the introduction of its own multiyear 
Contractor Logistics contract patterned  after the LOGCAP program in 2004. See Kinsey 
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and Erbel 2011. For more on UK and NATO logistics contracting, see Kinsey 2009; Cu­
sumano 2018.
12. Singer 2009; Gregory 2010.
13. Ferris and Keithly 2001.
14. Quoted in Farrand 2006, 1.
15. For more on the operational link between RMA and logistics outsourcing, see Er­
bel and Kinsey 2018.
16. On urban battlespaces, see Graham 2009. On war in borderlands and ungoverned 
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